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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Few would dispute that adult personal relationships characterized by caring and commitment
ought to be recognized and supported by the state because of their fundamental importance to the
well-being of individuals and communities. The law has long sought to identify these relationships by
reference to ties of blood, marriage or adoption. Contemporary norms, however, value adult
personal relationships by reference to their qualitative attributes rather than their formal legal status.
This shift in normative assumptions has accompanied profound shifts in Canadians’ living
arrangements over the course of the last thirty years. We have witnessed a decline in the marriage
rate, and sharp increases in the rate of non-marital cohabitation, divorce, non-marital and singleparent child rearing.
In seeking to recognize and support adult relationships of caring and commitment, the state
should be guided by the fundamental values of autonomy, privacy, equality and security that are
central to our constitutional and political traditions. Individuals should be free to choose whether
(and with whom) to form personal relationships. The state should promote relational autonomy by
avoiding policies that create pressure to abandon relationships of caring and commitment, or that
accord preferential status to certain categories of relationships defined without reference to their
qualitative attributes. The state ought to promote privacy by avoiding intrusion into peoples’ homes
and by avoiding legal rules that cannot be administered effectively without intrusive examinations
into peoples’ intimate lives. The state should promote equality by regulating adult personal
relationships by reference to qualities that are relevant to legitimate state objectives. The values of
equality and security require the state to seek to prevent exploitation and violence in personal
relationships. Finally, the value of security requires that the state put in place an identifiable and
accessible set of legal mechanisms to protect persons’ reasonable expectations formed in adult
personal relationships.
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Existing federal legislation seeks to recognize and support adult personal relationships of
caring and commitment through the pursuit of two legislative objectives. The first is the
establishment of legal mechanisms for the formation and dissolution of relationships. Currently this
is accomplished primarily through the law of marriage and divorce. The second objective is to
respond to the consequences of relationships characterized by emotional and economic
interdependence. This objective manifests itself at every stage of the evolution of adult personal
relationships. The state has an interest in supporting the integrity and security of ongoing
relationships of caring and commitment, and recognizing the value of caregiving provided in those
relationships. The state has an interest in protecting people from violence and exploitation to which
they may be particularly vulnerable in personal relationships. The possible existence of shared
economic interests arising in relationships of caring and commitment is relevant to many state
objectives in the context of the regulation of economic transactions. The economic and emotional
interdependence that characterizes adult personal relationships can be disrupted by a number of
events such as injury, illness, retirement, death or relationship break down. The state has an interest
in cushioning the impact that the sudden loss of emotional and economic support can have on
persons in relationships of caring and commitment, and in ensuring an equitable distribution of
economic entitlements on the break down of a relationship.
After summarizing existing federal statutes that employ relational terms, and categorizing
them according to the relational objectives they pursue, this report pursues the question of how to
reform these statutes to better support relationships of caring and commitment in a manner that
promotes the values of autonomy, privacy, equality and security. The report pursues this inquiry in
two stages. The first is to ask whether the relational objectives underlying particular statutory
schemes are still compelling. If not, the statutes should be repealed or the relational terms removed.
Second, if a statute is pursuing a legitimate relational objective, the question is how to go about
defining the relationships to which it ought to apply.
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The report identifies a number of laws that do not effectively pursue legitimate relational
objectives. These include the rules on spousal testimonial competence and compellability in the

Canada Evidence Act, the monthly allowance provisions of the Old Age Security Act, the anal
intercourse provision of the Criminal Code, and the insurable employment provisions of the

Employment Insurance Act. In each of these contexts, the current legislative provisions employing
relational terms do not pursue legitimate relational objectives in a coherent and compelling manner.
Other statutes employing relational terms require considerable revision to eliminate the dated or
questionable assumptions on which they rely. The guaranteed income supplement provisions of the

Old Age Security Act, the duty to provide necessaries of life provision of the Criminal Code, and the
wrongful death provisions of the Canada Shipping Act are examples of statutes in need of revision
to bring them into line with contemporary relational norms and expectations.
Federal statutes have employed a remarkable diversity of relational terms to accomplish their
objectives. These relational terms have been restricted, for the most part, to capturing relationships
flowing from ties of blood, marriage or adoption. Until recently, with the exception of pension and tax
statutes, federal statutes did not recognize persons cohabiting outside marriage. The Modernization

of Benefits and Obligations Act, passed shortly after the completion of this report, will add a new
definition - “common law partner” - to the vast majority of federal statutes. Cohabiting couples,
whether of the same or opposite-sex, will qualify as common law partners if they have lived together
for at least one year in a conjugal relationship. Conjugality is now the marker that determines which
unmarried, cohabiting adult couples will be included within federal legislation.
The report suggests that using conjugality as a central feature of the new relational definition
has a number of disadvantages. The distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships is
an elusive one. The conjugality requirement may result in inquiries into matters, such as the
partners’ sexual lives, that bear no relationship to legitimate state objectives. It may be possible to
draft a legislative definition that focuses solely and more effectively on the existence of the three
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qualitative attributes that are normally relevant to legitimate state relational objectives, namely,
shared residence, emotional intimacy and economic interdependence.
The Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act takes important steps forward in
implementing the principle of relational equality in federal statutes. It does so, however, by relying on
the ascribed or imposed status of “common law partner”. The values of equality, autonomy, privacy
and security could be significantly advanced if the state would broaden opportunities for persons
living together to choose to formalize their relationships. This could be accomplished in two ways: by
removing the legal bar to same-sex marriage, and by implementing a domestic partnership regime.
A careful analysis of the most recent judicial rulings on the equality rights in the Charter of

Rights and Freedoms reveals that the opposite-sex definition of marriage is vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. A government committed to meeting its constitutional obligations, and to
supporting relationships of caring and commitment, ought to remove the opposite-sex component
from the legal definition of marriage.
Whether or not the definition of marriage is amended in the future, the federal government
ought to enact a domestic partnership law that would enable any two adults to register as partners
for the purposes of federal laws and policies. Federal statutes should then be amended to accord
registered domestic partners the same package of rights and obligations as spouses. A domestic
partnership law would promote the equality and autonomy of non-conjugal cohabitants by permitting
them to subscribe to the full package of spousal/ partnership benefits and obligations from which
they are currently excluded. Even for unmarried couples living together in conjugal relationships, a
registered domestic partnership option would present a number of advantages over the current
legislative scheme: it would enable them to avoid the delays, uncertainties and potentially invasive
inquiries generated by the administration of the definition of common law partner.
A domestic partnership regime is the best way to address the needs of non-conjugal
cohabiting couples who are currently excluded from relational definitions in many federal statutes.
Whether non-conjugal cohabitants who choose not to register as partners ought to be included in
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federal laws can only be answered on a statute-by-statute basis. The report argues that there is a
compelling basis for subjecting non-conjugal cohabitants to the Criminal Code duty to provide each
other with the necessaries of life. Similarly, non-conjugal cohabitants should be included in the

Immigration Act’s sponsorship provisions. They should be able to invoke the testimonial privilege
that is attached to private communications by the Canada Evidence Act. On the other hand, to
accord to non-conjugal unregistered cohabitants a right to a division of pension entitlements, or a
right to claim pension survivor’s benefits, runs the risk of undermining their autonomy and
reasonable expectations.
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INTRODUCTION
Two individuals have lived together for fifteen years. They have a joint bank account to pay
for household expenses. They own their house jointly. They have a close emotional relationship.
They share meals. They care for each other through illness and other hardships. They attend social
and community events together. They have come to depend on each other for all of these things,
and have no intention of changing the interwoven nature of their lives. How should the state treat
these individuals? Should their relationship be included in rules regulating personal conflicts of
interest? Should they have a legal obligation to provide for each other’s basic needs? Should the
state provide financial relief if their household income is suddenly diminished as a result of disability,
retirement or death? Should their entitlement to income-tested social assistance be calculated by
reference to their combined household income? If their relationship breaks down, should they be
able to claim support from one another? If one of them dies, should the other be able to claim
benefits from the deceased’s employment pension plan or sue the person whose negligence was
responsible for the death?
The answer to these questions has long revolved around whether the two individuals were
married. If they were married, then they would be included within the broad web of legal regulation
that imposed benefits and obligations. If they were not married, they remained outside of this web of
regulation. Their entitlements depended on their status. Over the course of the last twenty-five
years, Canadian legislatures have increasingly included unmarried opposite-sex couples within laws
dealing with relational benefits and obligations, if they were cohabiting in a “conjugal” or marriagelike relationship. If two individuals were of the opposite sex, living in a conjugal relationship (which
although elusive, in the past seemed to involve amongst other factors, a sexual relationship), then
they would be entitled to a few federal benefits and obligations, but would have remained excluded
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from many others. If they were of the same sex, they would have been excluded. And if they were
not living in a conjugal relationship, they would be excluded.
With the impending enactment of Bill C-23, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations

Act,1 most benefits and obligations in federal statutes will be extended to both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples if they are living in a conjugal relationship. So, in the case of the two
individuals we described above who share so many aspects of their lives, they will be entitled to
most federal benefits and obligations if they have lived together in a conjugal relationship for at least
one year. If they are not living in a conjugal relationship, they will remain largely outside of the web
of federal regulation of adult personal relationships.2
Of course, all of this begs the basic normative question of whether the individuals should be
included. Should the legal regulation of adult personal relationships depend on marital or marital-like
status? Should individuals in non-conjugal relationships be more extensively included within this
legal regulation? What is the basis of the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal couples?
Should inclusion within the web of legal regulation depend on the existence of a sexual relationship?
As we will explore in considerable detail, it is no longer clear that the legal distinction between
conjugal and non-conjugal couples revolves around the existence of a sexual relationship. And if
sexual intimacy is not the defining feature of a conjugal relationship, then what is the basis of the
distinction? If two individuals live together in a relationship of economic and emotional
interdependence, should they be included within the web of legal regulation, regardless of their
“conjugal” status?

1

Bill C-23, An Act to modernize the Statutes of Canada in relation to benefits and obligations, 2 Sess., 36 Parl., 2000
(as passed by the House of Commons April 11, 2000). At the time of writing (May 2000), the Bill is being considered by
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. It is likely that the Bill will soon receive Royal
Assent. We have prepared this report on the assumption that the amendments proposed by Bill C-23 will soon be a
part of federal statutes.

nd

th

2

They may fall within federal statutes that employ terms such as “dependant” or “related person” and define those terms
broadly to include non-conjugal cohabitants. At the moment, federal statutes that embrace non-conjugal cohabitants
are relatively few in number. They do not include the most significant laws extending benefits and obligations in
relational terms.
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In this research paper, we explore all of these questions regarding the legal regulation of
adult personal relationships. In order to answer these questions, we address two fundamentally
interconnected issues: why should the state regulate these relationships, and which relationships
should be included within this regulation? In the past, the state has assumed an active role in
regulating the marital relationship. Over the years, this regulation has expanded to include a range
of other adult relationships. Many legal entitlements and obligations have been extended to
“marriage-like” relationships, that is, to unmarried persons living together in conjugal relationships.
At the same time, some legal entitlements and obligations have been extended to other familial or
familial-like relationships, including “dependants”, “near relatives” and “related persons”. The
growing web of legal regulation of adult personal relationships has embraced a wider range of
relationships in a haphazard, piecemeal fashion. While the expected passage of Bill C-23 (the

Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act) will bring a great deal more uniformity to the legal
treatment of unmarried cohabiting couples in the federal sphere, federal legislation continues to
approach non-conjugal familial relationships in an inconsistent manner. In some restricted spheres,
non-conjugal relationships may qualify for benefits and obligations. More often, and in particular
where direct financial support is at issue, these same relationships are not recognized.
There are a number of problems inherent in telling the story of the legal regulation of adult
personal relationships. First, the very language we have used to tell the story may prove to be part of
the problem. The terminology of “conjugal” and “non-conjugal”, which in many ways sets the terms
of the current debate, is increasingly problematic. As we discuss below, the distinction has always
been elusive and it may be that the legal coherence of the distinction is collapsing.
A second and related problem in telling the story of the legal regulation of adult personal
relationships is that the history of this regulation risks reinforcing marriage as the unstated norm
against which other types of relationships are described, evaluated and judged. The story suggests
that the process is one of expanding the concept of marriage or conjugality to include more and
more relationships; of beginning with marriage as the centre, and of gradually expanding the
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boundaries of marriage and conjugality to accommodate other types of relationships. It is a story in
which marriage remains the unstated norm, and in which the legal recognition of other types of
personal relationships is cast against this norm. It is a story that downplays the extent to which the
web of legal regulation already recognizes other types of relationships, and the extent to which these
relationships should also operate as a norm for describing and evaluating the range of adult
personal relationships that ought to be included within legal regulation.
In the first part of this paper, we consider the general question of why the state should
regulate adult personal relationships, and which relationships should be included within this
regulation. We examine the values and objectives that have shaped or should shape Canadian laws
regarding adult personal relationships. We map existing federal legislation onto these objectives,
and we explore the range of relational definitions - spousal and familial - that are used to advance
these objectives. In the second part of the paper, we consider whether these objectives are well
served by existing relational definitions, or whether these objectives would be better served by more
inclusive or more consistent definitions. We begin by examining various legal models for identifying
and defining adult relationships, including marriage, ascribed spousal/relational status, and
registered domestic partnership regimes. We then return to specific federal statutes and objectives,
and consider which of the models of inclusion is most appropriate in particular legislative contexts. In
our view, there is no one model that will satisfy all of the objectives of federal legislation. The
solution lies in finding the particular combination of legal options that best furthers legitimate state
objectives in particular policy contexts. Overall, however, we believe that federal legislation needs to
be far more inclusive of the broad range of adult personal relationships to better reflect and respect
the diverse ways in which Canadians structure their personal relationships. We will argue that the
enactment of a registered domestic partnership scheme, and the addition of registered domestic
partners to the web of federal regulation, is the best way for Parliament to address the problems of
under-inclusion that have not been addressed by Bill C-23.

PART ONE
IDENTIFYING VALUES AND OBJECTIVES
AND MAPPING EXISTING LEGISLATION
In the past, the State has assumed an active role in supporting the marital relationship. While
many legal entitlements and obligations have been extended over the years to unmarried cohabiting
couples, marriage – or a marriage-like relationship - has continued to be used as a proxy for the
kinds of relationships that the state should support. The general question that this section will
address is why has the state supported these marital and marital-like relationships? We examine
the objectives that have shaped Canadian laws regarding personal relationships in the past, and the
objectives that shape contemporary Canadian laws regarding personal relationships. We attempt to
categorize and map existing federal legislation that employs spousal or other relational definitions on
to the list of objectives we have identified. Finally, we illustrate the range of spousal and
relationships definitions contained within federal legislation, and highlight the range of adult personal
relationships that are excluded from these definitions.

I.

Values and Objectives of State Regulation
The traditional objective of the state regulation of adult personal relationships has often been

framed as one of promoting marriage. However, marriage over time has served many different
objectives. In this section, we begin with a brief history of the legal regulation of marriage, in which
we highlight these shifting objectives. We then turn to critique this ‘traditional’ objective, by
examining the demographic changes in the ways in which Canadians live in families, as well as the
legal and normative shifts that have accompanied these demographic changes. Finally, we examine
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the underlying values that ought to animate and shape the state regulation of adult personal
relationships. We conclude that marriage, although important, no longer captures the spectrum of
adult personal relationships deserving of state regulation.

A.

Traditional Objective of Promoting Marriage
1.

A brief history of marriage and its shifting objectives

The history of the legal regulation of family relationships in Canada has been, as with other
Western countries, a history of the centrality of marriage. English Canada inherited from England a
legal tradition within which the institution of marriage was privileged over other adult relationships,
and within which a range of status, rights and responsibilities were conferred exclusively on the
basis of marriage. However, over the centuries, marriage has served many different purposes.
In Roman law, marriage was considered a largely private matter, in which the law did not
involve itself to any great extent in the formation or dissolution of marriage. The status of marriage
did have important legal implications: “the existence or nonexistence of a marriage was indirectly
significantly for Roman law when it had to deal with problems involving membership of the ‘houses’
of which the body politic was composed, with succession on death, or with allocation of responsibility
for civil wrongs”.3 However, Roman law accepted whatever local custom recognized as marriage.
“Marriage was to the Romans, as to the other peoples of antiquity, a de facto rather than a de jure
matter, in the sense that two people were held to be married, not because they had gone through
any particular ceremony, but because they in fact lived together as man and wife. ”4 The dissolution
of marriage – a generally accepted practice - was similarly governed by custom. However, Roman
law did impose some limitations: it did not recognize marriages between free persons and slaves, or

3

Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law and Family in the United States and Western
Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) at 21.

4

Herbert Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman law, 2 ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1967) at 113.
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at one time, between senators and other upper class men and women of lower class or rank.5
Marriage, in Roman time, although not a formal legal institution, was very much about citizenship
and property.
The modern day legacy of the strict legal regulation of marriage began to take shape with the
rise of the Christian Church and its claim to exclusive jurisdiction over marriage. “The Church’s claim
to exclusive jurisdiction over marital causes and the novel idea that marriage was indissoluble were
both closely connected to the Christian idea that marriage is not only a natural institution and a
contract between the spouses, but also a sacrament, that is, a channel of divine grace.”6 The
dominance of the ecclesiastical courts over matrimonial causes was in place in England by the
middle of the twelfth century. Canon law established the indissolubility of marriage, and along with it,
a complex web of regulations for more precisely defining marriage.7 As part of the need to
accommodate and assimilate local custom, up until the Council of Trent, the Church recognized
both private, informal marriages and public, formal marriages. But, with the Decree Tametsi8 in
1563, a public ceremony in the presence of a priest became a condition for a valid marriage. During
this period, the legal regulation of marriage was very much about the Church’s struggle for political
and social control. While the religious and political objectives were obvious, the discrediting of
informal marriages was also animated by more secular concerns. The new merchant class,
increasingly concerned with controlling its wealth, was concerned with the financial implications of
clandestine marriages. Many wanted the Church to impose parental consent requirements. While
the Church did not impose this requirement, it did require that the ceremony now be public.

5

Glendon, supra note 3 at 21.

6

Ibid., at 23.

7

As Glendon explains, “Out of this need came the whole complex canon law system of marriage impediments and
prohibitions. The multiplication of these causes of nullity in turn led to the need to investigate in advance of marriage
whether impediments in fact existed and thus to the origin of the publication of the banns and the Church’s increasing
insistence on public marriage, as well as to the elaboration of procedures for declaring marriages invalid.” Ibid. at 27
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In continental Europe, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the jurisdiction over
marriage was slowly transferred from the Church to the secular authorities, who “simply took over
much of the ready-made set of rules of the canon law”. 9 While the Reformation rejected the idea of
marriage as a sacrament, its leaders did not question that marriage should continue to be governed
by Christian principles.10 The eighteenth century saw the rise of the codification of private law, which
included extensive regulation of the formation, dissolution and content of marriage, and the
emergence of compulsory civil marriage ceremonies.
In England, however, the Church of England maintained ecclesiastical jurisdiction well into
the nineteenth century. Informal marriages remained valid until the passage of Lord Hardwicke’s Act
in 1753,11 banning clandestine marriages, and setting out the basic requirements concerning the
validity of marriage (such as age, registration, witnesses). The English common law was concerned
with the integrity of the marital relationship. Through private law, it regulated entry into and restricted
exit from marriage, as well as the economic consequences of marriage. The doctrine of marital unity
established that “by marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protection and cover she performs every
thing”.12 The marital relationship was a highly integrated, economic relationship, in which the wife
was legally and financially dependent on her husband. Issues of status and filiation were crucially
important. The status of marriage conveyed not only social and legal status on spouses, but
conveyed social and legal status on children, controlling property and inheritance. Civil marriage was
only introduced in 1836 with the Marriage Act13 and judicial divorce introduced in 1857 with the

9

Ibid. at 31.

10

Ibid.

11

(U.K.), 26 Geo. II, c. 33.

12

Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

13

1836 (U.K), 6&7 Will. 4, c. 85.
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Matrimonial Causes Act.14 The mid-nineteenth century also saw the passage of the Married
Women’s Property Acts,15 whereby married women obtained independent legal personality.16

2.

Marriage in the 20th Century

By the turn of the twentieth century, Western family law systems had come to share,
generally speaking, a common set of assumptions. Domestic relations law was organized
around a unitary conception of the family as marriage-centred and patriarchal. Marriage was
treated as an important support institution and decisive determinant of the social status of
spouses and children. It was supposed in principle to last until the death of a spouse and was
terminable during the lives of the spouses, if at all, only for serious cause. Family solidarity
and the community of life between spouses were emphasized over the individual
personalities and interest of family members. Within the family, the standard authority
structure and pattern of role allocation decreed that the husband-father should predominate
in decision making and should provide for the material needs of the family. The wife mother
was to fulfil her role primarily by caring for the household and children. Procreation and childrearing were assumed to be major purposes of marriage, and sexual relations within
marriage were supposed to be exclusive, at least for the wife. Marriage, procreation, and
divorce were supposed to take place within legal categories. Illegitimate children had hardly
any legal existence at all.
Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law

The idea of the conjugal family was, in the words of James Snell, “triumphantly popular” at the
turn of the century in Canada. In terms that echo Glendon’s description quoted above, Snell has
described nineteenth century attitudes to the conjugal family as follows:
Conceived as a single, uniform institution, it incorporated virtually all the principles and ideals
valued by Canadian society. The family was the source of nurture and early training for
children, of comfort and nourishment for weary men at the end of hard day’s work, and of
17
women’s true fulfilment as wives and mothers.

Marriage was the cornerstone of this conjugal family and “it was seen to be equally at the heart of
Canadian society”. Church and state joined together in sanctioning this family through the wedding
ceremony.18 Marriage was the basic social and legal institution for reproduction and child rearing. It
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1857 (U.K.), 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85.

15

See for example, Married Women’s Property Act, 1882 (U.K.), 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75.
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This legal legacy provided the framework for English Canadian law. At the time of Confederation, jurisdiction over
marriage was divided. The federal government was given jurisdiction over marriage and divorce under section 91(26)
of the British North America Act (now Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 2,
No. 5) and the provinces given jurisdiction over the solemnization of marriage under section 92(12). At the time,
divorce was available either through an act of parliament, or where available, through divorce courts, although the law
varied from province to province.
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James Snell, In the Shadow of the Law: Divorce In Canada 1900-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).
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Ibid. at 22.

10

was based on an ideology of separate spheres and a sexual division of labour, within which women
were allocated the role of wives and mothers, “naturally” responsible for domestic labour and child
care. Men, by contrast, as husbands and fathers, were responsible for supporting their families.
As Snell observes, this conjugal family “was central to contemporary images of the Canadian
nation”. And it was intricately tied to the project of building a national identity, and the role of the
state was unquestionably one of supporting this family. “Over a vast area of authority and
responsibility the state or its agents acted in various ways to support the idea of the family in its
tangible expressions. Most directly these state activities were aimed at the maintenance of a
particular form of the family: a family household dependent largely on men’s wage labour and on
women’s domestic labour.”19 Policies on women and the family explicitly promoted this family and its
sexual division of labour. Beginning as early as the 1880s, and continuing into the twentieth century,
labour laws restricted women’s labour force participation, thereby enforcing women’s dependency
on the family (though not for immigrant and working class women, who were encouraged into
domestic employment).20 Mother’s allowances, initiated in 1916 in Manitoba, were designed to
assist married women with dependent children who had been widowed or whose
husbands were unable to provide for their families. It was designed to recognize that women who
had been “appropriately” dependent on a male breadwinner would then fall into desperate economic
circumstances upon the death, or disability of the breadwinner.21 Its objective was to encourage
these women to stay in the home, rather than enter the work force.22 It was in effect seen as a
“salary” rather than charity, and it excluded unwed or deserted mothers.23 Family law at this time
began to impose and enforce more private financial obligations, to ensure that male breadwinners

19

Ibid. at 28.

20

See Jane Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy: 100 Years of State Intervention in the Family (Toronto: Women’s Press,
1992).
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did not abandon their dependants. As Ursel observes, “[t]he introduction of each new welfare
measure was invariably coupled with more detailed laws of familial obligation to ensure that state
support would only be received when all available family resources had been exhausted. For
example, we find a coincidence of the enactment of the Old Age Pension Act with the introduction of
Parents Maintenance Acts and a tightening up of maintenance laws with the introduction of Mothers’
Allowance.”24
The regulation of marriage was very much about promoting and stabilizing a particular family
form, based on a male breadwinner and a female dependant responsible for childcare and domestic
labour. While debates around reform to the law of divorce often articulated the objectives of legal
regulation in terms of promoting the stability of marriage, and the integrity of the marital relationship,
the objective of supporting this particular family form as the basic social unit was never far from the
surface. The emergence of the social wage, as well as a range of state welfare policies, were all
informed by and served to reinforce this conjugal family and its sexual division of labour.
In the post-World War II period, the role of the state expanded, with the rise of the Keynesian
welfare state, and the extension of a range of public benefits. The post-war period witnessed a rise
in government expenditures on social services (education, health, social security) and income
security programs (family allowances, old age security, and unemployment insurance). This period
was also a time when the male breadwinner, nuclear family ideal appeared triumphant. Despite the
founding principles of universality, many of the social programs of the era reflected this male
breadwinner model. For example, in Canada, one of the earliest universal programs, the Family

Allowance Act,25 was designed as a wage subsidy program and recognized women as mothers and
homemakers. However, the Keynesian welfare state only took root in Canada in the mid 1960s, with
the passage of several major federal statutes, including the Canada Pension Plan,26 the Canada
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Ibid., at 143.
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S.C.1944, c.40.
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S.C. 1964-65, c.51.
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Assistance Plan,27 and the guaranteed income supplement amendments to the Old Age Security
Act.28 Many of these programs were informed by assumptions about the male breadwinner model.
For example, the Canada Pension Plan originally included a gender-specific widow’s pension. It was
based on the assumption that married women were financially dependent on their breadwinner
husbands.29 Further, if the widow remarried, she would lose her pension on the assumption that she
would then be financially dependent on her new husband. Pension plans for federal public
employees had similar survivor’s benefits for widows, similarly premised on the male breadwinner
model.30
In this male breadwinner model, marriage operated as a proxy for relationships of
dependency. Marriage was assumed to involve a homemaker wife, who was financially dependent
on her wage-earning husband. As such, marriage was assumed to be a highly economically
integrated unit, in which wives provided unpaid domestic services and child care, and husbands
provided financial support.
In current debates, particularly around same-sex marriage, much of this history disappears.
The state interest in marriage is said to relate to reproduction, social stability, and social support.31
Justice La Forest, in his dissenting opinion in Egan v. Canada, provided a classic statement of the
“traditional” approach to marriage:
Suffice it to say that marriage has from time immemorial been firmly grounded in our legal
tradition, one that is itself a reflection of long standing philosophical and religious traditions.
But its ultimate raison d’etre transcends all of these and is firmly anchored in the biological
and social realities that heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most
children are the product of these relationships, and that they are generally cared for and
32
nurtured by those who live in that relationship.
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But, the promotion of marriage has, since “time immemorial” served many state objectives.
Citizenship, property, religion, and supporting a sexual division of labour have all been important
objectives in the legal regulation of marriage. Through this century, the objective of state regulation
of marriage has been to support a particular family form, based on the assumptions of a male
breadwinner and female dependency. As a result of these assumptions, marriage has been used in
state regulation as a proxy for relationships of dependency.

B.

Critique of the Traditional Objectives: Demographic, Legal and
Normative Changes
In this section, we trace the demographic, legal and normative shifts that have together

undermined the ‘traditional’ state objectives of promoting marriage.

1.

Demographic Shifts

The last 30 years have witnessed major demographic shifts in the ways in which Canadians
live in families, emphasizing the increasing diversity of adult relationships. This shift, referred to as a
second demographic transition, is part of a trend in many Western countries, characterized by a
growth in non-marital cohabitation and single parent families, a decline in marriage, a rise in divorce,
and an increase in non-marital child bearing. While the majority of Canadians still live in families (in
1996, 84% lived in families), the nature of those family settings has changed. In 1996, 45% of all
families were married couples with children, 29% were married couples without children, 15% were
lone-parent families, 6% were common law couples with children, and 6% were common law
couples without children.33
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Statistics Canada, 1996 Census: Marital Status, Common-law Unions and Families: (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1997).
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(a)

Non-marital conjugal relationships

Amongst the most dramatic changes in the second demographic transition is the growth in
non-marital cohabitation. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of persons living in
non-marital conjugal relationships, or what are often called common law relationships. Since the
early 1980s, the number of persons living common law has tripled. There were approximately
2,000,000 such persons in 1995, as compared to 700,000 in 1981. These couples living common
law represented less than 1 in 16 couples in 1981, but had grown to nearly 1 in 6 by 1995. In 1995,
14% of all Canadian couples were living common law, more than twice the proportion they
represented in 1981 (6.3%). The number is even higher in Quebec where 25% of all couples were
living common law. The increase in common law couples with children is also striking, growing from
2.2% in 1981 to 5.5% in 1996.34
There has been a corresponding increase in the number of first unions that are common law
unions. Between 1970 and 1974, 17% of all first unions were common law. Between 1980 and
1984, the percentage of first unions that were common law had grown to 41%, and between 1990
and 1995, that number had increased again to 57%. The number again is higher in Quebec where
80% of all first unions are common law.35

(b)

Marriage

Over the past two decades, there has been a decrease in marriage rates. In 1991, there
were 6.4 marriages per 1000 population, compared with 7.8 in 1981 and 8.9 in 1971. Marriage rates
increased between 1986 and 1989, probably reflecting the changes to the Divorce Act,36 and the
ability of divorcing couples who were now able to remarry once their divorces were finalized. Since

34

See Anne-Marie Ambert, Divorce: Facts, Figures and Consequences (Ottawa: Vanier Institute of the Family) online:
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1990, marriage rates have again been decreasing. In 1995, the marriage rate was 5.4 per 1000
population.37 Between 1995 and 1999, the total number of marriages in Canada has declined
slightly, from 160,251 to 154,750.38

(c)

Divorce

As Table One indicates, there was a dramatic increase in divorce following the enactment of
the first federal Divorce Act in 1968,39 liberalizing the grounds of divorce, and another increase
following the enactment of the new Act in 1985. However, divorce rates appeared to have peaked by
1987, and there has been a slow but steady decrease in the total number of divorces since that
time.

TABLE ONE
DIVORCE RATES IN CANADA40
Year

# of divorces

Rate per 100,000
pop.

1961

6,563

36.0

Rate per
100,000 married
couples
N/A

1968

11,343

54.8

N/A

1981

67, 671

271.8

1,174.4

1985

61,980

253.6

1,103.3

1987

96,200

362.3

1,585.5

1993

78,226

N/A

N/A

1995

77,636

262.2

1,221.9

1997

67,408

N/A

N/A

37

Statistics Canada, 1996 Census, supra note 33.

38
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(d)

Lone-Parent Families

In 1996, lone-parent families constituted 15% of all families, an increase from 11.3% in 1981.
The vast majority of lone-parent families are headed by women (83% in 1996). The majority of lone
parent families were divorced or separated.41 Both women and men are less likely to be lone parents
as a result of the death of a spouse (20.6% and 23.4% respectively in 1991) compared to the 1950s
and 1960s, when almost two thirds of lone parents were widows or widowers. In 1991, 20% of
female lone parents were never married, as compared to approximately 8% of male lone parents.42

(e)

Non-Marital Childbearing

In 1981, common law couples with children represented only 1.9% of all Canadian families.
In 1996, the percentage of common law couples with children had grown to 5.5.%.

(f)

Women’s Labour Force Participation

Since the mid-1960s, there was a been a dramatic increase in women’s labour force
participation. Table Two illustrates the increase in married women’s labour force participation.

TABLE TWO
WOMEN’S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
Year

% of married women in labour
force

1941

5%

1961

22%

1985

55%

1991

61%

(source – Statistics Canada, Vanier Institute of the Family)

41

In 1991, 32.5% of female lone parents were divorced, and 24.6% were separated. Similarly, 33.6% of male lone
parents were divorced, and 37.6% were separated.

42

Colin Lindsay, Lone-Parent Families in Canada (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992).
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In 1967, 61% of Canadian families had a sole male breadwinner, and only 34% had a dual
male/female income earners. By 1990, only 15% of Canadian families followed a sole breadwinner
model, and 62% had dual male/female income earners.43 Further, women’s incomes now contribute
to an increasingly significant proportion of families’ incomes. In 1992, wives’ earnings represented
31% of the income of dual income families, up from 29% in 1989, and 26% in 1967.44 Women’s
participation in the labour market has become essential to the living standard of families.45 The male
breadwinner model of the so-called traditional family no longer characterizes the vast majority of
Canadian families.

2.

Legal Shifts

Prior to the passage of Bill C-23, the federal regulation of adult personal relationships in
many statutory contexts has relied exclusively on marriage as the marker of the relationships
relevant to the accomplishment of policy objectives. Change arrived first in the context of pension
survivor’s benefits. As early as 1919, and accelerat50ing in the 1950s, the marital model was
expanded to include unmarried cohabiting couples in pension laws. In 1955 the Defence Services

Pension Continuation Act46 created the discretion to deem a cohabitant to be a surviving widow if
she could establish that she had “been maintained” and “publicly represented by the contributor as
the spouse of the contributor”47 for seven years. The Canadian Forces Superannuation Act48 of

43

Vanier Institute of the Family, supra note 34 at 74.

44

Statistics Canada, 1995

45

The relative importance of wives earnings to total family income is also reflected in the percentage of Canadian
families whose income would fall below the low income cut-off points but for wives earnings. In 1992, 4% of Canadian
families were below this line. If women’s earnings were subtracted, 16% of these families were fall below the line.
Statistics Canada, Ibid. at 88.
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S.C. 1955, c.28.
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For 7 years, if either the deceased or claimant were married to someone else, or for an unspecified ‘number of years’ if
neither was married.

48

S.C. 1959, c. 21, s.12(4).
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1959 and the Canada Pension Plan49 of 1966 contained similar provisions permitting common law
spouses to apply for widows’ pensions. The model for the recognition of common law relationships
was highly restrictive. It was explicitly gender based, as a response to the assumed dependency of
women within conjugal opposite-sex relationships. In contrast to the rights of a married spouse, it
was up to the Minister’s discretion whether or not a common law spouse had a claim. The onus was
placed on the claimant to establish the facts supporting the existence of the common law
relationship and a lengthy period of cohabitation was required.
Further expansion in the legal definitions of spouse did not occur until the mid-1970s, when
the growth in non-marital cohabitation began to be accompanied by a gradual shift in the law’s
approach, with a growing recognition of marriage-like relationships. With the increase in cohabitation
outside of marriage, the law began, in an ad hoc manner, to extend rights and responsibilities to
couples who lived in marital-like relationships. Private family law was slowly expanded in the 1970s
and early 1980s, through the extension of support obligations and provisions dealing with
cohabitation agreements,50 and the use of the principles of unjust enrichment to address the
property rights of cohabiting couples.51 In the context of provincial social assistance, the state has
always taken an expansive approach to the recognition of spousal relationships in an attempt to
reduce welfare costs by privatizing support obligations.52 At the federal level, the rights of cohabiting
couples were extended and strengthened in pension statutes. In 1975, for example, the spousal
allowance was introduced in the Old Age Security Act, and the definition of spouse included
“persons of the opposite sex who have lived together for at least one year and have publicly

49

Canada Pension Plan, S.C. 1964-65, c. 51, s. 56. Remarriage terminated a widow’s right to a pension. Married
spouses’ claims were also terminated by seven years of cohabitation with a common law spouse.

50

Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c.2.
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Soc. 127, 143 (arguing that especially for sole support mothers on social assistance, “the definition of ‘spouse’ has
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Osgoode Hall L.J. 589, 616.
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represented themselves as man and wife”.53 In the 1970s Parliament made modest improvements to
the limited recognition of common law spouses in the Canada Pension Plan and employment
pension statutes.54 However, apart from pension statutes, all federal laws explicitly addressing the
legal status of spouses, including those enacted in the 1970s and 1980s, continued to be restricted
to married spouses.55
In the 1990s, the definition of spouse again began to undergo further expansion, again in an

ad hoc manner. In 1992, the Pension Benefits Division Act56 was enacted, and included oppositesex couples who cohabited in a conjugal relationship for not less than a year.57 In 1993, the
definition of spouse in the Income Tax Act was similarly expanded beyond husbands and wives to
include opposite-sex conjugal cohabitants who have lived “with the taxpayer in a conjugal
relationship” for at least a year.58 Likewise, in 1995 the Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances

Act59 was amended to entitle opposite-sex conjugal cohabitants to survivor’s benefits.60
These reforms eroded the law’s role in privileging marital over non-marital relationships. At
the same time, they continued and indeed consolidated the law’s role in privileging marriage-like or
conjugal relationships over non-conjugal relationships. The objectives underlying the extension of
rights and responsibilities to unmarried cohabitants was to recognize that these relationships were,
in some respects, functionally similar to marital relationships, particularly in relation to economic

53

R.S. 1970, c.O-6; as amended 1974-75-76, c. 58. This definition also applied for the Guaranteed Income Supplement
under the Act.
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dependency. These laws were often based on a recognition and promotion of the same sexual
division of labour, recognizing the economic dependency of women within opposite-sex
relationships.
More recently, the expansion of spousal definitions has been propelled by the constitutional
norms of equality, which require the removal of discrimination on the basis of marital status. 61 This
process of expanding the legal recognition of spousal-like relationships also began to be applied to
same-sex couples, as constitutional norms increasingly required the removal of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. In 1997, the British Columbia government introduced legislation
extending legal rights and responsibilities to same-sex relationships. In 1999, the Ontario
Government introduced Bill 5, which extended to same-sex couples the same legal rights and
responsibilities as cohabiting opposite-sex couples.62 In 1999, the federal Public Sector Pension

Investment Board Act, amended the definition of survivor in a range of federal pension laws to
remove the opposite-sex requirement.63 And earlier this year, the federal government introduced Bill
C-23, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, which will significantly extend the rights and
responsibilities of both opposite and same-sex unmarried cohabitants.

3.

Normative shifts

The demographic and legal shifts have been accompanied by a change in contemporary
attitudes towards the regulation of adult relationships. There appears to be an emerging consensus
in Canadian society that it is no longer legitimate to promote or discourage adult relationships solely
on the basis of their status or formal attributes. Promoting relationships simply on the basis of status

61

In 1986, Ontario enacted the Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c.64, an omnibus bill that
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(marital over non-marital, legitimate over illegitimate, biological over social, heterosexual over
homosexual) is increasingly seen as violating the basic values of individual autonomy, privacy,
equality and security.

(a)

Public Opinion

There has been a significant shift in public attitudes towards non-marital unions over the last
decade, particularly in attitudes towards same-sex couples. A brief review of public opinion polls
over the last decade demonstrates this change.
In 1992, a Gallop poll found that 61% of Canadians opposed same-sex marriages.64 In 1994,
a Gallop poll found that more than 40% of Canadians under the age of 40 now support same-sex
marriages compared with only 29% of the general population. 65 In 1996, an Angus Reid poll found
that a slight majority of Canadians were in favour of same-sex marriage, with 49% of Canadians in
favour of gay marriage and 47% opposed.

66

Fifty-five percent of respondents supported the

granting of same-sex benefits.
In 1998, an Angus Reid poll conducted for the Department of Justice found that 74% of
respondents supported the extension of federal social benefits to gay couples, 69% wanted them to
receive income benefits and obligations, and 67% said same-sex couples should receive the same
benefits and obligations as common law couples.67 However, only 59% of respondents supported
calling gay couples “spouses”. The support for legally calling same-sex couples "spouses" is most
likely to come from Canadians between the ages of 18 to 34 years. The lowest levels of support
tended to be among those over 54 years. The poll also found that 71% of respondents believed that
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benefits and obligations should not depend on spouse-like relationships but on any relationship of
economic dependency.68
An Angus Reid survey carried out between May 25-30, 1999 found that 53% of Canadians
believed that same-sex couples who wish to marry should be allowed to do so.69 The survey further
found that 63% of Canadians believed that gays and lesbians should be entitled to spousal benefits.
Overall, the public opinion polls demonstrate shifting attitudes towards same-sex couples.
Within less than a decade, a significant majority of Canadians now believe that same-sex couples
should be entitled to the same spousal benefits as opposite-sex couples. And a slight majority of
Canadians now support same-sex marriage. Moreover, the polls generally confirm that attitudes are
generational, with younger Canadians increasingly supporting equal treatment and the right to marry
for same-sex couples. While this issue does not appear to be have been tracked in the same way
over time, the 1998 Angus Reid Poll reveals that Canadians are overwhelmingly in favour of
extending benefits and obligations on the basis of economic dependency, rather than spousal
status. Canadian attitudes towards the legal regulation of adult relationships seem to be moving
away from exclusive support for the traditional family towards a broader approach that includes
same-sex couples, as well as non-conjugal relationships. Canadians appear to be increasingly
committed to freedom of intimate association, and to the equal treatment of and respect for the
choices that individuals make in structuring their personal relationships.

(b)

Constitutional Values

Canadian’s commitment to freedom of intimate association and to the equal treatment and
respect of the choices that adults make in structuring their personal lives now finds constitutional
expression. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms70 as well as federal and provincial
human rights codes, prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status and sexual orientation.

68
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We focus here briefly on two leading decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that deal with
marital status discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination, respectively.
In Miron v. Trudel,71 the Supreme Court of Canada, by a 5-4 majority, held that a definition of
spouse that excluded unmarried cohabiting couples for the purposes of recovering insurance
benefits following a motor vehicle accident violated section 15 of the Charter. The majority opinions
of McLachlin J. and L’Heureux-Dubé J. held that section 15 prohibited discrimination against
unmarried couples. In McLachlin J.’s view,
…discrimination on the basis of marital status touches the essential dignity and worth of the
individual in the same way as other recognized grounds of discrimination…. Specifically, it
touches the individual’s freedom to live life with the mate of one’s choice in the fashion of
one’s choice. This is a matter of defining importance to individuals. It is not a matter which
72
should be excluded from Charter consideration…

Moreover, she said, the exclusion of unmarried cohabiting couples may perpetuate the historic
disadvantage that they have suffered, ranging “from social ostracism through denial of status and
benefits”.73
Justice McLachlin further observed that “of late, legislators and jurists throughout our country
have recognized that distinguishing between cohabiting couples on the basis of whether they are
legally married or not fails to accord with current social values or realities.”74 She noted that many
statutory provisions have extended rights and responsibilities to unmarried couples. Finally, the
Court considered and rejected the argument that because marriage is “a good and honourable
state”, it cannot be a ground of discrimination. According to McLachlin J., the issue is “not whether
marriage is good”; rather, the issue is whether “marriage can be used to deny equal treatment to
people on grounds which have nothing to do with their true worth or entitlement.” Quoting
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s comments in Mossop that “It is not anti-family to support protection for non-
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traditional families”, she added that “One might equally say it is not anti-marriage to accord equal
benefit of the law to non-traditional couples”.75
In the section 1 analysis, the Court concluded that the exclusion of cohabiting couples was
not rationally connected to the objectives of the legislation of sustaining families when one of their
members is injured in an automobile accident. According to the Court, marital status was not a
reasonably relevant marker of individuals who should receive benefits in the event of any injury to a
family member in such an accident. The majority concluded that this was one of those “exceptional
cases” in which the appropriate remedy was “reading in”. It incorporated the subsequent
amendments to the definition of spouse made to the Insurance Act76 into the standard automobile
insurance policy.
The Court’s ruling in Miron suggests that laws dealing with spousal relationships that exclude
unmarried couples are likely to violate section 15 of the Charter. They will be unconstitutional unless
the government can demonstrate that the limitation of these laws to married spouses is necessary to
accomplish pressing and substantial objectives. Court rulings since Miron have declared
unconstitutional laws that exclude common law couples from the right to seek spousal support and a
division of family property pursuant to provincial family laws.77 Throughout the 1990s, a number of
law reform commission reports across the country have similarly concluded that the continuing
exclusion of common law couples’ right to seek a division of property from provincial family laws is
not justifiable.78 While restricting rights and responsibilities to married couples was at one time the
unquestioned norm of legal regulation, such restrictions have now come to be viewed as
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discrimination on the basis of marital status, and a violation of the basic value of the equality of
intimate relationships.
In M. v. H.,79 the Supreme Court of Canada, in an 8-1 majority, held that section 29 of the
Ontario Family Law Act80 discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by excluding lesbians and
gay men from the right to seek spousal support from a same-sex partner with whom they have
cohabited. Applying the framework for equality analysis that a unanimous Court had elaborated in Law
v. Canada,81 the principal majority judgement of Cory and Iacobucci JJ.82 found that section 29 of the
Act violates the human dignity of lesbian and gay couples. According to the Court, the exclusion of
these couples promotes the view that these couples are “less worthy of recognition and protection. It
implies that they are judged to be incapable of forming intimate relationships of economic
interdependence as compared to opposite-sex couples.” Moreover, “it perpetuates the disadvantages
suffered by individuals in same-sex relationships and contributes to the erasure of their existence.”83
In the section 1 analysis, the majority held that the exclusion was not rationally related to the
objectives underlying the spousal support provisions in Part III of the Family Law Act, which they
characterized as dealing equitably with the economic needs of persons in interdependent relationships
and the alleviation of claims on the public purse by privatizing the costs of family break down.84 The
majority concluded that the appropriate remedy was to declare section 29 of the Act to be of no force
and effect. The declaration was suspended for six months to enable the Ontario legislature to consider
ways of bringing this provision, and other laws, into conformity with the equality rights in the Charter.85
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In M. v. H., the Supreme Court recognized the “conjugal nature” of same-sex relationships.
For the first time, the Court recognized that same-sex relationships are entitled to the same rights
and responsibilities as other unmarried conjugal relationships. While the Court was careful to restrict
its conclusions to the legal provision at issue, its analysis had far-reaching implications. The Court
noted that the legislatures may now wish to turn their attention to the numerous other statutes that
rely on similar definitions of spouse.86 The immediate implication of the decision was clear – the time
had come for governments to recognize same-sex couples on the same basis as other unmarried
conjugal couples.
Together, Miron and M. v. H. are powerful statements of the normative commitment to
freedom of intimate association and to the equal treatment and respect of the choices that adults
make in structuring their personal lives. The once legitimate government objective of privileging the
marital relationship over all other relationships in the allocation of rights and responsibilities has
given way to a recognition of the different ways in which individuals enter into adult personal
relationships. The constitutional decisions are both limited, however, to individuals living in
“conjugal” or “marriage-like” relationships. These decisions do not speak to the question of
extending recognition, rights and responsibilities to non-conjugal couples. While Canadian attitudes
towards non-conjugal couples appear to also be changing, this normative shift has not yet witnessed
a similar judicial or constitutional affirmation.
The House of Commons has recently expressed its normative commitment to equality and
freedom of intimate association in conjugal relationships by passing Bill C-23. In her comments on
second reading of the Bill, Minister of Justice Anne McLellan stated that Bill C-23 is intended to bring
federal statutes into line with the core Canadian values of “fairness, tolerance, respect and equality”.
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She added that the Bill is designed to respect the principle of equal treatment of persons living in
“recognized stable relationships”,87 that is, “committed common law relationships”.88

4.

Conclusion

The demographic shifts in Canadian family structures are increasingly reflected in legal and
normative shifts about the legal regulation of adult relationships. The second demographic
transition, with its significant increase in unmarried cohabitation, has brought with it changed
attitudes towards the once privileged marital relationship. While marriage remains an important
social and normative institution for many Canadians, increasingly its status as the exclusive legal
model for adult personal relationships is being abandoned. Other conjugal relationships – unmarried
opposite-sex relationships and same-sex relationships - are increasingly seen as deserving of equal
respect and recognition. There appears to be an emerging consensus that the values of equality
and autonomy, which we explore in greater detail in the section that follows, require that the legal
regulation of adult relationships reflect the changes in how individuals enter into their intimate
personal relationships.
The legal regulation of non-conjugal relationships, however, is still relatively uncharted
territory. On the one hand, as we will discuss in greater detail below, a broad range of non-conjugal
relationships are already recognized in law. There appears to be considerable public support for the
idea that benefits and obligations should depend on the existence of relationships of economic
dependency, whether or not the relationships are conjugal or marriage-like.89 The recent debates
around Bill C-23 seem to have brought this issue squarely onto the public agenda. The Minister of
Justice, in introducing the Bill for first reading, acknowledged that “there is some interest in
extending benefits and obligations to individuals in other relationships of economic and emotional
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interdependence”. On the other hand, appropriate state approaches to the regulation of nonconjugal relationships remain a relatively unexplored issue, and there is less evidence available that
traces the demographic, legal and normative changes relevant to their situation.
In the section that follows, we explore the values and objectives that ought to animate state
regulation of adult personal relationships. We believe that many of these values and objectives have
resonance for both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships alike. Just as marital status is no longer
considered an appropriate marker for the distribution of benefits and obligations, we believe that
there is reason to seriously interrogate the extent to which conjugality remains the appropriate
marker.

C.

Identifying Legitimate Values and Policy Objectives
1.

Values

We have identified five norms or values that ought to guide state regulation of adult personal
relationships. The first is that relationships characterized by caring and commitment ought to be
recognized and supported by the state because of their fundamental importance to the well-being of
individuals and communities. The value of supporting and recognizing relationships of caring and
commitment provides the underpinning of all legitimate state policies regarding adult personal
relationships. It is, in that sense, the primary value at play in this context. The other four values
come into play once it is accepted that the state ought to support and recognize relationships of
caring and commitment. Those four values are autonomy, privacy, equality and security. The state
ought to respect individuals’ ability to choose whether or not to form personal relationships.
Likewise, absent violence or exploitation, choices of intimate companions and decisions regarding
the termination of personal relationships ought not to be interfered with by state policy. The state
ought to avoid examinations into the details of people’s intimate lives. Protecting a zone of personal
privacy free from state intrusion is essential to creating a sense of security and trust in which
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relationships of caring and commitment can flourish. In regulating adult personal relationships, the
state must respect legal prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status and sexual
orientation. And, finally, the state should seek to advance the security of persons in adult personal
relationships by protecting their reasonable expectations.
We believe there is little controversy about the relevance of these values. Indeed, the value
of supporting relationships of caring and commitment is so self-evident that it is frequently taken for
granted in the literature. It is a value that unites commentators across disciplinary and political
divides. Much of the contemporary debate about family policy in liberal democratic societies is
concerned with how best to accomplish the support of relationships of caring and commitment while
at the same time respecting basic individual rights to autonomy, privacy, equality and security. While
debates about appropriate family policies frequently generate passionate disagreements, the
disputes are not about the relevance of the five values we have identified. They are, rather, about
the implications of these values for the design of particular state policies in the face of dramatic
social and economic changes. Before turning to that topic, we will outline the dimensions of each of
the five values.

(a)

Caring and Commitment

There is a growing consensus that the value of adult personal relationships should be
measured by their qualitative attributes, that is, by the roles they perform, the needs they meet, and
the satisfactions they provide. Giddens has observed that intimacy has been restructured in
contemporary liberal democracies, such that adults now form and maintain personal relationships
“for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another”.90 In a context of
diverse and fluid domestic arrangements, the value of personal relationships must be located in
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actual practices and functions rather than formal legal attributes. As Silva and Smart have stated,
“what a family is appears intrinsically related to what it does”.91
What do adult personal relationships do that makes them worthy of state support and
recognition? The answer lies in the provision of care in committed relationships. We all have needs
to be known and to know another, to be loved and to love another, to be cared for and to care for
another. Caring for another entails a bundle of roles, such as attending to emotional and sexual
needs, sharing resources to provide food, shelter and clothing, and providing personal services and
guidance to dependants such as children or disabled, elderly or infirm adults. For these needs to be
met, patience and devotion over an extended period of time is required. As Nussbaum has argued,
people “have interpersonal needs that are a deep part of who they are, and these needs are
frequently best satisfied in relationships involving commitments that bind the parties over time”.92
Relationships of caring and commitment are a public as well as a private good. Living
together in economically and emotionally supportive relationships “enhances people’s mental health,
makes them more resilient in times of crises, allows them to pool their resources and thus makes
them more productive”.93 If the state is attendant to the value and consequences of interdependent
relationships, people will be more willing to make enduring commitments that promote the public
good.94

(b)

Autonomy

The freedom to choose whether and with whom to form intimate relationships is a
fundamental interest in free and democratic societies. Karst has persuasively argued that “it is the
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choice to form and maintain an intimate association that permits full realization of the associational
values we cherish most”, namely companionship, caring, commitment, intimacy and selfrealization.95 American constitutional doctrine has long recognized that “freedom of personal choice
in matters of family life” is a fundamental liberty interest.96 Choice and personal autonomy are
fundamental values in Canadian constitutional doctrine as well. As Iacobucci J. stated in R. v.

Salituro,
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom guaranteed in
the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and their own
philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will express
themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursue.
These are all examples of the basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will
respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid
97
subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life.

The value of associational autonomy requires that the state not directly interfere with adults’
freedom to choose their intimate relationships. The state should also refrain from indirect
interference with associational autonomy by, for example, creating financial pressure to abandon
personal relationships of caring and commitment, or by according privileged status to certain kinds
of relationships defined without reference to their qualitative attributes. The value of autonomy does
not mean that the state should never intervene in personal relationships. Rather, the state has an
obligation to ensure that autonomy is exercised in a manner that does not compromise the equal
right to autonomy of others. For example, the state must take steps to protect adults who are
vulnerable to economic exploitation or physical/emotional abuse in personal relationships.
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(c)

Privacy

Privacy is also recognized as a fundamental value in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence.
It is, in the words of the Supreme Court, “at the heart of liberty in a modern state.”98 Privacy includes
the right to be free from unwarranted state intrusion or interference in intimate spaces,99 and the
right to control the dissemination of confidential information.100
Relationships of caring and commitment are built on intimacy, candour and trust.101 In our
intimate relationships we reveal thoughts and actions that we are not willing to reveal to others.
Without the confidence that our intimate thoughts and acts will not be discovered by others,
personal relationships cannot flourish. In Charles Fried’s words,
To respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard ourselves as the objects of love,
trust, and affection is at the heart of our notion of ourselves as persons among persons, and
privacy is the necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as oxygen is for
102
combustion.

At its most basic level, privacy requires that the state avoid physical intrusions into the
“bedrooms of the nation". It also requires that the state avoid, wherever possible, the establishment
of legal rules that cannot be administered effectively without intrusive examinations into, or
disclosure of, the intimate details of adult personal relationships. Sexual behaviour, in particular,
should not be subject to state investigations in the absence of a compelling objective. Sexuality is an
especially intimate and sensitive aspect of many personal relationships. Moreover, absent violence
or exploitation, the presence or absence of a sexual relationship, or the nature of adults’ sexual acts,
are matters that normally bear no relationship to legitimate state objectives. At the same time,
privacy rights are not absolute, and must give way, with appropriate safeguards, to compelling
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objectives such as the state interest in prosecuting and preventing crime, including the commission
of crimes involving domestic violence and abuse.

(d)

Equality

The guarantee of equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms requires that the state
accord equal concern and respect to adult personal relationships regardless of personal
characteristics such as the sexual orientation or marital status of the participants. Relationships can
be treated differently according to their actual qualitative characteristics. However, the Supreme
Court has held that neither marital status nor sexual orientation can be used as a proxy for
identifying relationships characterized by emotional and economic interdependence.103 Thus, state
laws and policies cannot in their purposes or effects impose disadvantages on persons living in
relationships of caring and commitment outside of marriage. Bill C-23, the Modernization of Benefits

and Obligations Act, will implement the principle of relational equality in most federal statutes by
eliminating the differences in the legal status of married spouses and persons living in conjugal
relationships outside of marriage. However, Bill C-23 does not seek to achieve an equitable
distribution of burdens and benefits between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. Rather,
conjugality will replace marriage as the proxy employed in federal statutes to identify relationships
characterized by caring and commitment. This approach is inconsistent with the value of equality if
conjugality does not in fact accurately identify the qualitative attributes of adult personal relationships
that are relevant to particular state policies.
The value of equality also requires the state to be attentive to the potential for exploitation
within personal relationships. This value is reflected in the profound changes that have occurred in
the law of family property in recent decades, and in the increasing attention legislators have paid to
the prevention of domestic violence. Finally, the value of equality requires an equitable distribution of
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burdens and benefits within particular categories of relationships. This means that laws must employ
definitions that are capable of consistent interpretation and enforcement.

(e)

Security

Relationships of caring and commitment meet important human needs. They can create a
sense of ordered, stable well-being in people’s lives. At the same time, the combination of emotional
and economic interdependence in personal relationships can give rise to distinct forms of
vulnerability. Intimacy, privacy and interdependence are features that in combination afford unique
opportunities for violence and exploitation to which the state must respond. Moreover, the state
ought to recognize and respond to the fact that people structure their lives around a set of
reasonable expectations formed in adult personal relationships. It is common for people to rely on
an expectation that they will continue to benefit in the future from the economic and emotional
support provided by their personal relationships. Persons in committed relationships reasonably
expect the state to provide them with some protection in meeting their needs if they suffer a sudden
deprivation of emotional and economic support. The state should promote the security of persons in
intimate relationships by providing them with an identifiable and accessible set of legal protections to
respond to these reasonable expectations.
The value of security does not mean that the state should respond to all expectations formed
in personal relationships. It should, however, respond to 'reasonable' expectations determined by an
objective standard: what would a reasonable person have expected in all of the circumstances?
Such mixed objective/subjective evaluations are common in Canadian law. For example, in Pettkus
v. Becker, Dickson J. (as he then was) held that a common law partner’s reasonable expectations
entitled her to a share of family property:
….where one person in a relationship tantamount to spousal prejudices herself in the
reasonable expectation of receiving an interest in property and the other person in the
relationship freely accepts benefits conferred by the first person in circumstances where he
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knows or ought to have known of that reasonable expectation, it would be unjust to allow the
104
recipient of the benefit to retain it.

The reasonableness of individual expectations is a factor of shifting social norms: individual
expectations are normally considered reasonable when they converge with social norms, and not
reasonable when they diverge. If societal expectations have not crystallized, or cannot be
ascertained, an objective/subjective inquiry can still be useful in identifying reasonable expectations
that ought to be protected by the state.

II.

Mapping Existing Federal Legislation
In this section, we categorize and map on to a list of legitimate policy objectives existing

federal legislation that employs spousal and relational criteria. In this mapping, we will also provide
examples of the variety of spousal and relational definitions. This section will not consist of a
detailed examination of all federal legislation. We will attempt to at least identify all relevant federal
statutory provisions and allocate them to the appropriate objective. From the group of statutory
provisions allocated to each objective, we will choose at least one for a detailed examination that will
explore its origins and rationale.
The employment of relational criteria in federal legislation is ubiquitous. There are literally
hundreds of statutory provisions that regulate adult personal relationships by employing terms such
as spouse, family, dependant, cohabitant and, if Bill C-23 is enacted, common law partner. At first
glance, this vast array of legislative activity does not appear to adhere to any organizing principles.
On closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that the state is seeking to accomplish two
basic objectives in regulating adult personal relationships. The first is to enable people to form and
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to dissolve a legally recognized relationship. Currently this is accomplished primarily through the law
of marriage and divorce. The second and very broad objective is to take into account the multitude
of consequences that accompany relationships characterized by emotional and economic
interdependence. This general objective manifests itself in a number of particular ways at every
stage of the evolution of adult personal relationships. Each of these objectives, illustrated in Table
Three, will be described below.

TABLE THREE
STATE OBJECTIVES BY STATUTE
Objectives
1. Regulating the formation and dissolution of
adult, personal relationships

Examples of Federal Statutory Provisions
Marriage (Prohibited Degrees)Act
Divorce Act, s.8 (grounds for divorce)
Criminal Code, ss.290, 293 (bigamy & polygamy)

2. Responding to the Consequences of
Emotional and Economic Interdependence
in Adult Personal Relationships
2(a) Supporting the Integrity and Security of
interdependent relationships

Immigration Act, Employment Insurance Act s.29,
Evidence Act. s.4(3), Criminal Code, s.23(2)

2(b)

Recognizing the potential existence of
shared economic interests in family
relationships (conflict of interest)

Bank Act, Business Development Bank of Canada Act,
Canada Cooperatives Act, Cooperative Credit
Associations Act, Canada Corporations Act, Insurance
Companies Act, Unemployment Insurance Act

2(c) Tailoring financial benefits or penalties to
recognize the consequences of economic
dependence or interdependence

Canada Pension Plan , Old Age Security Act, Pension
Benefits Standards Act, Public Service Superannuation
Act (and other superannuation Acts)

2(d) Recognizing the Economic Costs and Value
of Caregiving Relationships

Income Tax Act

2(e) Compensation for the loss of, or harm to,
emotional and economically interdependent
relationships

Canada Shipping Act, s.645 , Carriage by Air Act, Canada
Labour Code, s.210(1), Judges’ Act. s.40(1)

2(f) Preventing violence or abuse during and
upon the break down of personal
relationships

Criminal Code

2(g) Restructuring financial relationships on the
break down of adult personal Relationships

Divorce Act, s.15.1, 15.2, s.16
Canada Pension Plan
Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance
Act, Garnishment Attachment and Pension Diversion Act,
several superannuation Acts
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Since at the time of writing (May 2000) there are no apparent obstacles to the imminent
enactment of Bill C-23, we will describe federal statutory provisions in this section as if they have
already been amended by the Bill.

A.

Regulating the formation and dissolution of adult, personal
relationships
An important objective of federal legislation has been the regulation of the formation and

dissolution of adult personal relationships. To be more specific, federal legislation has regulated to a
limited extent the entry into and, to a much greater extent, exit from marriage. As long as the
institution of marriage itself is an important legal category, it is important that there be clear rules
about the formation and dissolution of this institution.

1.

Entry into Marriage

The Constitution Act, 1867, s.91(26) gives the federal government power to make laws in
relation to “marriage and divorce”.105 Section 92(12) gives provincial legislatures the power to make
laws in relation to “the solemnization of marriage in the province”. As a result of this division of
power, the federal Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over the essential validity of marriage and
the recognition of foreign marriages, while the provinces have jurisdiction over the formal validity of
marriage.106 The essential validity of marriage deals with the capacity of individuals to enter into a
marriage. At common law, the parties must be of the opposite sex, have the ability to consummate
the marriage, have reached a minimum age, not be related too closely by consanguinity or affinity,
not be parties to a prior existing marriage, and have the capacity to consent. Until this year,
Parliament did not see any need to enact legislation incorporating these common law rules. Section
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Constitution Act, 1867, UK, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.
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See Bushnell, “Family Law and the Constitution”, (1978) 1 Can. J. Fam. L. 202; Katz, “The Scope of the Federal
Legislative Authority in Relation to Marriage”, (1975) 7 Ott. L. Rev. 384.
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1.1 of Bill C-23 will become the first definition of marriage to appear in a federal statute. It will define
marriage “as the lawful union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others”.
The federal government has rarely exercised its jurisdictional authority over marriage. There
is no comprehensive federal legislation governing the essential validity of marriage, nor the foreign
recognition of marriage. In 1990, the federal government enacted the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees)

Act107 that reformed the rules of consanguinity and affinity. This law replaced the Marriage Act108
which had included a more extensive list of prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity. All other
aspects of the essential validity of marriage continue to be governed by common law, and in
Quebec, by the Civil Code.109
The bigamy and polygamy prohibitions in the Criminal Code110 are also part of the legal
regulation of marriage, and can be seen to form part of the set of rules governing the formation of
marriage. While the common law rules of marriage provide that a marriage is void if there is a prior
existing marriage, the Criminal Code makes entrance into a bigamous or polygamous marriage a
criminal offence. Section 290 provides that any one who commits bigamy – defined as going through
a form of marriage while married to another person – commits an offence. Section 293 provides that
every one who practices or enters into any form of polygamy, or any kind of conjugal union with
more than one person at the same time, commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding five years.

2.

Exit from Marriage

In striking contrast, the federal government has fully exercised its constitutional jurisdiction
over divorce. The Divorce Act, 1968 was the first nation-wide, uniform law of divorce. The Act
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S.C. 1990, c.46.
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R.S.C. 1970, c.A-14.
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Civil Code of Quebec Art. 1260 C.C.Q.

110

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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recognized marital offence grounds111 and non-marital offence grounds for divorce.112 The 1968 Act
was replaced by the Divorce Act 1985, which now provides for divorce on the basis of permanent
marital break down. The Divorce Act 1985 sets out the jurisdiction over divorce113, the grounds and
bars to divorce114, as well as the procedural requirements and legal effects of divorce (effective
dates, appeals, filing of affidavits). It also includes provisions for spousal and child support, which
are discussed in further detail in the next section on restructuring financial relationships, as well as
provisions for the resolution of child custody and access.115 The regulations issued pursuant to the

Divorce Act 1985 provide the establishment and operation of the Central Registry of Divorce
Proceedings in Canada. 116
As long as the institution of marriage itself is a relevant legal category, it is a legitimate
government objective to establish clear rules about the formation and dissolution of this institution.
To the extent that legal rights and responsibilities are created on formation and/or dissolution of
marriage, there needs to be rules regulating the status of marriage and divorce. These rules protect
the interests and choices of the parties themselves, by providing a clear demarcation of the
termination of the status of the relationship. It also protects the interests of third parties, whose
economic interests might be affected by the existence or non-existence of a marital relationship.

111

Section 3 set out the matrimonial offence grounds for divorce, including adultery, sexual offences, bigamy, and
cruelty.

112

Section 4 introduced the idea of permanent marriage break down as the basis for divorce, including imprisonment,
living separate and apart for 3 years, desertion for 5 years, and addiction to alcohol.
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Section 3 sets out the jurisdiction of courts, and the rules for resolving potential jurisdictional conflicts in divorce
proceedings.
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According to section 8, there are three grounds for establishing this permanent marital break down – living separate
and apart for one year, adultery and cruelty.
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The provisions dealing with child custody and access, which regulate parent-child relationships, are beyond the
scope of this paper, which is focusing on the regulation of adult relationships.
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Divorce Act, 1985, Regulations, SOR/86-600.

40

B.

Responding to the Consequences of Emotional and Economic
Interdependence in Adult Personal Relationships
The second general objective of state regulation is to take into account the consequences

that accompany relationships characterized by emotional and economic interdependence. This
objective manifests itself in a number of particular ways at every stage of the evolution of adult
personal relationships. The state has an interest in supporting the integrity and security of ongoing
relationships of caring and commitment, and recognizing the value of care-giving provided in those
relationships. The state has an interest in protecting people from violence and exploitation to which
they may be particularly vulnerable in personal relationships. The possible existence of shared
economic interests arising in relationships of caring and commitment is relevant to many state
objectives in the context of the regulation of economic transactions. The economic and emotional
interdependence that characterizes adult personal relationships can be disrupted by a number of
events such as injury, illness, retirement or death. The state has an interest in cushioning the impact
that the sudden loss of emotional and economic support can have on persons in relationships of
caring and commitment. In the discussion that follows, we will canvass the range of federal statutes
that seek to accomplish each of these objectives.

1.

Supporting the Integrity and Security of Interdependent Relationships

An important objective of federal legislation is the preservation of the stability and integrity of
on-going interdependent relationships. Federal legislation includes a broad range of provisions
that attempt to remove obstacles to the continuation of adult personal relationships.117 For example,
the Employment Insurance Act118 includes a statutory provision that is designed to protect and
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E.g, s.5(1.1) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29 (providing that a non-citizen who resides abroad with a
Canadian spouse or common law partner who is working for the government abroad will have that time abroad
counted as a day of residence in Canada for the purposes of the Act); s.16.20(2), s.24.10(4), s.26.20 and s.35(1) of
the Young Offenders Act R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 (taking into account an offender’s proximity to family in making orders in
relation to imprisonment, secure custody, conditional supervision or temporary release); s.264(2) of the Criminal
Code (criminal harassment includes threatening behaviour to any member of a person’s family); s.423(1) of the
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promote the integrity of ongoing interdependent relationships. Section 29 sets out the kinds of
factors to be taken into account in determining whether there was “just cause” for voluntarily leaving
or taking leave from employment, for the purposes of eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits.
The factors in section 29(c) include an “obligation to accompany a spouse, common law partner or
dependent child to another residence” and an “obligation to care for a child or a member of the
immediate family.”119 As a result of section 29(c), an individual will not be deprived of the benefits to
which they would otherwise be entitled by virtue of leaving a job in order to accompany their spouse
or dependent child, or to care for a child or immediate family member. The provision removes a
significant financial disincentive to the maintenance of ongoing relationships of interdependency or
dependency.
We have chosen to examine in greater detail two examples of laws with the objective of
preserving and promoting the integrity of ongoing relationships: immigration law that allows for family
reunification, and evidence laws that place restrictions on spousal testimony in criminal trials.

(a)

Immigration

The Immigration Act, 1976120 has a number of provisions that recognize and promote the
integrity of ongoing interdependent relationships. The Act states that a foremost objective of the Act
is to “facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent residents with their close

Criminal Code (criminal intimidation includes violence or threats of violence to one’s spouse, common law partner or
children, or intimidation of a relative); s.810 of the Criminal Code (information can be sworn if a person fears for the
safety of his or her spouse, common law partner or child); s.210(1) of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2
(entitles employees to bereavement leave upon the death of immediate family members); s.2 of the Witness
Protection Program Act, S.C. 1996, c. 15 (entitles persons to protection if they are vulnerable to threats because of
their relationship with a witness); s.28 Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (criteria for selecting
penitentiary include accessibility to an inmate’s home community and family); s.71(1) of the Corrections and
Conditional Release Act (inmates entitled to have reasonable contact, including visits and correspondence, with
family and friends); s.17(1) and s.116(1) of the Correctional and Conditional Release Act (family leave entitlements).
118

S.C. 1996, c. 23.
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Ibid., s.29 as amended by Bill C-23, s.108.
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S.C. 1976-77, c. 52.
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relatives abroad”.121 The Act allows for the immigration of “accompanying dependants”.122 An
individual who is granted an immigration visa may bring to Canada their “accompanying
dependants”, defined as a spouse, and any unmarried son or daughter under 19 years of age. Any
individual granted admission as a refugee may similarly bring their dependants. The objective of
these provisions is to protect the integrity of close family relationships, by allowing an individual who
is eligible to immigrate to Canada to bring his or her spouse and/or children.
Bill C-23 does not contain any amendments to the Immigration Act. The definition of spouse
within the categories of accompanying dependants and family class therefore remains unchanged to
date. Spouse is currently defined in the Immigration Regulations, 1978 as “the party of the opposite
sex to whom that person is joined in marriage”123 The family class also allows a person to sponsor
their fiancé.124 Unmarried couples do not qualify as accompanying dependants, nor do they qualify
as members of the family class, unless they are engaged to be married. 125 While most opposite-sex
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Immigration Act, Part I, s. 3(c). See Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 1997 II. 854 “Family Reunification
is one of the key objectives of the Immigration Act whereby Canadian citizens and permanent residents may sponsor
applications for permanent residence in Canada made by relatives who are members of the family class.”

122

Immigration Regulations, 1978, as amended SOR/98-544, Section 2, defines “accompanying dependant” as “a
dependant of that person to whom a visa is issued at the time a visa is issued to that person for the purpose of
enabling the dependant person to accompany or follow that person to Canada, and if the dependant is the spouse of
that person, who is at least 16 years of age at the time the visa is issued.”
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SOR/85-225. Section 4(3) provides that the family class does not include a spouse who entered into the marriage
primarily for the purpose of gaining admission to Canada as a member of the family class and not with the intention of
residing permanently with the other spouse. (SOR/93-44, s. 4(F))
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Fiancée – para 6(1)(d) of the Regulations provides that a visa officer can issue a visa to a member of the family class
in the case of fiancée if
(a) the sponsor and the fiancée intend to reside together permanently after being married, and did not become
engaged primarily for the purpose of the finance gaining admission to Canada as a member of the family class,
(b) there are no legal impediments to the proposed marriage of the sponsor and the fiancée under the laws of the
province in which they intend to reside, and
(c) the sponsor and the fiancée have agreed to marry within 90 days after the admission of the fiancée. (SOR/97-145,
s. 3)
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In 1997, the definition of spouse was amended for the purposes of sponsorship. The definition was changed to
include a person of the opposite sex who is cohabiting with the sponsor in a conjugal relationship at the time the
sponsor gives an undertaking, having cohabited with the sponsor for a continuous period of at least one year.
SOR/97-145 However, this expanded definition only applies for the purpose of the provisions relating to the cosigning of an undertaking. The See Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, C. Gaz. 1997 II. 854 stated that the
amendments are intended to bring the definition of spouse in line with the government’s obligations under the
Charter: “for the purposes of co-signing provisions only, a spouse includes a common-law spouse who is defined as a
person of the opposite sex who has cohabited with the sponsor in a conjugal relationship for at least one year. This
provision has been included to conform to the equality provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”
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couples would be able to opt to marry in order to qualify,126 same-sex couples have no similar
option.
While the Immigration Act was not included in Bill C-23, the Minister of Citizenship has since
introduced Bill C-31, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.127 Although the Bill is primarily
designed to toughen the immigration and refugee system,128 the Minister has promised supporting
regulations in the coming months that will expand the “family class”. According to the Backgrounder
Paper, this will include “modernizing the definition of family class to ensure consistency in
accordance with government legislation under consideration – family class will include spouses,
common-law and same-sex partners.”129
The Immigration Act also allows Canadian citizens and permanent residents to sponsor
family members for immigration to Canada. A Canadian citizen or permanent resident can sponsor a
member of his or her “family class” for immigration to Canada. The objective of these family class
sponsorship provisions is similar to the accompanying dependant provisions, namely, to recognize
and protect the integrity of family relationships, by facilitating the reunion of family members. The Act
has a broad definition of family class that allows an individual to sponsor a broad range of relatives
under the family reunification program. “Family Class” is currently defined in section 1(5) of the
Regulations (SOR/93-4) as including:

However, the Statement also recognizes the privitizing objectives that underlie the amendment: “…new measures to
strengthen sponsorship will help protect immigrants from being abandoned by their sponsors as well as protect
municipal, provincial and federal governments from being financially responsible for supporting family class
immigrants who cannot support themselves”. This amendment had the effect of broadening the category of persons
who can assume responsibility for the support of immigrants within the family class, but does not expand the category
of the family class itself. As such, it is as much about reducing welfare dependency through the privatization of
support obligations as it is about maintaining the integrity of family relationships.
126

Some opposite sex couples may have difficulty, due to a prior existing marriage, particularly if they are immigrating
from a country with highly restrictive divorce laws.
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Bill C-31, 2
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Through for example front-end security screening of all claimants, clarified grounds for detention, fewer appeals to
delay the removal of “criminals”, and the suspension of refugee claims for those charged with crimes until the courts
have rendered a decision.
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Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Opening the Front Door Wider” Backgrounder #2, News Release 2000-09. The
amendments to the family class promised by the Minister of Citizenship will also broaden the definition of dependant
child by increasing the age from 19 to 22.
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Session, 36 Parliament, 48-49 Elizabeth II, 1999-2000.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the sponsor’s spouse;
130
the sponsor’s dependent son or dependent daughter;
the sponsor’s father or mother;
the sponsor’s grandmother or grandfather;
the sponsor’s brother, sister, nephew, niece, grandson or granddaughter, who is an
orphan and is under 19 years of age and unmarried;
(f) the sponsor’s fiancée;
(g) any child under 19 years of age whom the sponsor intends to adopt and who is
(i) an orphan
(ii) an abandoned child whose parents cannot be identified
(iii) a child born outside of marriage who has been placed with a child welfare authority
for adoption
(iv) a child whose parents are separated and who has been placed with a child welfare
authority for adoption
(v) a child one of whose parents is deceased and who has been placed with a child
welfare authority for adoption, or
(h) one relation regardless of age or relationship to sponsor where sponsor does not
have a spouse, son, daughter, father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother,
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece who is a Canadian citizen, permanent resident
or whose application for landing the sponsor may otherwise sponsor.

The rules for family class sponsorship thus recognize a broad range of relatives for potential
sponsorship.
Finally, the Immigration Act also makes provision for a class of applicants known as
“assisted relatives”. “Assisted relatives” is part of the independent class of immigration applications
(which also includes skilled workers). Independent immigrations are assessed against a series of
selection criteria131. In addition, assisted relatives are awarded five bonus points.132 Assisted
relatives also need a guarantee of financial assistance from their Canadian relatives if they require

130

Prior to 1988, the family class consisted of parents and their dependent children up to 21 years of age and unmarried.
In July 1988, family class was expanded to include all unmarried children, regardless of their age. In 1993, the
regulations were amended to reduce the family class to encompass only those unmarried children who were 19 years
of age or under, and those children over 19 years who were dependent, either as a result of being students or of
having some kind of physical or mental disability. The amendments to ‘family class’ promised by the Minister will
again revise the age from 19 to 22 years.

131

Points are allocated according to a range of factors including Education, Specific Vocational Preparation, experience,
occupation demand, arranged employment or designated occupation, demographic factor, age, knowledge of English
and French languages and personal suitability.

132

Prior to 1993 assisted relatives were awarded more bonus points (15 for brothers, sisters and married children; ten
bonus points for more distant relations. The bonus points made it relatively easy for assisted relatives to achieve the
total 70 point pass mark. Thus large numbers of applicants could qualify as assisted relatives because of the bonus
points they received. An amendment to the Regulations, SOR/93-44, January 1993 reduced the bonus points
awarded to assisted relatives.
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help in settling. Assisted relative is defined as “a relative other than a member of the family class,
who is an immigrant and is an uncle or aunt, a brother or sister, a son or daughter, a nephew or
niece or a grandson or granddaughter of a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who is at least
19 years of age and who resides in Canada”.133
The Immigration Act thus recognizes a broad range of familial relationships. While the Act
provides differing degrees of protection to these different relationships, the objectives of all three
categories (accompanying dependant, family class and assisted relative) are similar. The Act seeks
to recognize and protect the integrity of family relationships, by facilitating the reunion of family
members.

(b)

Canada Evidence Act - Spousal Competence, Compellability and Privilege

Section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act134 has been justified on the grounds that it is designed
to protect and promote the integrity of ongoing interdependent relationships. To understand the
effects of section 4, it is necessary to begin with an understanding of the common law rules it
preserves with some alterations.
At common law, the accused person and his or her spouse are incompetent to testify. There
are exceptions to the rule that enable spouses to testify for the prosecution if the charge involves an
injury or threat of injury to the spouse or a child,135 or in any case in which the spouses are
irreconcilably separated.136 Section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act has added a number of other
exceptions to the common law rule of incompetence. Section 4(1) makes an accused person and
his or her spouse competent to testify for the defence. Sections 4(2) and 4(4) make spouses
competent and compellable to testify for the prosecution when the accused is charged with specified
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SOR/93-44 1993.
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
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J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman and A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths,
1999) at 699, 701.
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R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3. S.C.R. 654.
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offences, including sexual offences against children or youth, vagrancy, prostitution-related
offences, sexual assault, polygamy, and various crimes of violence involving victims under the age
of 14 years. These sections preserve the common law rule that spouses are not competent to testify
for the prosecution with the exception of the listed offences, in which case they are both competent
and compellable. In other words the statutory scheme seeks to accomplish “in a rough fashion” a
balance between “the competing interests of the need for the court to receive relevant information
about a crime and the need to foster marital harmony and to protect a confidential relationship.”137
Even if a spouse is testifying because he or she is competent pursuant to the common law
exceptions or the statutory exceptions in s.4(2) or s.4(4), s.4(3) sets out a privilege that permits a
witness spouse to refuse to answer questions about communications with his or her spouse during
the marriage.

2.

Recognizing the Potential Existence of Shared Economic Interests in
Relationships of Caring and Commitment.

A wide range of federal statutes recognize that the economic and emotional
interdependence that accompanies many adult personal relationships may give rise to shared
interests or conflicts of interest at odds with the accomplishment of federal legislative objectives. For
example, the premise of a trial by jury is that the Crown and the accused are entitled to have the
evidence assessed dispassionately by impartial representatives of the community. Actual impartiality
and the appearance of impartiality are both necessary to the maintenance of public confidence in
the criminal justice system. If a member of the jury has a personal relationship with a participant in
the trial, his or her ability to assess the evidence fairly and impartially may be called into question.
For this reason, section 632(b) of the Criminal Code gives the judge presiding over a jury trial the
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Sopinka et al, supra note 135, at 703-4.
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discretion to excuse any juror from service if the juror has a “relationship with the judge, prosecutor,
accused, counsel for the accused or a prospective witness”.138
Federal statutes that regulate financial institutions reflect a similar concern with ensuring that
transactions with related parties do not give rise to preferential treatment or the appearance of
preferential treatment. Parliament has prohibited banks from entering transactions with related
parties unless standards and procedures designed to minimize the risk of partiality are followed. The

Bank Act provides that “a bank shall not, directly or indirectly, enter into any transaction with a
related party of the bank.”139 A related party includes minor children, spouses and common law
partners of directors, senior officers or significant shareholders.140 The prohibition on entering
transactions with related parties is subject to a number of exceptions that are extensively regulated
by the Act.141 Similar provisions can be found in the Business Development Bank of Canada Act,142
the Canada Cooperatives Act,143 the Cooperative Credit Associations Act,144 the Insurance

Companies Act,145 and the Trust and Loan Companies Act.146
A presumption that certain personal relationships give rise to shared economic interests
animates a number of federal statutes that regulate corporate takeovers, corporate returns and
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R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 632.
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S.C. 1991, c. 46, s.489(1).
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Ibid. s.486(1) as amended by Bill C-23, s.7.
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Ibid. sections 489-506.
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S.C. 1995, c.28. Section 31 defines interested persons as including spouses, common law partners (Bill C-23, s.26),
children, siblings or parents of a director. Section 32 prohibits the bank from granting a loan to a director. Section 33
provides that close relatives of directors who apply for loans must disclose that they are interested persons, and a
loan to an interested person can be made only after approval of the board at a meeting where the director related to
the applicant is absent.
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S.C. 1998, c.1. Section 2(1) defines an associate as including a spouse, common law partner (Bill C-23, s.28), child,
and any person related by blood or marriage with whom a person resides. Section 160 restricts the ability of a
cooperative to enter transactions with associates.
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S.C. 1991, c.48. In Part XII (self-dealing), the definition of related parties in s.410(1) includes minor children, spouses
and common law partners (Bill C-23, s.86). Section 413(1) restricts transactions that associations can enter into with
a related party.
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S.C. 1991, c.47. In Part XI (self-dealing), the definition of related parties in s.518(1) includes minor children, spouses
and common law partners (Bill C-23, s.158). Section 521 restricts transactions that companies can enter into with
related parties.
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insider trading. For example, the Bank Act defines a takeover bid as a bid by an offeror and his or
her associates to take control of over ten per cent of the shares of a bank. If this threshold is met,
certain regulatory provisions are triggered. Section 283(1) defines associates as including children,
spouses, and common law partners of an offeror, as well as persons related to the offeror by blood
or marriage who share a residence with the offeror.147 Similar provisions can be found in the Canada

Business Corporations Act,148 the Trust and Loan Companies Act,149 and the Insurance Companies
Act.150 In the Corporations Returns Act, the information that must be included in corporate returns
depends on the situation of affiliated corporations, which includes corporations controlled by a
related group.151 Section 2(1) defines a related group as persons related by blood, marriage,
common law partnership or adoption.152 The Canada Corporations Act prohibition on insider trading
applies to insiders and associates of insiders.153 The definition of associates includes children,
spouses, and common law partners of an insider, as well as persons related to the insider by blood
or marriage who share a residence with the insider.154
The presumption of shared interests in personal relationships is the rationale underlying
federal laws that prohibit nepotism in hiring,155 restrict persons’ ability to vote on or act in relation to
matters concerning a relative’s economic interests,156 put family members’ claims on a bankrupt
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S.C. 1991, c.45. The definition of related parties in s.474(1) includes minor children, spouses and common law
partners (Bill C-23, s.302). Sections 477-89 prohibit transactions with related parties subject to certain exceptions.
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S.C. 1991, c.46, s.283(1) as amended by Bill C-23, s.4.
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definition affects the definition of a takeover bid in s.194 of the Act.
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Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.E-2, s.15(1) (returning officer cannot hire close family member as assistant;
includes parents, spouses, common law partners (Bill C-23 s.31), siblings, and children).
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Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3, s.4 as amended by Bill C-23, s.4 (related persons includes
persons related by blood, marriage, common law partnership, or adoption); s.13.30 (trustee cannot act in relation to
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person’s estate in a subordinate position,157 and call into question the validity of commercial
transactions between related persons.158
A particularly important example of a provision that calls into question the validity of
transactions between related persons is s.5(2)(i) of the Employment Insurance Act.159 We have
selected this provision for detailed examination because it employs relational definitions to limit
entitlement to important social benefits for many unemployed persons.
In order to qualify for unemployment benefits pursuant to the Employment Insurance Act,
claimants whose employment has been terminated must have worked for the required number of
hours in insurable employment. Section 5(2)(i) provides that employment is uninsurable if the
employer and employee were not dealing with each other at arm’s length. The objective of this
provision is to prevent people from fraudulently claiming unemployment benefits by manufacturing
fictitious or artificial employment relationships.

the estate of a debtor with whom the trustee is related without permission of the court); s.54(3) as amended by Bill C23, s.8 (related creditor may not vote in favour of a proposal); s.66.19(2) (creditor related to a consumer debtor may
not vote in favour of the acceptance of a consumer proposals); s.113(3): as amended by Bill C-23, s.13 (spouses,
common law partners, siblings, parents, children, uncles, aunts of bankrupt cannot vote for the appointment of
trustees or inspectors); Business Development Bank of Canada Act, S.C. 1995, c. 28, s.31, s.33 as amended by Bill
C-23 s.26 (director cannot vote on an application by an interested person, which includes a spouse, common law
partner, child, sibling, parent, and parent and siblings of spouse or common law partner). See also Investment
Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.), s.3 (defining ‘voting group’ for the purposes of determining whether an
entity is controlled by Canadians; includes two or more persons who, because of a personal relationship, would
ordinarily be expected to act together).
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Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3, s.137(2) as amended by Bill C-23, s.15 (spouse, former spouse,
common law partner, or former common law partner cannot claim wages before other creditors); s.138 as amended
by Bill C-23, s.16 (claims by spouses, common law partners, parents, children, siblings, aunts and uncles for wages
cannot be preferred).
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Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), s.48 (the value of goods for the purposes of calculating duty is the
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According to section 3(2), the question of whether persons are not dealing with each other at
arm’s length is to be determined by reference to s.251 of the Income Tax Act:
251. (1) For the purposes of this Act; (a) related persons shall be deemed not to deal with
each other at arm’s length; and (b) it is a question of fact whether persons not
related to each other were at a particular time dealing with each other at arm’s
length.

Until 1993, the Income Tax Act defined related persons as persons related by blood relationship,
marriage or adoption. Parliament added common law opposite-sex couples to the definition in 1993,
and Bill C-23 will add same-sex couples in 2000.160
Without more, the combined effect of s.251(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act and s.5(2)(i) of the

Employment Insurance Act would be to deprive all employees who work for a related person of their
entitlement to unemployment benefits upon termination of their employment. This was, in fact, the
situation prior to 1990. Recognizing the harshness of an irrebutable presumption that employment
between relatives is not “real employment”, Parliament amended the Act in 1990.161 The
amendment, now s.3(2)(c)(ii) of the Employment Insurance Act, gives the Minister a discretionary
power to treat employment by a relative as insurable employment if the Minister “is satisfied that,
having regard to all the circumstances of the employment, including the remuneration paid, the
terms and conditions, the duration and the nature and importance of the work performed, it is
reasonable to conclude that they would have entered into a substantially similar contract of
employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm’s length.” The effect of the amendment
is that employment by a relative is not automatically assumed to be fictitious and therefore excluded
from the definition of insurable employment. Employment by a related person will be considered
insurable if, after a careful examination of the circumstances, the Minister concludes the
arrangement constituted a “real” contract of employment.
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The 1990 amendment recognizes that an employee’s work for a family member may be
perfectly legitimate, and, upon termination, the employee may have an equally valid and pressing
need for unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, we believe that the use of relational terms in the
insurable employment provisions of the Act ought to be abandoned entirely. The use of relational
terms is not necessary to the policy objective of preventing fraud. Moreover, the use of relational
terms to determine entitlement has a negative impact on relational privacy and may discourage the
formation of relationships of caring and commitment. We will pursue these arguments further in
Section C below.

3.

Tailoring financial benefits or penalties to recognize the consequences
of economic dependence or interdependence

A wide range of federal statutes seek to tailor benefits or penalties in a manner that takes
into account the emotional and economic interdependence that accompanies family relationships.
For example, the amount of support that is available to farmers pursuant to the Agricultural

Marketing Programs Act162 will be reduced if related farmers have received support. Farmers are
related if they are living together (“cohabiting”, whether or not in a conjugal relationship) or if they are
related by blood, marriage, common law partnership or adoption.163 Similarly, a number of offence
provisions in federal statutes provide that the calculation of the financial penalty to be imposed after
a person has benefited from an improper transaction (such as bribery), take into account benefits
received by family members.164
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Relational concerns may sometimes cut in the other direction, leading to a reduction in the
size of a penalty or a narrower definition of offences if they would otherwise interfere with an
offender’s ability to meet the needs of family members. For example, a court is not to make an order
imposing a “victim fine surcharge” on a convicted offender if it would result in “undue hardship to the
offender or the dependants of the offender”.165 Similarly, it is not an offence to brew beer or grow
tobacco without a licence so long as the beer or tobacco is for personal or family consumption.166
Similarly, exemptions to firearms offences are provided for persons hunting or trapping for the
purposes of family sustenance.167 These exemptions reflect a view that meeting the needs of
interdependent family units is more important than, or not in conflict with, the public safety goals of
the offences.
Pension laws are a significant area in which federal legislation employs relational criteria in
an attempt to recognize the consequences of economic dependence or interdependence that may
exist in adult personal relationships. We will outline the features of the complex array of federal
statutes in this area. These statutes can be divided into four categories according to the purposes
they serve. First is the Canada Pension Plan, a compulsory social insurance scheme that provides
benefits to employee contributors and their families. Second is a large group of federal statutes
establishing employment pension plans for particular sectors of the federal public service, such as
the Public Service Superannuation Act. We will consider, as part of this second group, the statutes
that provide disability benefits (the Pension Act), employment pensions (the Canadian Forces

Superannuation Act) and old age supplementary pensions (the War Veterans Allowance Act) to
members of the armed forces and their families. The third category is pension standards legislation,
the Pension Benefits Standards Act, which establishes minimum requirements for employment

definition of "frauds on the government" gifts to government officials or their family members); s.117 of the National
Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.N-5 (offence to attempt to peddle influence by accepting gifts personally or through any
member of one’s family).
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pensions provided by private sector employers whose activities are federally regulated. Legislation
in these first three categories create pension entitlements for employees and their families. The
focus of our analysis will be on the rules determining entitlements to survivors’ benefits, since this is
the most important area in which the employment pension statutes use relational criteria. The fourth
category is the universal old age pension scheme established by the Old Age Security Act. We will
examine in some detail the use of relational criteria in this Act to determine eligibility for a monthly
allowance in the years leading up to pension entitlement at age 65, and to determine eligibility for
the guaranteed income supplement for low income pensioners.

(a)

The Canada Pension Plan

The Canada Pension Plan establishes a national scheme of old age pensions and supplementary
benefits related to employment. It is a contributory scheme financed by employers and payroll
deductions from employees. The Plan provides retirement benefits to contributors over the age of 60
and disability benefits to contributors under the age of sixty. Relational criteria, however, are taken
into account in two circumstances: divorce, which we discuss below168 and death of the employee
contributor. In the latter case, spouses or common law partners are entitled to claim a pension as
"survivors". Factors such as age, responsibility for dependent children, and disability determine a
claimant’s entitlement to, and the amount of, the survivor’s pension.169
The CPP survivor’s pension has evolved considerably from its original form in a manner that
mirrors changing social attitudes to conjugal relationships. When the Plan first came into force in
1966, the survivor’s pension was called a "widow’s pension".170 The scheme of the legislation makes
clear that the widow’s pension was premised on an assumption that married women were
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homemakers who were financially dependent on their breadwinner husbands. The widow’s pension
was gender-specific. It was not available to widowers. If a widow remarried, her new husband was
presumed to be meeting her needs for financial support. Her widow’s pension would automatically
terminate.171 The original CPP gave limited recognition to the needs of women living in common law
relationships with male contributors. The Minister did have discretion to award a widow’s pension to
a surviving common law spouse. She had to establish that she had "been maintained" and "publicly
represented by the contributor as [his] spouse" for seven years (if either the deceased or the
claimant were married to someone else) or for an unspecified number of years (if neither was
married).172
Enacted prior to the liberalization of divorce law, the original CPP expressed a clear
preference for the claims of separated wives over those of women cohabiting in conjugal
relationships with the widows’ husbands. A wife's claim to the widow's pension could be displaced
by a common law spouse only after seven years of cohabitation in a relationship of dependency, and
then only if the ministry considered it appropriate. The legislation put in place an all or nothing
entitlement that could operate harshly on wives and common law spouses. The original CPP did not
make provision for apportioning the widow's pension between a deceased contributor's wife and his
common law spouse. This problem continues to exist in the current CPP and can give rise to
significant injustice.
In the early 1970s, the ascendance of formal notions of liberal equality demanded gender
neutrality in federal statutes. In 1974, the CPP widow's pension became a survivor's pension
available to the wife or husband of a deceased contributor.173 The discretion to award the survivor's
pension to a common law spouse remained. The period of cohabitation required before a common
law spouse's claim could be considered was reduced to three years (if either of the cohabitants was
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married) or one year (if neither was married), and the exclusion of common law spouses who were
not dependent on the deceased contributor was dropped.174
After 1974, the objective of the CPP survivors’ pensions was no longer as clear as it had
been in 1966. The aim of the 1966 widow’s pension was to address the consequences of the
presumed dependency of wives on their husbands. After 1974, this dependency rationale could no
longer provide the sole explanation of the survivor’s pension provisions. Few widowers were
dependent on their wives’ income the way wives were on their husbands’ income. And common law
spouses could claim a survivor’s pension whether or not they were dependent on the deceased’s
income. Beginning in 1974, CPP survivors’ pensions are best understood as serving two objectives:
compensating dependent spouses for the sudden loss of their spouses’ income and compensating
interdependent spouses for their contribution to the employment earnings of their spouses. The first
objective responds to spousal need. The second objective responds to earned spousal entitlement.
Just as family law has embraced a compensatory understanding of the role of spousal support
orders,175 the legal structure of CPP survivors’ pensions since 1974 reflects an understanding that a
spouse’s employment earnings have been made possible by the support and work of the other
spouse. Individual employment earnings have been earned, in this sense, by both spouses. We will
refer to these dual objectives underlying CPP survivors’ pensions as the dependence and
compensatory objectives.
In 1986, the position of common law spouses was significantly strengthened. They became
automatically entitled to CPP survivor’s pensions if they had cohabited with the deceased for at least
one year, even if the deceased also left a surviving wife or husband.176 With the passage of Bill C23, same-sex couples will be in the same position as opposite-sex common law couples. A survivor
will be defined as the common law partner of the contributor at the time of the contributor’s death, or,
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if there is no common law partner, the person who was married to the contributor at the time of
death.177 The CPP still does not contain a provision allowing for the apportionment of a survivor’s
pension where a contributor leaves both a separated spouse and a common law partner. Rather,
the common law partner receives the entire survivor’s pension, even if the common law partnership
was brief and the marriage long. The absence of a just apportionment scheme raises the stakes too
high in the inevitable unseemly contests that can arise between two surviving spouses.178 Moreover,
the complete denial of a survivor’s pension to a separated wife or husband when the other spouse
has formed a new common law partnership is plainly inconsistent with the compensatory objective of
survivors’ pensions. In our view, the absence of apportionment provisions from the CPP violates the

Charter's prohibition on marital status discrimination.179
(b)

Pension Plans for Federal Public Employees

Pension plans for federal public employees are established by a number of federal statutes,
including the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act,180 the Defence Services Pension Continuation

Act,181 the Governor General’s Act,182 the Judges Act,183 the Lieutenant Governors Superannuation
Act,184 the Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances Act,185 the Public Service Superannuation
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Act,186 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Continuation Act,187 and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police Superannuation Act.188 Entitlement to a pension, as is the case with the CPP, is
determined on an individual basis calculated by reference to an employee’s contributions and length
of service. In addition to these employment pension plans, the Pension Act189 establishes pensions
to compensate members of the armed forces who have been disabled or have died as a result of
military service, and the War Veterans Allowance Act190 provides for supplementary old age
pensions for war veterans. All of the above statutes provide for survivors’ benefits to be paid on the
death of the federal employee or veteran. After Bill C-23, benefits will be payable to a surviving
spouse or common law partner of the deceased contributor or veteran.
The eligibility criteria for the receipt of benefits by adult survivors, and the objectives of adult
survivor benefits, have evolved in a manner comparable to the changes in the CPP described
above. Up until the 1970s, adult survivor benefits were widows’ pensions, terminable upon the
widow’s remarriage. Typically a common law wife had no right to a widow’s pension, but she might
be granted a widow’s pension if she had cohabited with the deceased for a lengthy period of time,
had been maintained by him and held out to the public as his wife. These were the essential
features of the scheme adopted, for example, in the original versions of the Pension Act (1919),191
the Public Service Superannuation Act (1953)192 and the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act
(1959).193 It is evident that widows’ right to receive benefits pursuant to their husbands’ employment
pension plans was premised on a "family wage" dependency model. The objective was to respond
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to the sudden loss of income by a homemaker wife who had been entirely dependent on her
husband’s income and, upon his death, had little earning power of her own.
Over the course of the last thirty years, survivors’ benefits in federal employment and
veterans’ statutes have been continually reformed as the material and ideological premises of the
dependency model have eroded. Women’s participation in paid employment has increased steadily
and dramatically since the 1950s. Women’s labour participation rates remained flat at roughly 20%
for the first half of the twentieth century. The climb that began in the 1950s passed 40% in the 1970s
and reached 60% in the 1990s.194 Married women’s labour participation rates have followed the
overall trend. This is true even for mothers of young children. For example, even when there were
three or more children under the age of six in the family, roughly half of married women held paid
employment in 1990, up from roughly one fifth in 1970.195 Another force of change has been the
enactment of legal guarantees of equal treatment on the basis of sex, marital status and sexual
orientation. Since the 1970s, spousal interdependency has steadily replaced women’s dependency
as the dominant assumption underlying legal understandings of marital relations.
In the 1970s, widows’ pensions became survivors’ pensions that could be claimed by
common law spouses after a shorter period of cohabitation regardless of whether they had been
dependent upon the deceased. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rights of common law spouses were
placed on the same footing as surviving wives and husbands, and the required period of
cohabitation was reduced to one year. With the passage of the Public Sector Pension Investment

Board Act196 in 1999 and the expected passage of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act
in 2000, same-sex partners of deceased contributors or veterans can now claim survivors’ benefits.
A survivor who remarries or forms a new common law partnership no longer has to surrender his or
her survivor's benefits. If the deceased lived with a common law partner at the time of his or her
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death, and also had a surviving spouse, then the survivor’s benefits are divided between the two in
proportion to the number of years they cohabited with the deceased.
These changes in federal pension laws have not followed a consistent timetable or pattern.
Some statutes abandoned the elements of the marital dependency model belatedly if at all. Clearly,
legislators have found their way to recognizing non-marital relationships more readily in some
contexts than others. For example, that soldiers might have common law wives was acknowledged
in 1919; that a Prime Minister, judge, Lieutenant Governor or Governor General might have a
common law partner was a prospect that Parliament could not face 80 years later.197 One of the
positive aspects of Bill C-23 is that it will introduce greater uniformity into the previously haphazard
treatment of survivor’s benefits in federal pension statutes for employees and veterans. The
exception is the War Veterans Allowance Act, a statute that has been peculiarly resistant to
modernizing trends over the years. Even after Bill C-23, a veteran’s survivor who remarries or forms
a new common law partnership loses his or her entitlement to survivor benefits. The Minister retains
discretion to deny a survivor’s benefit to a separated spouse. Parliament should remove these
anachronisms and bring the War Veterans Allowance Act into line with the contemporary approach.
The current model of employment pension survivors’ benefits, like the CPP survivors’
pensions, is premised on a combination of dependency and compensatory rationales. The
dependency rationale has been eroded, but it is not obsolete. Some spouses or partners,
particularly women who worked in the home during long-term relationships with breadwinner men,
still require economic support to cushion the economic blow they suffer on the sudden loss of their
only source of income. The dependency rationale, however, can no longer be the sole objective
underlying the current regime of survivors’ benefits. Survivors can claim benefits regardless of need,
even if they cohabited with the deceased for little more than a year, and even if they have since
formed a new conjugal relationship. Even economically self-sufficient spouses or partners facilitated
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the employment earnings of their mates by living with them in relationships of caring and
commitment. The surviving spouse or partner contributed indirectly to the deceased’s earned
employment entitlements, a role for which he or she deserves compensation. Hence the justice of
dividing the benefit among multiple claimants in proportion to the number of years they lived with the
deceased.
In our view, the dependency and compensatory objectives are both valid and justify the
continued use of relational criteria in legislation governing survivors’ benefits in employment pension
plans. What remains to be considered is whether these objectives could be better accomplished if
persons other than spouses and common law partners were entitled to claim survivors’ benefits. We
will pursue this issue below.

(c)

Pension Standards Legislation

The federal legislation regulating employment pension plans at private sector workplaces
within federal jurisdiction is the Pension Benefits Standards Act.198 The Act sets out minimum
standards that pension plans are required to meet. One of these requirements is the provision of
survivor benefits to spouses or common law partners.199 After Bill C-23, a survivor's benefit must be
made available to the common law partner at the time of the employee's death, or if there was no
common law partner the employee's spouse. For an employee without a spouse or common law
partner, there is no obligation to provide a survivor's benefit. The benefit cannot be terminated upon
remarriage or the formation of a new common law partnership.200 In contrast to the pension statutes
governing its own employees, the Act does not require private employment pensions to provide for

197

These omissions from the 1999 reforms (Ibid.) will be addressed by Bill C-23.

198

R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (2

199

Ibid., s23, as amended by Bill C-23, s.264.

200

Ibid., s.24, as amended by Bill C23, s.257.

nd

Supp.).

61

division of the survivor benefits between a surviving spouse and common law partner. Instead, the
legislation provides that the common law partner’s claim displaces the claim of a spouse.201

(d)

Old Age Pensions

The Old Age Security Act,202 first introduced by the federal government in 1951, provides a
pension entitlement to all residents of Canada over the age of 65. It was initially a universal
entitlement calculated without regard to the needs or resources of a particular recipient. Since 1989,
the old age pension is indirectly subject to an income test: the Income Tax Act recovers all or part of
the pension from persons with high incomes. Despite the individual nature of the old age pension
entitlement, there are several supplemental aspects of the legislation that rely on relational criteria.
Both are attempts to provide additional financial support to the elderly or near-elderly poor since the
basic old age pension entitlement is not adequate to meet subsistence needs.
The first is the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), introduced in 1966.203 The amount of
the monthly GIS an eligible pensioner receives is determined by his or her relational status. The Act
sets out two basic rates as the maximum entitlements that form the starting point for GIS
calculations.204 We will label these the "single rate" and the "conjugal rate".205 The single rate is
significantly higher206 than the conjugal rate,207 on the assumption that the combined living expenses
of cohabiting pensioners are less than double that of single pensioners because of economies of
scale. After Bill C-23, the single rate will apply to pensioners who are single, widowed, divorced,
separated, living with others in non-conjugal relationships, or living with a spouse or common law
partner who is not a pensioner. The conjugal rate will apply when two pensioners live together and
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are spouses or common law partners. The basic rates are then reduced by a formula that takes into
account the income of the applicant pensioner if he or she does not live with a spouse or partner,
and that takes into account the combined income of the applicant pensioner and his or her spouse
or partner if the applicant is living in a marital or conjugal relationship. The assumption underlying
the GIS formula is that spouses and partners pool their resources. Hence, it is the aggregate income
of an applicant and his or her spouse/partner that determines whether an applicant is entitled to a
supplement and, if so, at what amount.
The 1966 version of the GIS did not recognize common law spouses. It treated all
pensioners living with others outside of marriage as individual applicants. They could claim the
higher basic rate for singles, and they did not have to pool incomes for the purposes of determining
the amount of their monthly entitlement. Since 1998, a pensioner living in a conjugal relationship
with a person of the opposite sex is subject to the calculations previously restricted to married
pensioners,208 and Bill C-23 will accomplish the same result for same-sex conjugal partners.209 The
Act used to treat cohabiting pensioners more favourably if they were not married. Now it will treat
cohabiting pensioners more favourably if they cohabit in non-conjugal relationships.
The second part of the Act that employs relational criteria is the spousal allowance, first
enacted in 1975, to be renamed the "monthly allowance" by Bill C-23.210 The spousal allowance is
available to spouses who are over the age of 60 and under the age of 65, and who are living with an
older spouse or partner who is a pensioner. Entitlement to, and the amount of, the allowance is
based on an income test similar to that employed in the GIS provisions.
The 1975 legislation was the first federal statute to give common law spouses the same
rights as husbands and wives. It did not, however, give rights to anyone other than spouses. Low
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income persons over the age of 60 but not yet 65 could not claim an allowance if they were not living
with a pensioner spouse. The excluded group included persons who were single, divorced,
separated or widowed.
Parliament expanded the entitlement of widows incrementally over the years. Initially, a
widow was cut off the spousal allowance if her pensioner spouse died. In 1978, legislation provided
that widows could continue to receive spousal allowances for six months after they became
widowed.211 As of 1979, spousal allowance recipients who became widowed would not be cut off
their OAS/GIS entitlement at all.212 And in 1985, all widows over the age of 60 could claim a spousal
allowance even if they became widowed before the age of 60.213 In contrast, Parliament has done
nothing for the near elderly poor who are single, divorced or living with others in non-conjugal
relationships, and next to nothing for separated spouses.214
Members of the near elderly poor cannot claim a monthly allowance if they have cohabited
with a pensioner in a non-conjugal relationship, or if they are single, divorced, or separated from
their spouses or partners. The monthly allowance thus represents a significant departure from the
philosophy of universal, individual entitlement that inspired the original Old Age Security Act. By
distributing benefits according to marital/conjugal status, it also represents a significant departure
from the goal of directing old age pensions to seniors with the greatest needs (defined by income
tests) that animates the current OAS/GIS scheme.
The objective of the monthly allowance is to compensate for the hardship that results from
the loss of income in dependency relationships upon the breadwinner’s retirement. The same
rationale that led to the adoption of survivor’s benefits triggered by the death of a breadwinner, is
reproduced here upon retirement. Both events produce sudden shifts in the financial resources. The
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rationale for extending benefits exclusively to spouses, partners and widows is that many elderly
couples live in relationships that followed "traditional" social patterns regarding the division of labour
and age of the partners; many couples consist of an older male wage-earner and a younger female
homemaker. For such couples, if the older, formerly wage-earning, spouse retires at age 65, the
couple may have great difficulty getting by solely on his combined entitlement under the old age
pension and GIS. In other words, the spousal allowance was initially designed to respond to the
needs of the homemaker who may have devoted much of her life to caring for children and for her
spouse, and is entirely dependent on her spouse’s income.215 Widows, too, are presumed to have
slim employment prospects in their sixties, because a substantial majority did not participate in the
paid labour force during their marriages. A good example of the expression of this objective is the
speech of the Hon. Jake Epp, then the Minister of National Health and Welfare, in the House of
Commons in 1985 when entitlement to the spousal allowance was fully extended to widows and
widowers:
We cannot and will not allow a very vulnerable segment of Canada’s near elderly population
to continue to suffer because of circumstances completely beyond their control…. Low
income widowed persons aged 60 to 64 do not have many of the options available to most of
us. For instance, the vast majority of the persons who will benefit from this Bill are women
who have been financial dependants for most, if not all, of their lives. They did not question
this financial dependence because society deemed it appropriate. Societal norms dictated
that the husband would enter the labour force and earn the money while the wife stayed in
the home and performed the unpaid role of mother, housekeeper, companion, nurse,
guidance counsellor and community worker, the list is endless…. the Bill before us today
recognizes this contribution… the contribution these people have made to our society goes
216
beyond financial measure.

The spousal allowance provisions have been the subject of several Charter challenges. In

Egan v. Canada,217 the Supreme Court of Canada found that the exclusion of a gay couple from
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entitlement to a spousal allowance amounted to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
violation of section 15 of the Charter. However, a 5-4 majority of the Court upheld the exclusion on
the grounds that Parliament should be left to decide whether it has the resources available to extend
the benefits to same-sex couples.218 If Bill C-23 is passed, Parliament will have responded to the

Egan ruling by granting common law partners, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, the right to
receive a monthly allowance if they meet the other eligibility criteria in the legislation. In Collins v.

Canada,219 the Federal Court Trial Division found that the spousal allowance provisions
discriminated on the basis of marital status by denying entitlement to spouses who are single,
separated or divorced. However, Rothstein J. found that Parliament is in a better position than the
courts to make social policy choices that have significant fiscal consequences.220 As a result, he
concluded that the limitation on equality rights was justifiable pursuant to section 1 of the Charter.
The effect of his judgment is to place on Parliament the constitutional responsibility of determining
whether persons between the ages of 60 and 64 who are single, separated, divorced, or living with
others in non-conjugal relationships should be eligible for an old age monthly allowance. We will
return to this issue below.

4.

Recognizing the Economic Costs and Value of Caregiving
Relationships

Because the provision of unpaid domestic services, emotional support and personal care to
children and adults is a socially useful role that entails significant financial sacrifice, it is an important
government objective to provide economic support to homemakers or unpaid domestic caregivers.
As Margrit Eichler has written, "it is in the state’s interest to support caregiving for inevitable
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dependants by any means available."221 The Income Tax Act has taken modest steps in this
direction through the dependants’ credit and the caregiver credit provisions. As we saw in the
previous section, survivors’ pensions and the spousal allowance in the Old Age Security Act were
designed to respond to the needs of women who were dependent on the employment income of
their husbands, frequently because they devoted their lives to raising children and caring for other
family members.
No federal statute, however, provides direct income support to homemakers and domestic
caregivers for the unpaid work they perform. The Income Tax Act credits are of no direct assistance
to a person without tax liability sufficient to absorb the credit. The caregivers’ credit is more likely to
flow to the benefit of a co-resident who can claim the credit for care provided by another family
member. One of the goals of survivors’ benefits and spousal allowances is to compensate women
for the sacrifices they make in performing unpaid domestic labour. However, entitlement to these
benefits depends on spousal status, a crude proxy for the identification of these needs. Moreover,
entitlement to survivors’ pensions or spousal allowances is tied to events in the breadwinners’ lives
(retirement or death), rather than a determination of homemakers’ or caregivers’ own needs.
It has long been recognized that this gap is a serious injustice that needs to be addressed
through the development of new federal social policies. For example, the 1985 Parliamentary
Committee on Equality Rights commented that:
The lack of pension coverage for homemakers, above the basic OAS/GIS level, represents a
serious flaw in our pension system. Although society values and depends on the contribution
of homemakers, work in the home is not recognized as being of the same value as paid work
performed inside or outside the home… We all agree that some mechanism must be found
to recognize the vital contribution of homemakers to their families and to society and to
222
ensure that all older Canadians have adequate retirement incomes.

The implementation of a homemaker’s pension would accomplish more directly and
accurately the objectives that survivors’ benefits and the old age monthly allowance have sought to
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accomplish. In the absence of homemakers’ pensions, survivors’ benefits and old age spousal
allowances will continue to play a role in advancing the objective of compensating spouses and
partners for the valuable contributions they make in the form of unpaid domestic care and services.
These are awkward vehicles, however, for delivering on this important policy objective. They link
benefits to the existence of a spousal or partnership relationship with an employee contributor (in the
case of survivor's benefits) or pensioner (in the case of the spousal allowance). They do not link
benefits specifically to the provision of unpaid domestic care and services.
We have argued that the central value that ought to guide state regulation of adult personal
relationships is the promotion of relationships characterized by caring and commitment. There is no
doubt that the failure to provide any direct form of income support to unpaid domestic caregivers
seriously compromises this value.

5.

Compensation for the loss of, or harm to, emotional and economically
interdependent relationships

Death or personal injury can have serious consequences for adults in personal relationships
with the deceased or injured person. Reasonable expectations of continued financial and emotional
support are obviously terminated in the case of death and may be seriously disrupted by personal
injury. It is a legitimate state objective to seek to respond to or alleviate these distinct relational
harms. It is necessary to do so by employing relational terms in the drafting of the legal rules.

(a)

Bereavement Leave

Employment standards laws seek to ensure that employers respect employees’ needs for
time to grieve, attend funerals, gather with family and friends, commence administration of estates
and deal with other financial matters, and rearrange their lives following the death of a loved one.
Legislation does so by stipulating minimum bereavement leave entitlements that employers must
provide to employees. The relevant provision in the federal context is s.210(3) of the Canada Labour

Code, which provides that
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Every employee is entitled to and shall be granted, in the event of the death of a member of
his immediate family, bereavement leave on any of his normal working days that occur during
the three days immediately following the day of the death.

The regulations define “immediate family” as including spouses, common law spouses (which
presumably will be changed to “common law partners” following the passage of Bill C-23),223 parents
(including in-laws), children, siblings, and “any relative of the employee who resides permanently in
the employee’s household or with whom the employee permanently resides.”224

(b)

Relocation of Family

Another federal law that recognizes and seeks to alleviate a distinct financial consequence of
death is s.40(1) of the Judges Act which provides that if a judge dies while in office, his or her
children and surviving spouse or common law partner are in some circumstances entitled to a
“removal allowance” if they have to move to another part of the country following the death. The
provision recognizes that family members may have to move their residence when a judge is
appointed, and, for a variety of personal or economic reasons, may have to move again upon the
judge’s death.225

(c)

Wrongful death or injury

Where the death or injury of a person is caused by the wrongful actions of another,
Canadian statutes give family members a right to bring a civil action to recover damages for the
economic and emotional injuries they have suffered consequent upon the tortiously caused death or
injury. While the establishment of statutory tort actions is a matter that normally falls within provincial
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jurisdiction, the federal government has the power to establish civil actions as an incidental aspect
of its jurisdiction over certain activities such as aeronautics, navigation and shipping.
Thus, for example, the Carriage by Air Act226 imposes liability on airlines to each member of
a passenger’s family who suffered damage because of a passenger’s death.227 Family members are
defined to include wives, husbands, common law partners, parents, grandparents, siblings, children
and grandchildren.
Similarly, Part XIV of the Canada Shipping Act228 enables “dependants” to bring a wrongful
death action when a member of the family is killed through the negligence of another in a boating
accident that occurs at sea or on inland waters anywhere in the country. For the purposes of
highlighting the reform issues with respect to statutes that seek to respond to the economic and
emotional relational consequences of death or injury, it will be illuminating to conduct a more
detailed examination of the origins and evolution of this statutory cause of action.
The common law took a very harsh approach to family members’ loss of the expectation of
continued emotional or economic support upon the death of a loved one: no cause of action was
recognized. The severity of the common law rule was overcome in England in 1846 with the
enactment of Lord Campbell’s Act.229 The Act recognized the legitimate interests of “dependants” in
the lives of their close family members. It enabled family members to bring a claim for their
pecuniary losses consequent upon the negligently caused death of a family provider. The Act set out
a list of family members who were entitled to bring a claim: wives, husbands, parents, grandparents,
children and grandchildren. The common law bar to wrongful death actions remained in place for
claims brought by persons in relationships with the deceased that did not fall within the statutory list.
If a claimant had the requisite relationship with the deceased, the Act permitted recovery of his or
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her derivative “pecuniary” losses. It was not possible to claim damages for grief, bereavement, loss
of consortium, or for the deceased’s suffering prior to death.230 Rather, the claim is for the loss of a
reasonable expectation of a future pecuniary benefit. The claim will include the portion of the
deceased’s disposable income and the value of the domestic services that would have flowed to the
benefit of the claimant in the future.
Wrongful death statutes inspired by Lord Campbell’s Act have been passed in all common
law provinces and similar rights of action are recognized in the Quebec Civil Code. However, in the
context of Canadian maritime law, a wrongful death action was not added to the Canada Shipping

Act until 1948.231 The scope of the action is closely modelled on Lord Campbell’s Act. The list of
potential claimants is identical to the 1846 statute, with the exception that the definitions of children
and parents includes persons in adoptive or social (in loco parentis) parent-child relationships.
Unlike some of its provincial counterparts, the maritime law wrongful death action has not been
modernized since 1948 to reflect contemporary conceptions of relational losses. Section 61 of the
Ontario Family Law Act,232 for example, puts in place a relational claim that is not limited to wrongful
death actions. It also permits claimants to bring actions in cases of negligently caused personal
injury to a family member, broadens the class of claimants to include common law spouses and
same-sex partners,233 and expressly permits recovery of damages for loss of “guidance, care and
companionship that the claimant might reasonably have expected to receive from the person if the
injury or death had not occurred.”234 In contrast, the federal maritime wrongful death action is still
limited to claims resulting from death, common law partners and siblings are not included in the list
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of claimants, and compensation for the loss of future emotional support is not explicitly recognized.
In all of these ways, the Canada Shipping Act continues to reflect a limited nineteenth century
conception of relational harm.
While Parliament has not taken any steps to modernize the scope of the maritime wrongful
death claim since 1948, the Supreme Court of Canada took significant steps forward in its 1998
ruling in Ordon Estate v. Grail.235 The Court recognized that
...contemporary conceptions of loss include the idea that it is truly a harm for a dependant to
lose the guidance, care and companionship of a spouse, parent, child, etc... It is unfair to
deny compensation to the plaintiff dependants in these actions based solely upon an
anachronistic and historically contingent understanding of the harm they may have
236
suffered.

The Court therefore reformed Canadian maritime tort law to permit claims for relational losses
arising out of negligently caused personal injury to a family member, and to permit claims for loss of
guidance, care and companionship upon the negligently caused death or personal injury of a family
member.237 The Court was not willing, however, to expand the class of claimants entitled to bring a
claim to include common law partners238 and siblings:
...although it may be desirable for Parliament to expand the list of eligible dependants under
s. 645 of the Canada Shipping Act, it would be inappropriate for the courts to undertake this
task unilaterally by reforming non-statutory maritime law in order to supplement the statutory
provision. Through the Canada Shipping Act, Parliament has spoken as to the class of
eligible plaintiffs in the case of a fatal accident. For this Court to reform the law to expand the
239
class would be to effect a legislative and not a judicial change in the law.

Parliament has not yet acted to expand the list of eligible claimants. Bill C-23 contains no
amendment to the Canada Shipping Act. However, it is clear that this omission is not the result of a
judgement that the status quo is acceptable. Rather, the federal government “has undertaken to
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complete a top-to-bottom modernization” of the Act240 and the forthcoming amendments will no
doubt address the issue of eligible claimants in the maritime wrongful death action. We will return to
this issue in Part II (B), below.

6.

Preventing violence or abuse in adult personal relationships

Intimate relationships give rise to unique risks and vulnerabilities. These risks and
vulnerabilities may be compounded by isolation from others and emotional or economic
dependence. Just as caring and committed relationships are worthy of state support and
recognition, the state ought to be vigilant to discourage and condemn relationships that are violent
or abusive. These concerns have led the state away from regulating relationships by reference to
their formal status and towards regulation premised on actual relational qualities. The repeal of the
marital rape exemption in 1983 is a clear example of this fundamental shift in norms guiding state
regulation of adult personal relationships.241
A number of provisions of the Criminal Code aim to prevent and punish physical violence or
harassment in adult personal relationships. Criminal prohibitions on assault and sexual assault apply
with equal force to persons who are married or in other adult relationships. To be valid, consent to
sexual activity cannot be obtained “by abusing a position of trust, power or authority.” (s.273.1(2)(c))
The “rape shield” provision of the Criminal Code aims to prevent the use of evidence of
complainants’ past sexual relationship with an accused or anyone else from being used to suggest
that they abandoned their right to physical security. (s.276(2)) The criminal harassment provision of
the Code, s.264, was enacted in large part to discourage “stalking” and other behaviour threatening
the physical and psychological security of persons seeking to avoid or end intimate personal
relationships. The incest prohibition in s.155 of the Code reflects the view that sexual intercourse
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with a parent, grandparent, child, grandchild or sibling is likely to be either abusive or psychologically
damaging. The offences of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching and sexual exploitation
in sections 151-153 and section 153.1 of the Code seek to protect persons who are vulnerable to
sexual abuse as a result of youth or disability. These provisions of the Code reflect particular
concern regarding the potential abuse by adults of relationships of authority or dependence. One
provision that stands out as anomalous is the prohibition on anal intercourse in section 159 of the
Code. This provision makes it an offence to engage in anal intercourse unless the act takes place in
private between two persons who are married to each other or both over the age of 18.
A concern with addressing the consequences of violence or abuse in adult personal
relationships is evident in the sentencing provisions of the Code. Evidence that an offender abused
his spouse or child, or abused a position of trust or authority in relation to a victim, is an aggravating
factor in sentencing (s.718.2(a)(ii) and (iii)). Moreover, an offender who has caused or threatened
harm to a member of his household can be required to make restitution to them for any costs they
have incurred as a result of moving out of the offender’s household for temporary housing, food,
child care and transportation (s.738(1)(c)).
In addition to its concern with preventing and punishing physical violence, the Criminal Code
targets serious forms of abusive neglect that threaten the lives or health of persons in dependency
relationships. Section 215(1) imposes legal duties on parents and guardians to provide the
necessaries of life to children, on spouses and partners to provide the necessaries of life to each
other, and on caregivers or custodians to provide the necessaries of life to persons under their
charge who are wholly dependent on them ‘by reason of detention, age, illness, mental disorder or
other cause.’ Necessaries of life is understood by the courts to include food, clothing, shelter and
medical treatment. By virtue of section 215(2), it is an offence to fail to provide necessaries to a
child, spouse or common law partner who is ‘in destitute or necessitous circumstances’. It is also an
offence to fail to provide necessaries and thereby endanger the life or health of a child, spouse,
common law partner, or wholly dependent person under one's charge.
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In Canada’s original 1892 Criminal Code, it was an offence for husbands to not provide
necessaries to their wives.242 The offence reflected the view that marriage imposed a permanent
obligation on husbands to support their wives, even in the case of separation.243 In 1974, the marital
offence was amended to impose a spousal duty to provide necessaries on wives as well as
husbands.244 In 2000, Bill C-23 will extend the duty to provide necessaries to common law partners
of the opposite or same-sex.245 The spousal offence thus originated in a patriarchal model of the
family and has since been changed to accommodate the demands of gender neutrality and nondiscrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation. These expansions in the offence
have occurred without any alteration of the substantive definition of the crime. We will take up the
argument below that s.215 is in need of further reform to eliminate its reliance on outdated
assumptions regarding dependency relationships.
As the above review illustrates, the state’s legitimate concern with preventing violence or
abuse related to adult personal relationships most often manifests itself in federal legislation in the
form of criminal offences directed at punishing violence or abuse. Criminal prohibitions operate
retroactively to punish behaviour that has already occurred and provide some deterrence of
prospective acts of violence. The federal government, however, could do much more to protect
persons from the risks of violence in their personal relationships. The Witness Protection Program

Act246 provides a useful model for a more pro-active approach to the prevention of violence. The Act
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enables the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. to provide new identities and police protection to persons
admitted to the program. At the moment, the program is limited to witnesses who have assisted in
the prosecution of criminal offences and to persons who, because of their "relationship" or
"association" with a witness, require protection.247 These limitations reflect the restricted purpose of
the program: “to promote law enforcement by facilitating the protection of persons who are involved
directly or indirectly in providing assistance in law enforcement matters.”248 The Act reflects the view
that "witnesses are the ultimate public servants"249 and need to be protected from violence or threats
of violence to which they are exposed by their participation in the criminal process as Crown
witnesses. At the moment, protection can be afforded to persons at risk of relational violence only if
they have testified against their ex-spouses or ex-partners (or are associated with someone who
has).
The goals of the Witness Protection Program are laudable. Yet the restriction of the program
to witnesses and their associates raises the concern that the government is willing to act to prevent
violence in personal relationships only when it furthers its interest in punishing criminal acts that
have already occurred. The state ought to be concerned with protecting all persons from risks of
violence. Canadians who are not witnesses ought to be entitled to seek pro-active protection from
serious ongoing abuse, intimidation or threats they face from ex-spouses, ex-partners, or other
persistent stalkers. The federal government should give serious consideration to expanding the

Witness Protection Program Act, as proposed in a 1999 private member’s bill,250 or by expanding its
new identities program, which has provided limited assistance to victims of domestic abuse.251
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7.

Restructuring financial relationships on the break down of adult
personal relationships

Another important objective of federal legislation has been to assist in the restructuring of
financial relationships on marriage break down. Federal legislation has imposed spousal and child
support obligations on divorce, provided for the division of benefits under the Canada Pension Plan,
as well as established a range of mechanisms for the enforcement of support orders. These
provisions are intended to recognize the consequences of financial interdependency on marriage
break down, by imposing and enforcing support obligations between family members.

(a)

Family Support Obligations - Divorce Act, 1985

The Divorce Act, 1985 imposes both spousal support and child support obligations on
marital break down. Section 15.1 deals with child support obligations. Following the 1997
amendments, these child support obligations are governed by the child support guidelines. The
objectives of the guidelines are: (a) to establish a fair standard of support for children that ensures
that they benefit from the financial means of their parents (b) to reduce conflict and tension between
parents or spouses by making the calculation of child support more objective; (c) to improve the
efficiency of the legal process by giving courts and parents and spouses guidance in setting the
levels of child support and encouraging settlement, and (d) to ensure consistent treatment of
parents or spouses and their children who are in similar circumstances. 252 While child support is a
right of the child, and is thereby more specifically part of the regulation of the parent/child
relationship, the child support guidelines are nevertheless an important dimension of the
restructuring of adult relationships upon marriage break down. The guidelines are intended to give
guidance to this restructuring, and thereby allow parents to reach agreements with less conflict or
litigation.
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Section 15.2 of the Divorce Act 1985 deals with spousal support. Section 15.2(1) authorizes
courts to make spousal support orders on divorce. The objectives of spousal support orders are set
out in section 15.2(6), as (a) recognizing any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses
arising from the marriage or its break down; (b) apportioning between the spouses any financial
consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for
the support of any child of the marriage; (c) relieving any economic hardship of the spouses arising
from the break down of the marriage; and (d) in so far as practicable, promoting the economic selfsufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.
The family support obligations of the Divorce Act fit within the general objectives of family
law, setting out the private rights and responsibilities of individual family members, providing that
family members have obligations to support one another, and those obligations do not cease upon
break down of the family. The support provisions of the Divorce Act recognize that marriage is an
economic partnership that may confer economic advantages and disadvantages on the spouses,
advantages and disadvantages that need to be addressed when that relationship breaks down.

(b)

Enforcement of Family Support Obligations

The Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act253 provides generally for
garnishment and attachment of federal salaries. It further provides for the diversion of pension
benefits from federal sources to satisfy financial support orders, including any support order made
under the Divorce Act, or any provincial law relating to family support obligations. The person named
as recipient of a financial support order can apply for a diversion of a pension benefit payable to the
recipient. The Act allows for up to 50 percent of the benefit to be diverted, or if the support order is in
arrears, more than 50 percent of the benefit may be diverted.
There are a number of federal superannuation statutes which include provisions for the
garnishment of pensions or annuities to satisfy support orders. The Canadian Forces
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Superannuation Act,254 the Diplomatic Service (Special) Superannuation Act,255 the Lieutenant
Governors Superannuation Act,256 the Public Service Superannuation Act,257 and the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act 258 all include provisions that allow a pension, annuity
or amounts otherwise payable under the Acts to be diverted to satisfy financial support orders, in
accordance with Part II of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act. 259 The Judges

Act and the Governor General’s Act have virtually identical provisions.260
The Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act261 provides for (1) the
release of information regarding location of a person in breach of a family provision (including a
support, custody or access order);262 (2) the garnishment of federal moneys to satisfy support orders
and support provisions; and (3) the denial of federal licenses, including a passport.263
(c)

Division of Pensions on Relationship Break down

Division of property on relationship break down falls within provincial jurisdiction. However,
federal legislation provides for the division of federal pensions, otherwise in accordance with
provincial rules.
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The Canada Pension Plan Act allows for a division of unadjustable pension earnings
between spouses and common law partners on relationship break down. On divorce or separation,
section 55 of the Act allows each of the former spouses or common law partners to make an
application for the equal division of pension entitlements that each spouse/partner accumulated
during the relationship. Prior to Bill C-23, under section 55, “spouse” was defined as a married
spouse. 264 Spouses or former spouses had to have cohabited for at least 36 consecutive months.
Former spouses could apply for a division for unadjustable pensions earnings accrued in the months
in which the former spouses cohabited during the marriage. Bill C-23 will amend the definition of
spouse in section 2(1) of the Canada Pension Plan Act, adding “common law partner”, defined as a
“person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the relevant time, having
so cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period of at least one year.” Section 55.1 will also
be amended to allow for the division of unadjusted pension earnings in the case of common law
partners. Section 55.1(3) now provides “that persons subject to a division of unadjusted pensionable
earnings must have cohabited for a continuous period of at least one year in order for the division to
take place”.265
As Carol Rogerson notes “this provision reflects the same economic model of the spousal
relationship as do schemes which provide for division of matrimonial property after marriage break
down – i.e., the view of marriage as an economic partnership in which spouses contribute equally to
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the accumulation of wealth during the course of the relationship, entitling them to equal shares of
the wealth upon break down.”266
The Pension Benefits Division Act also provides for the division of pensions earnings of the
members of federal pension plans for public employees. Prior to the Bill C-23, a member, spouse or
former spouse may apply to divide the member’s pension benefits.267 Section 2 of the Act defined
spouse as “a person of the opposite sex who (a) is married to the member, (b) is cohabiting with the
member in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited with the member for a period of not less
than a year, or (c) is a party to avoid marriage with the member.” Bill C-23 will amend the definition,
replacing opposite-sex common law spouses with “common law partner.” Any application may be
made (1) where a court, in a proceeding involving divorce, annulment or separation, orders the
pension benefits to be divided between the member and the spouse/former spouse, or common law
partner or (2) where the spouses or common law partners have lived separately and apart for one
year, and a court orders that the pension benefits be divided, or the member and spouse/former
spouse or common law partner made a written agreement providing for the division of pension
benefits. 268 A division of pension benefits is made by transferring 50% of the value of the pension
benefits that accrued during the period subject to division to the spouse or former spouse.269 The

Pension Benefits Standards Act270 governs private pension plans in federally-regulated workplaces.
Section 25 provides for the assignment of pension benefits to a spouse, former spouse or common
law partner.271

266

Carol Rogerson, supra note 169 at 324-5.

267

Section 4, Pension Benefits Division Act.

268

Section 4(2), Pension Benefits Division Act.

269

Section 8(1), Pension Benefits Division Act, if the plan is a retirement compensation arrangement. Otherwise, it is
transferred to a registered pension plan selected by the spouse/former spouse, a prescribed retirement savings plan
or fund, or to the purchase of a prescribed immediate or deferred life annuity for the spouse/former spouse.

270

R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (2

271

Section 25(1) , Pension Benefits Standards Act. Prior to Bill C-23, section 2 of the Act defined spouse to include
persons of the opposite sex who have cohabited in a conjugal relationship for not less than one year. Under section
25, spouse was given the same meaning that it is given under the applicable provincial property law, or in relation to
an assignment or agreement between the parties, includes persons who have cohabited in a conjugal relationship for

nd

Supp.).

81

These various federal statutes providing for the division of pension benefits are all based on
the same principle as the provincial family laws dealing with division of property, namely, that
marriage is a kind of economic partnership, that gives rise to an entitlement to equal sharing on
marital break down. As Rogerson notes “these provisions governing pension division can essentially
be seen as an adjunct to private law rights with respect to division of matrimonial property between
spouses upon marriage break down”.272

8.

Conclusion

In this section, we have provided, for descriptive purposes, an overview of federal laws that
employ relational terms. We have sought to categorize those laws according to the legitimate federal
objectives that they seek to accomplish. It is important to emphasize that to conclude that these are
legitimate objectives in the regulation of adult relationships is not to suggest that the objectives are
well served by existing spousal or relational definitions. Nor is it to conclude that all of the statutes
included in our review ought to be seen as having legitimate relational objectives. In the sections
that follow, we further interrogate both of these issues.

III. Legitimacy of Relational Objectives in Particular Policy
Contexts
In this section, we pursue a critical evaluation of some of the laws reviewed above to
determine whether their pursuit of relational objectives continues to be compelling. While we have

at least one year. Bill C-23 will amend the statute, allowing for the assignment of pensions benefits to a formercommon law partner.
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Rogerson, supra note 169 at 328.
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concluded in the previous section that these laws are pursuing objectives that, in the abstract, are
legitimate relational objectives, it may be that the continued pursuit of these objectives in a particular
legislative context is no longer legitimate. In other words, there are instances where the use of
relational criteria is an entirely inappropriate way of imposing penalties or distributing state benefits,
rights and/or responsibilities. This could be the case for a number of reasons. First, the relational
objective may lack any factual or empirical foundation. We argue that this is the case with the anal
intercourse offence in the Criminal Code. Second, the asserted relational objective may not
correspond to the actual objectives of a legislative scheme. The actual design or operation of a
legislative scheme may call into question the legitimacy of an asserted relational objective. This is
the case, we argue below, with respect to the insurable employment provisions of the Employment

Insurance Act and the monthly allowance provisions of the Old Age Security Act. Third, even if the
law is contributing to the accomplishment of relational objectives, there may be other more
compelling state objectives that override the pursuit of the relational objectives in the particular
policy context. We argue that this is the case with the evidentiary rules that make a husband or wife
incompetent and non-compellable as witnesses for the Crown in a criminal trial of his or her accused
spouse.

A.

The Anal Intercourse Offence in Section 159 of the Criminal Code
The anal intercourse provision of the Criminal Code uses adult relational terms in a manner

that stands out as anomalous in the current normative structure of sexual offences. Unlike other
particular kinds of sexual acts, section 159 makes the act of engaging in anal intercourse an offence
regardless of whether violence, exploitation or a commercial exchange was involved. An exception
to the prohibition was added in 1969 to remove from the scope of the offence acts of anal
intercourse engaged in, in private, by husband and wife, or any two persons over the age of twenty-

83

one.273 In 1987, the age of consent to anal intercourse was reduced to eighteen274 (still four years
higher than the age of consent that operates with respect to other kinds of consensual, noncommercial sexual activity). The continuing presence of distinct treatment of acts of anal intercourse
in the sexual offence provisions of the Criminal Code can be justified only if acts of anal intercourse
involve distinct harms or risks of harm to the participants. The marital exemption, in turn, must be
explained by the proposition that protecting marital privacy and autonomy is of greater concern than
the alleged harms of anal intercourse.
Since its enactment in 1969, Parliament has not amended the marital exemption to extend it
to acts committed by partners to other kinds of committed relationships. Bill C-23 will not amend
section 159.275 As a result, unmarried persons under the age of 18 can be charged with committing
the offence, even if the charge relates to private, non-exploitative sexual acts with a common law
partner. However, the Ontario and Quebec Courts of Appeal have declared the anal intercourse
provision to be of no force and effect on the grounds that it discriminates on the basis of age and
sexual orientation, and that it fails to further any compelling state objective.276 The provision remains
in force in the other provinces. Rather than expand the marital exemption in section 159(2) of the
Code, Parliament ought to repeal s.159 entirely. The distinct criminal prohibition on anal intercourse
does not contribute to the accomplishment of any legitimate policy objectives.

B.

Defining Insurable Employment in the Employment Insurance Act
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The Employment Insurance Act excludes non-arm’s length employment from the definition of
insurable employment. Without sufficient insurable employment, an employee who has lost his or
her job does not qualify for unemployment benefits. These provisions pursue a legitimate federal
objective: the denial of benefits to persons who have in essence committed fraud by manufacturing
fictitious employment relationships for the purpose of claiming benefits. The question is whether
relational terms ought to be used to protect the scheme from being abused by collusive employers
and employees.
The legislation currently uses relational definitions to accomplish this objective. If persons
are unrelated, “it is a question of fact whether [they] were at a particular time dealing with each other
at arm’s length.” If persons are related by blood, marriage, common law partnership or adoption,
they are deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length.277 Until 1990, the presumption of nonarm’s length dealing between related persons was irrebuttable: family employment was not insurable
under the Act. Relational status was unjustly used as a proxy for fictitious employment. Meanwhile,
whether employment by non-family members was real and therefore insurable was a question of fact
to be determined in each case.
Now, even if persons are related, and therefore initially deemed to not deal with each other
at arm’s length, s.5(3)(b) of the Employment Insurance Act allows the Minister to deem the reverse:
…if the employer is, within the meaning of [the Income Tax Act], related to the employee,
they are deemed to deal with each other at arm’s length if the Minister of National Revenue is
satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the employment, including the
remuneration paid, the terms and conditions, the duration and the nature and importance of
the work performed, it is reasonable to conclude that they would have entered into a
substantially similar contract of employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm’s
length.

The 1990 amendment thus abandons the view that family employment is always
manufactured with an eye to taking advantage of unemployment benefits. Whether family
employment qualifies as insurable employment depends on an examination of the relevant facts
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(“having regard to all the circumstances of the employment”). In other words, after the 1990
amendment, the tests for determining whether employment between related persons or between
unrelated persons is insurable are the same: in both cases, it is the factual elements of the
employment relationship itself that determines whether it is fictitious or real. This is as it should be.
According to the legislation as currently structured, however, decision-makers must follow an
unnecessarily confusing and circuitous path. The use of the notion of an “arm’s length” relationship
as a proxy for fraudulent arrangements is confusing. Commercial relationships between persons
with common interests – such as friends, associates or family members – are not necessarily tainted
by collusive fraud. Similarly, persons without any prior association may both have something to gain
from concocting a fictitious employment relationship. A more direct way of pursuing the objective of
this provision would be to replace the exclusion of non-arm’s length employment currently effected
by sections 5(2)(i) and 5(3), and to replace those sections with a provision excluding employment if,
having regard to all the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the contract of employment
was manufactured to take advantage of unemployment benefits.
The removal of the arm’s length and relational definitions from section 5 of the Act would
have advantages beyond the production of a more transparent and less confusing legislative
regime. At the moment, since persons related by blood, marriage, partnership or adoption are
deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length (at least initially), the existence of such a
relationship becomes a subject of inquiry and contestation in the administration of the scheme.
For many years, the administration of the provision excluding non-arm’s length employment
from insurable employment has given rise to a steady stream of appeals to the Tax Court by
claimants denied unemployment benefits.278 A significant number of these cases involved
examinations into the private relational aspects of claimants’ lives to determine, for example,
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Dozens of such appeals have appeared each year in the QuickLaw database over the past decade. Since January
1999, we found over 70 appeals by claimants denied unemployment benefits after the termination of their
employment by a relative. The vast majority of these appeals fail, in large part because the onus is on the claimant to
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whether opposite-sex cohabitants were in a conjugal relationship.279 In some of the reported cases
claimants have denied the existence of a conjugal relationship with their employers, while the
Minister has sought to establish such a relationship to help justify the decision to deny benefits. This
is an undignified spectacle that ought to be avoided if at all possible.
The Minister and the courts appear to have imposed a heightened degree of suspicion and
scrutiny on family employment relationships. In our view, this focus on the personal aspect of a
family employment relationship entails an unnecessary invasion of privacy. It also distracts attention
from what the real issue ought to be regardless of whether a personal relationship existed: was the
employment relationship manufactured for fraudulent purposes or not?
Moreover, as a general principle, the government should not make an individual’s entitlement
to basic financial benefits dependent upon the non-existence of a personal relationship per se.
Persons should not be put in the position of having to choose between the formation of personal
relationships and receiving benefits to meet their basic financial needs. The Employment Insurance

Act as currently structured and administered places an incentive on persons in family relationships
to avoid working for each other. This negative consequence can be avoided and privacy respected
without compromising the policy objectives of the statute. In our view, the relational and arm’s length
concepts in section 5 of the Act should be replaced by a provision excluding employment if, having
regard to all the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the contract of employment was
manufactured to take advantage of unemployment benefits.

C.

The Monthly Allowance in the Old Age Security Act

establish that the Minister exercised his or her discretion in an arbitary or capricious manner. There are relatively few
reported cases finding employment between unrelated persons to be uninsurable.
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As described above, the stated purpose of the monthly allowance provisions has been to
respond to the distinct needs and contributions made by women who have performed unwaged
labour in the home. However, the legislative scheme has never been limited to claims by
homemaker women. Rather, it is a gender-neutral scheme that relies on a combination of factors age, spousal/partner or widowed status, and combined income - to determine entitlement. Adult
relationships qualify for entitlement regardless of the presence or absence of children, and
regardless of whether the relationship involved economic dependency. Indeed, common law
partners qualify for the benefit even if they have lived together for only one year.
Given these features, it is obvious that the legislative design is poorly tailored to the stated
relational objective. The goal of the scheme as drafted is, rather, to respond to the economic needs
of the elderly or near elderly poor, male or female, so long as they are widowed or living in a spousal
or partnership relationship. Because the financial needs the legislation addresses are not distinct to
spouses, partners or widows, the Act is a serious affront to the dignity of single, separated or
divorced persons whose economic needs may be equivalent or more pressing. Indeed, statistics
show that it is elderly women living alone who, not surprisingly, have the highest rate of poverty in
Canada. As the Federal Court concluded in the Collins case,280 the monthly allowance provisions of
the Old Age Security Act discriminate on the basis of marital status in violation of section 15 of the

Charter.
The same conclusion was reached by the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights in
1985. They recommended that “the Spousal Allowances under the Old Age Security Act be replaced
with an equivalent benefit that is available without reference to marital status.”281 The government
acknowledged in its response that “there are other near-elderly persons in need who still do not
have the financial protection offered by the Spouses Allowance [sic].” However, the government
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refused to change the law, citing fiscal limitations: “as was recognized by the all-party Task Force on
Pension Reform in 1983, restraint prevents the Government from going further at this time.”282 Thus,
fiscal constraints have been cited by both the courts283 and the government for maintaining
discrimination contrary to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms for more than twenty years.
Yet, with all due respect, the fiscal argument fails to provide a compelling justification for the
maintenance of discriminatory benefit programmes. Parliament has a constitutional obligation, when
faced with limited resources, to avoid limiting the distribution of resources to claimants identified by a
prohibited ground of discrimination. Parliament has a range of choices available to it that are
consistent with its constitutional obligations, including making a lower level of benefit available to a
larger group of people. Thus, equality norms dictate that the denial of monthly allowances to single,
divorced or separated claimants be repealed.
One option would be to remove any relational preconditions to entitlement in the Old Age

Security Act. Entitlement to a monthly allowance could be determined solely by reference to need.
For example, it could remove the relational requirements and make a reduced benefit available to all
persons over the age of sixty whose income falls below a certain level. Entitlement to a monthly
allowance would then be determined solely by reference to income. Such a scheme would be an
improvement on the current legislation in two ways. First, income is a far better proxy than relational
status for identifying financial need. Second, an income test avoids state inquiries into private
matters that can accompany a relational test of entitlement. Moreover, because individuals are
already required to disclose their annual income to the federal government for income tax purposes,
an income test can be applied without additional invasions of privacy and with relatively modest
administrative cost.
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A second option would be to replace the monthly allowance available to spouses and
common law partners with a monthly allowance targeted more directly to homemakers and
caregivers who sacrificed employment earnings in order to provide caregiving and domestic services
to other members of their households. While the design and administration of any such scheme
would pose practical challenges, in theory it is preferable to the current use of spousal or partnership
status to accomplish these goals.

D.

Spousal Competence and Compellability in Criminal Trials
Section 4 of the Canada Evidence Act is in need of reform. The government is currently

considering a package of amendments to the Act, and, in deference to those deliberations, Bill C-23
does not propose any amendments to the Canada Evidence Act.
The first law reform issue is whether the policies underlying these special evidentiary rules
regarding spousal competence and compellability are still valid and still outweigh the competing
policy that favours the admission of all relevant and probative evidence that can aid in the factfinding process. If not, then legislation ought to be passed amending section 4 and completely
abolishing the common law rules restricting the competence or compellability of husbands and
wives. If there are valid policies underlying the evidentiary rules, then there are strong arguments for
expanding the application of the special spousal evidentiary rules so that they apply to other adult
personal relationships whose integrity or harmony is worth preserving. The question would then
become how to define the adult personal relationships that ought to be included. The general
approach taken to other statutes by Parliament in Bill C-23 suggests that, at the very least, “common
law partners” should be incompetent or non-compellable witnesses in the same circumstances as
married spouses (and that they should be able to claim a privilege for their private communications).
There may even be other non-conjugal adult personal relationships -- for example, relationships
between siblings or non-conjugal cohabitants -- whose emotional strength and integrity is worth
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preserving to the same degree as marital relationships. If so, they too should be incompetent and
non-compellable witnesses (and their communications privileged) in the same circumstances as
spouses or common law partners. We will return to these definitional issues below.
A number of policies have been offered over the years for the spousal evidentiary rules.
Wigmore traces marital testamentary privileges back to the end of the 1500s and early 1600s. He
notes that a variety of explanations for the rule were given in texts beginning in the seventeenth
century, including the marital unity of husbands and wives and the assumption that their interests
are identical.284 Neither of these early rationales for the rule is consistent with contemporary attitudes
to the marital relationship.285 The two surviving rationales, according to recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada,286 are, first, that the rules are necessary to foster the integrity and
harmony of marital relationships, and second, that they reflect “the natural repugnance in every fairminded person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other’s condemnation, and to
compelling the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life
partner.”287 The “natural repugnance” rationale, however, is not self-explanatory. What is the basis
of the “natural repugnance”? In our view, it has its source in either the unity or common interests of
spouses, or the protection of their relational integrity, intimacy and privacy. Since the unity and
common interests rationales are based on now discredited conceptions of marital relations, we are
left with the marital harmony rationale. However, even this rationale fails to provide a compelling
justification of the current rules which have come under sustained attack from courts and
commentators.
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Consider first the rule that makes a spouse an incompetent witness for the prosecution in
cases that do not fall within the common law exceptions or do not involve offences listed in sections
4(2) or 4(4) of the Canada Evidence Act. The spousal incompetence rule has the effect of
preventing a spouse from testifying even if he or she would prefer to do so. In other words, the
legislation substitutes a paternalistic preference for preserving marital harmony even if it conflicts
with a spouse’s own view on whether his or her relational interests are best served by testifying or
not. In our view, there are two fundamental objections to this position. One is that if a spouse
chooses to testify against his or her husband, there may be little marital harmony left to protect. And,
second, even if the integrity of the relationship is an ongoing concern, the witness spouse is in the
best position to determine whether it is worth taking the relational risks that testifying entails. As
Iacobucci J. stated in R. v. Salituro,288
The grounds which have been used in support of the rule are inconsistent with respect for the
freedom of all individuals, which has become a central tenet of the legal and moral fabric of
this country particularly since the adoption of the Charter. In R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, Dickson J. (as he then was) defined freedom in this way (at p. 336):
"Freedom must surely be founded in respect for the inherent dignity and the inviolable rights
of the human person." The common law rule making a spouse an incompetent witness
involves a conflict between the right of the individual to choose freely whether or not to testify
and the interests of society in preserving the marriage bond.
To give paramountcy to the marriage bond over the right of individual choice in cases of
irreconcilable separation may have been appropriate in Lord Coke’s time, when a woman’s
legal personality was incorporated in that of her husband on marriage, but it is inappropriate
in the age of the Charter. As Wilson J. put it in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p.
166, the Charter requires that individual choices not be restricted unnecessarily.
The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom guaranteed in
the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and their own
philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will express
themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursue.
These are all examples of the basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will
respect choices made by individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will avoid
subordinating these choices to any one conception of the good life.
Through its family and divorce laws, our society has recognized that spouses have the right
to seek dissolution of the marriage where relations between them have irrevocably broken
down. The recognition that a marriage may be dissolved is reflected in the long history of
289
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Justice Iacobucci’s reasoning in Salituro led him to conclude that the common law rules of spousal
incompetence should not apply in situations where the spouses are irreconcilably separated. This
issue was easily resolved “because there is no marital harmony to be preserved.”290 He left open the
“difficult question” of whether the spousal incompetence rule should be abrogated more broadly.291
In our view, the reasoning in Salituro provides a compelling basis for making spouses competent
witnesses for the prosecution in all circumstances. Justice Iacobucci acknowledged that the
principles he espoused “favour abolishing the rule entirely and making all spouses competent
witnesses in all circumstances”.292 However, he suggested that “a far-reaching change of this kind is
best left to the legislature”.293
There is not necessarily a conflict between the public interest in promoting marital harmony
and the individual’s right to choose whether or not to testify. As Iacobucci J.’s comments suggest,
changes in divorce laws reflect the abandonment of the notion that society ought to impose a
different view of the worth of a particular marital relationship on a participant to that relationship. A
witness spouse is in the best position to measure the value of the relationship and the degree to
which its integrity may be threatened by testifying. As Lamer C.J. and Iacobucci J. commented in R.
v. Hawkins, an approach that vests the spouse of an accused with the choice to testify against his or
her partner is more consistent with the protection of the marital harmony as well as the autonomy
and dignity of the individual.294
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Salituro, supra note 286 at 676.
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Ibid. at 673.
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Ibid. at 677.
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Ibid. at 678. See also Hawkins, supra note 285 at 1071 para. 42, (“it is our opinion that any significant change to the
rule should not be made by the courts, but should rather be left to Parliament”, per Lamer C.J. and Iacobucci J.).
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Hawkins, supra note 285 at 1071 para. 41. See also the comments of La Forest J. in Hawkins, at 1095 para. 101: “A
rule prohibiting a spouse from testifying if he or she wishes raises serious questions about whether it unreasonably
infringes on a person’s liberty and equality interests protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Such
an infringement would, in my view, require justification…” See also Hamish Stewart, “Spousal Incompetency and the
Charter”, (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 411, 415: “A rule which says that a spouse cannot testify against an accused,
purely by virtue of her status, smacks of ancient doctrines, like coverture, that denied that married women could be,
independent of their husbands, full participants in public life.”
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The more difficult question is whether a witness spouse should also be a compellable
witness for the prosecution in all cases. There are two main advantages of such a rule. First, courts
would have the benefit of relevant spousal testimony and therefore the pre-eminent goal of a
criminal trial - ascertaining the truth - would be advanced. Second, a witness spouse will be less
exposed to potential intimidation or violence by an accused (or associates of an accused) since he
or she would have no choice but to testify.295 The disadvantage of making a spouse compellable for
the prosecution is that the witness will be forced to testify even in circumstances where he or she
believes that the integrity of his or her relationship with the accused will suffer. The difficulty of
balancing these competing concerns is reflected in the current patchwork of exceptions to the rule of
spousal non-compellability developed under the common law and augmented by sections 4(2) and
4(4) of the Canada Evidence Act.
There is no doubt that the current balance achieved by the common law and the Act between
truth-seeking and marital harmony is unprincipled. The case for reform is strong. Two options strike
us as worthy of consideration.
The first is to make spouses compellable in all cases on the grounds that the contribution of
the non-compellability rule to marital harmony is outweighed by the importance of admitting
probative evidence in criminal trials. In other words, the judgment made by sections 4(2) and 4(4) of
the Act – that the pursuit of truth outweighs the protection of relational harmony - should not be
limited to the listed offences, but is equally compelling in any criminal trial.
The second option is to empower judges to decide on a case by case basis whether the
balancing of the competing policies favours compellability or not. This was the approach advocated
by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in their Report on Evidence (1975). The Commission
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McLachlin J.A. (as she then was) argued in R. v. McGinty, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 97, 100, that the public policy of
preventing spousal abuse leans in favour of a rule of making a spouse compellable in trials where the accused is
charged with spousal violence. Arguably the same policy concerns lean in favour of a rule of spousal compellability in
all cases.
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recommended the adoption of a general rule that all persons are competent and compellable,
subject to the following exception for witnesses related to the accused:
In a criminal proceeding, a person who is related to the accused by family or similar ties is not
compellable to be a witness for the prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the
relationship, the probable probative value of the evidence and the seriousness of the offence
charged, the need for a person’s testimony is outweighed by the possible disruption of the
296
relationship or the harshness of compelling the person to testify.

While this proposal aims to implement a more accurate balance between the relevant competing
concerns than the crude balance achieved by s.4, it has a number of serious disadvantages. The ad

hoc balancing involved makes its application in any given case unpredictable and subject to
appeal.297 In addition, its application requires an intrusive inquiry into the nature of the intimate
relationship at stake. The invasion of privacy required by such an inquiry is itself a threat to relational
harmony. We are also persuaded that a compellability rule is likely to reduce the exposure of
witness spouses to the threat of intimidation or violence. While the difficulty of measuring the
contribution that the non-compellability rule makes to relational harmony gives us some pause, on
balance we believe that Parliament would be best advised to remove the limits on spousal
compellability entirely, rather than extend the rule to broader categories of relationships or offences
on a case-by-case basis.
The case for preserving the privileged nature of marital communications is stronger. For one,
the privilege is limited to private, intimate communications. It does not deprive a court of all of a
spouse’s relevant testimony. It thus achieves a better balance of competing concerns than that
achieved by the rules on competence and compellability. Since the rationale for the privilege is the
protection of privacy and the promotion of candour and trust in intimate adult relationships, there is
much value in the Law Reform Commission of Canada’s recommendation that the privilege ought to
attach to the speaker rather than the witness.298
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Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence (Ottawa: The Commission, 1975) at 37 (section 57 of draft
Evidence Code).
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This point is made in the dissenting comments of Commissioner La Forest (as he then was), ibid. at 80.
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In conclusion, the strong arguments in favour of abolishing the special rules on spousal
competence and compellability ought to lead to the repeal of those rules. The marital
communications privilege in section 4(3) of the Act is more narrowly drawn to protect important
relational interests without unduly compromising the search for truth. The privilege in section 4(3)
should be retained and extended to a broader range of adult personal relationships. The question of
how to define the scope of relationships covered is one we return to in Part II (B), below.

IV. Spousal/Relational Definitions
In this section, we review the spousal and relational definitions that are being used to
promote otherwise legitimate state objectives. Spousal definitions were extended beyond married
couples in a limited and haphazard manner, on a statute by statute basis. Much federal legislation
was left untouched, some was only partially extended, and much was extended with little to no
consideration of a comprehensive or consistent policy towards the regulation of adult relationships.
The landscape of spousal definitions is entirely changed with the introduction of Bill C-23. Conjugal
relationships will be now more extensively included within federal legislation, although the process of
inclusion is not complete. As we will highlight, some federal statutes continue to apply to married
couples only.
Bill C-23 does not address the broader category of relational definitions in the same way as it
systematically addresses the legal situation of spouses and partners. As a result, federal legislation
will remain essentially unchanged by Bill C-23 in its treatment of non-conjugal relationships. A range
of relational terms and definitions are used in federal legislation, including dependent, related
persons, near relative, immediate family, and members of a family who are part of a household.
There is no consistency to the ways in which groups of individuals are defined or included within
federal legislation. Nor is there any consistency to the ways in which the relational terms are
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deployed. ‘Dependent’, for example, is subject to a range of different definitions across different
federal statutes.
In this section, we map the existing spousal and relational definitions in federal legislation.
We begin with a review of spousal definitions, and highlight the changes that will be introduced upon
the enactment of Bill C-23, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act. We then review the
range of relational definitions deployed in federal legislation.

A.

Spousal/Conjugal Definitions
Prior to Bill C-23, “spouse” in federal legislation referred to married spouses, and in the

Income Tax Act and pension statutes, spouse also included common law opposite-sex couples. Bill
C-23 will significantly amend these spousal definitions. It has introduced a new term – “common law
partner” and “common law partnership”– defined as “a relationship between two persons who are
cohabiting in a conjugal relationship, having so cohabited for a period of at least one year.” This
common law partner definition will replace the extended definition of spouse through which common
law heterosexual couples were previously included within federal pension and tax legislation.
Spouse will now mean married persons, and common law partner means any two persons living in a
conjugal relationship for at least one year.
Bill C-23 will extend to common law partners a vast number of federal provisions that
previously applied only to married spouses.299 It will also extend to same-sex couples a number of
statutory provisions that previously applied to married spouses and common law opposite-sex
couples.300 The Bill leaves unchanged a handful of federal statutes that apply only to married
spouses.301
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See Appendix B1.
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See Appendix B2.

301

See Appendix B4.
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B.

Relational Definitions
Federal legislation uses a broad range of relational terms to pursue otherwise valid relational

objectives. Table Four outlines the range of these relational terms, with examples of federal statutes
that use them.

TABLE FOUR
RELATIONAL TERMS IN FEDERAL STATUTES
Relational term

Examples of Federal Statutes

Assisted Relative

Immigration Act

Associate, Associated persons

Canada Business Corporations Act
Canada Cooperative Act
Special Import Measures Act
Insurance Companies Act
Trust and Loan Companies Act

302

Dependant

Canada Elections Act
Canada Shipping Act
Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act
Immigration Act
Merchant Seaman Compensation Act
Visiting Forces Act

Family

Cooperative Credit Associations Act
Corrections and Conditional Release Act
Excise Tax Act
Firearms Act
Insurance Companies Act
Trust and Loan Companies Act

Family class

Immigration Act

Immediate family

Canada Labour Code
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Act

Interested Person

Business Development Bank of Canada Act

Members of family, forming part of household

Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act
Criminal Code

302

The chart includes examples of statutes with definitions of dependant. There are many additional statutes that include
a generic use of the term “dependant” that are not listed here.
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Carriage by Air Act
Near relative

Canada Shipping Act

Person who because of relationship or
association with a person

Witness Protection Program Act

Related person

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
Special Import Measures Act
Customs Act
Excise Tax Act

Relative

Corrections and Conditional Release Act
Criminal Code

Some of the relational terms are deployed consistently across federal legislation. “Associate”
and “related person” for example are used quite consistently. By contrast, “dependant” and
“immediate family” have very different definitions in different contexts. To further add to the
confusion, some of the relational definitions were amended as a result of Bill C-23, but many were
not. (See Appendix B5 and B6). In the following section, we briefly review the range of the definitions
of these relational terms found in federal statutes.

Associate and Related Person
The term “associate” generally includes a person’s spouse or common law partner, a child of
that person or of the spouse or common law partner, and a relative of the person or the person’s
spouse or common law partner, if that relative has the same residence.303 Similarly, the term “related
person” is defined quite consistently through federal legislation, as “persons are related to each
other if connected by blood relationship, marriage, common law partnership or adoption”. 304

303

For example, the Canada Business Corporations Act defines associate as including “a person’s (d) spouse of that
person or an individual who is cohabiting with that person in a conjugal relationships, having so cohabited for a period
of at least one year, (e) a child of that person or of the spouse or person referred to in para (d) and (f) a relative of the
person or of the spouse or individual referred to in para (d) if that relative has the same residence as the person. See
also the Canada Cooperative Act and the Canadian Corporations Act.
Other statutes use slightly different language, but still capture the same group of people. For example, the Bank Act
defines ‘associate’ as including “spouse, or common law partner of the offeror, child of the offeror or of the offeror’s
spouse or common law partner, or relative of the offeror or of the offeror’s spouse or common law partner, if that
relative has the same residence.” See also the Insurance Companies Act and the Trust and Loan Companies Act.
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Related person is usually defined specifically in relation to section 251 of the Income Tax Act. For example, section
45(3)(a) of the Customs Act states that “ …persons are related to each other if (a) they are individuals connected by
blood relationship, marriage, common law partnership or adoption within the meaning of s.251(6) of the Income Tax
Act.” See also the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Excise Tax Act, and the Special Import Measures Act.
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Dependant
“Dependant” is sometimes defined within federal statutes. However, as Table Five
illustrates, there is no consistency in these definitions.

TABLE FIVE
DEFINITIONS OF DEPENDANT
Statute

Definition

Canada Elections Act

Dependent means a spouse, common law partner or relative who
ordinarily resides with the elector. A relative is someone who is
related by blood or marriage. (s. 21(3)Schedule 2, part 3)

Canada Shipping Act

Dependant means the wife, husband, parents and children of a
deceased person. (s. 645)

Foreign Missions and International
Organizations Act

Dependent means “spouses and relatives dependent on them”

Immigration Act

Accompanying dependent means a spouse, or unmarried son or
daughter under the age of 19.

Merchant Seaman Compensation
Act

Dependants means members of the family of a seaman who were
wholly or partly dependent on his earnings when he died or, but for
incapacity of the seaman due to an accident, would have been so
dependent. (s. 2(1))

Pension Act, ss.48 & 49

Dependant means a surviving spouse or child of a member to whom
a pension may be paid under this part (s.48(1)).

Pension Act, s. 42

Dependant means any person entitled under court order to support.
(s.42(1)).

Visiting Forces Act

Dependant means a person who forms part of the member’s
household and depends on the member for support. (s.2)

A brief review of the definitions in Table Five illustrates that some of these definitions will be
amended by Bill C-23 (see for example, the Canada Elections Act which now incorporates common
law partner, and the Visiting Forces Act wherein the definition of dependant was broadened), while
others were not. (See for example the Canada Shipping Act, which continues to use the language of
husband and wife, and the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, which did not
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add common law partners.) Further, there is a broad range of federal statutes that use the term
“dependant”, but do not define it.305

Immediate Family
Several statutes use the term “immediate family”. The Canada Labour Code provides for
bereavement leave for members of immediate family.306 The term is defined in the regulations as
“(a) the spouse of the employee, including common law spouse, (b) the father and mother of the
employee and the spouse of the father or mother, including common law spouse, (c) the children of
the employee (d) the brothers and sisters of the employee (e) the father in law and mother in law of
the employee and the spouse of the father in law or mother in law, including common law (f) any
relative of the employee who resides permanently in the employee’s household or with whom the
employee permanently resides.”307 The Canada Labour Code will not be amended by Bill C-23.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Act also uses the term “immediate family”.308
Schedule, Part 4, s.2, Article 18 provides that the “Officials of the Organisation…shall (b) be
granted, together with their spouses and members of their immediate family residing with and
dependant on them…” It was not included within Bill C-23.

Family class
The Immigration Act uses the relational term “family class”, to allow an individual to sponsor a
broad but specified range of relatives under the family reunification program. “Family Class” is
currently defined (SOR/93-4) as including:
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See for example, Bank of Canada Act; Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11; Business Development Bank of Canada
Act; Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act, R.S.C., c. C-16, s. 1; 1978-79, c. 16, s. 12; Cape Breton
Development Corporation Act, R.S.C.1985, c. C-25; Farm Products Agencies Act, R.S.C.1985, c. F-4, S.C. 1993, c-3,
s. 2; Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, R.S.C.1985, c. R-10; Public Service Superannuation Act, Canada
Corporations Act, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Agreement Act, S.C. 1991, c. 12;Veterans
Review and Appeal Board Act, S.C. 1995, c. 18; Corrections and Conditional Release Act; Criminal Code;
Department of Veteran Affairs Act, R.S.C.1985, c. V-1; Civilian War-related Benefits Act, R.S.C.1985, c.C-31.
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Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, s.210.

307

SOR/78-560, s.5, SOR/91-461, s.35.

308

Privileges and Immunities (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-24.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the sponsor’s spouse;
309
the sponsor’s dependent son or dependent daughter;
the sponsor’s father or mother;
the sponsor’s grandmother or grandfather;
the sponsor’s brother, sister, nephew, niece, grandson or granddaughter, who is an
orphan and is under 19 years of age and unmarried;
(f) the sponsor’s fiancee;
(g) any child under 19 years of age whom the sponsor intends to adopt and who is
(i) an orphan
(ii) an abandoned child whose parents cannot be identified
(iii) a child born outside of marriage who has been placed with a child welfare authority
for adoption
(iv) a child whose parents are separated and who has been placed with a child welfare
authority for adoption
(v) a child one of whose parents is deceased and who has been placed with a child
welfare authority for adoption, or
(h) one relation regardless of age or relationship to sponsor where sponsor does not have a
spouse, son, daughter, father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, uncle,
aunt, nephew or niece who is a Canadian citizen, permanent resident or whose
application for landing the sponsor may otherwise sponsor.

The amendments to the family class promised by the Minister of Citizenship will broaden the
definition of spouse to include common law partners, as well as broaden the definition of dependent
child by increasing the age from 19 to 22.310

Assisted Relatives
The Immigration Act also uses the relational term “assisted relatives”. “Assisted relatives” are
part of the independent class of immigration applications, but who are awarded bonus points by
virtue of their relational status to a Canadian citizen or permanent resident.311 Assisted relative is
defined as “a relative other than a member of the family class, who is an immigrant and is an uncle

309

Prior to 1988, the family class consisted of parents and their dependent children up to 21 years of age and unmarried.
In July 1988, family class was expanded to include all unmarried children, regardless of their age. In 1993, the
regulations were amended to reduce the family class to encompass only those unmarried children who were 19 years
of age or under, and those children over 19 years who were dependent, either as a result of being students or of
having some kind of physical or mental disability. The amendments to “family class” promised by the Minister will
again revise the age from 19 to 22 years.

310

Citizenship and Immigration Canada, supra note 129.

311

Prior to 1993 assisted relatives were awarded more bonus points (15 for brothers, sisters and married children; ten
bonus points for more distant relations. The bonus points made it relatively easy for assisted relatives to achieve the
total 70 point pass mark. Thus large numbers of applicants could qualify as assisted relatives because of the bonus
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or aunt, a brother or sister, a son or daughter, a nephew or niece or a grandson or granddaughter of
a Canadian citizen or permanent resident who is at least 19 years of age and who resides in
Canada”. 312

Near Relative
The Canada Shipping Act uses the term “near relative”, which is defined in s.191(4). “Near
relative means one of the following persons, namely, the spouse, father, mother, grandfather,
grandmother, child, grandchild, brother or sister of the seaman.” It will not be amended by Bill C-23.

Person who because of the relationship or association with a person
The Witness Protection Program Act uses a very broad relational term. Section 2 provides
that for the purposes of the witness protection program, a witness includes not only a person who
has given information or evidence, but also (b) “a person who because of their relationship to or
association with a person referred to in paragraph (a) may also require protection for the reasons
referred to in that paragraph”.313

C.

Conclusion
While the expected passage of Bill C-23 will result in greater consistency in spousal and

common law definitions, the process of inclusion for cohabiting couples remains incomplete. Several
federal statutes continue to apply only to married couples. Further, as this section has illustrated, the
inclusion of non-conjugal relationships remains both partial and inconsistent. An array of relational
terms are deployed in different federal statutes, that include some non-conjugal relationships for
some purposes, but not others. Nor is there any consistency in the relationships that are included –

points they received. An amendment to the Regulations, SOR/93-44, January 1993 reduced the bonus points
awarded to assisted relatives.
312

SOR/93-44 1993.

313

Witness Protection Program Act, S.C. 1996, c.15, s. 2.
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sometimes the definition is narrow, other times it is wider. Moreover, for the most part, these
relational definitions are limited to familial relationships, that is, persons related by blood, marriage,
common law partnership or adoption. They do not include close personal relationships between
individuals who are not so related.
Many otherwise legitimate objectives of state regulation could arguably be furthered by the
inclusion of these excluded relationships. Basic equality norms require that the process of including
conjugal relationships be completed. There is no longer any legitimate justification for the exclusion
of these conjugal couples. Federal objectives would only be furthered by completing the process of
inclusion. The question of the inclusion of non-conjugal couples is, admittedly, more complex.
However, as we will also argue further below, a compelling case can be made that many federal
objectives could be furthered by the inclusion of a broader range of non-conjugal relationships. The
question is one, however, that we believe must be addressed on an objective by objective/ statute
by statute basis.

PART TWO
FRAMING THE STATE’S ROLE TOWARD ADULT
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Part Two of this paper considers how adult personal relationships ought to be defined for the
purposes of legal regulation. We canvas the range of options for including adult personal
relationships, and assess the advantages and disadvantages of these various legislative means of
identifying adult personal relationships relevant to particular policy goals. Finally, we will attempt to
make recommendations appropriate to each of the main state policy objectives identified in Part I as
legitimate.

I.

Legal options for identifying adult relationships
In this section, we review the different legislative models for identifying and defining adult

relationships. We consider both the models that federal legislation currently uses, such as marriage
and deemed or ascribed spousal/relational status, as well as alternative models such as domestic
partnership regimes and new statutory relationship definitions.

A.

Marriage
In the past, the state has used marriage as a proxy for commitment and for identifying the

relationships worthy of legal recognition. But, the transformations in the Canadian family in the last
three decades has seriously undermined the utility of this proxy. Marriage is now both over-inclusive
and under-inclusive of the kinds of relationships that may deserve legal recognition in light of
legitimate policy objectives. For example, laws may be over-inclusive in presuming that all married
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persons form units with an identity of financial interests (e.g. laws dealing with conflicts of interest),
when in fact some married couples may not pool their resources or even live together. Many other
laws dealing with the consequences of interdependent personal relationships may be underinclusive in their application only to married persons. Many other relationships may possess the
qualitative attributes relevant to the objectives of the laws (e.g., the definition of “dependants”
entitled to bring a wrongful death action pursuant to s.645 of the Canada Shipping Act).

1.

Current definition

As discussed above, the federal government has rarely exercised its jurisdiction in relation to
marriage, and as a result, the essential validity continues to be governed largely by common law,
and in Quebec, by the Civil Code. At its most general, marriage has been defined at common law as
the “voluntary union of life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others”.314 This
passage continues to be cited by the courts as an authoritative definition of marriage.315
In the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in M. v. H., Parliament
moved to defend the opposite-sex definition of marriage. On June 8, 1999, the House of Commons,
by a vote of 216-55, approved a motion brought by the Reform Party stating that “it is necessary…to
state that marriage is and should remain the union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of
all others”.316 However, the motion itself has no legal force. The government has been under pressure
to pass legislation to accomplish the goals of the motion. There is only one step, short of constitutional
amendment, that Parliament could take to protect the common law definition of marriage from
constitutional challenge in the courts. Parliament could reproduce the definition in legislation that
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Hyde v. Hyde & Woodmansee (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130, in which Lord Penzance, stated at 133 “I conceive that
marriage, as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man
and one woman, to the exclusion of all others” [hereinafter Hyde].

315

See Re North and Matheson (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 280, Layland v. Ontario (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 658 [hereinafter
Layland].

316

House of Commons Debates (Hansard) (8 June 1999) at 1020.
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included a notwithstanding clause. Such a step would immunize the definition of marriage from a
challenge based on sections 2 or 7 to 15 of the Charter for a period of five years.
When Bill C-23 was introduced in the House of Commons in February 2000, it did not contain a
definition of marriage. The Minister of Justice emphasized in her statements to the House on second
reading that the Bill did not change the legal definition of marriage. In the face of arguments that the
Bill undermines the status of marriage, the government proposed an amendment in committee that
became section 1.1 of the Bill as passed by the House of Commons on April 11, 2000. Section 1.1
provides as follows:
For greater certainty, the amendments made by this Act do not affect the meaning of the word
"marriage", that is, the lawful union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.

If Bill C-23 is passed without further amendment by the Senate, section 1.1 of the

Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act will become the first provision of federal legislation to
make reference to the common law definition of marriage. Section 1.1 does nothing more than give
prominence and clear expression to the reform option not chosen: Parliament chose not to touch the
definition of marriage in Bill C-23. The political purpose of section 1.1 is easy to understand: the
government felt under pressure to signal its desire to preserve the definition of marriage from legal
challenges by same-sex couples. On the other hand, section 1.1 has little legal significance.
Parliament’s unwillingness to change the opposite-sex requirement of marriage had already been
conveyed in unambiguous terms. Bill C-23, like all other federal statutes, must comply with the Charter.
So long as Parliament remains averse to employing the notwithstanding clause of the Charter to limit
judicial review of federal legislation, the definition of marriage will remain vulnerable to a constitutional
challenge.

2.

Over-inclusiveness

As a proxy for marking those relationships deserving of legal recognition, marriage is
potentially over-inclusive. For example, many conflict of interest laws assumed that all married
couples constitute a single economic unit, with an identity of financial interests. These laws
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presuppose that married couples pool their resources and share financial information. While many
married couples do so, some married couples do not pool their resources. Some may not even live
together. Using marriage as a proxy neglects any consideration of whether the couple actually has
shared financial interests. Using marriage as a proxy also assumes that married couples live
together in these economic units.

3.

Under-inclusiveness

Marriage, as currently defined, is also under-inclusive of the kinds of relationships deserving
of legal recognition. Prior to the introduction of Bill C-23, unmarried cohabiting couples – of both the
same and opposite sex - were excluded from many of the legal rights and responsibilities that were
extended to married couples. While Bill C-23 will wed common law partners with married spouses in
almost all federal statutes, there are a number of significant federal statutory provisions that remain
restricted in their application to married couples. If the government follows through on its stated
commitments to amend the Immigration Act, the Canada Evidence Act, and the Canada Shipping

Act, implementation of the principle of equal treatment of common law partners and married
spouses will be near completion in federal legislation.

(a)

Same-sex couples

The opposite-sex definition of marriage excludes same-sex couples from entering into a
legally valid marriage. Unlike cohabiting heterosexual couples who might be said to be choosing to
remain outside of the institution of marriage, the prohibition on same-sex marriage operates to
preclude same-sex couples from opting into marriage. As a result, same-sex couples do not have
access to the bundle of benefits and obligations that extend only to married couples. At the
provincial level, British Columbia,317 Ontario318 and Quebec319 have taken large steps forward in

317

Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.5; Family Relations Amendment Act, 1997, S.B.C. 1997, c.20; Family Maintenance
Enforcement Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1997, c.20; Pension Statute Amendment Act (No. 2), 1998, S.B.C. 1998, c.40.
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recognizing the equality rights of same-sex couples. Outside the context of public employment
rights, same-sex couples remain legally unrecognized in the other jurisdictions. Even in the three
provinces that have moved forward, important benefits and obligations continue to be restricted to
married couples. This is the case, for example, with the provisions of all provincial family laws
dealing with the division of property on relationship break down.320
In this section, we begin with a review of the existing case law involving same-sex couples
and marriage, as well as developments in other jurisdictions. We then interrogate the
constitutionality of the opposite-sex definition of marriage, in light of the most recent Supreme Court
of Canada equality jurisprudence.

(i)

Challenges to opposite-sex requirement of valid marriage

The opposite-sex requirement of a valid marriage has been unsuccessfully challenged by
same-sex couples. In the pre-Charter case of Re North and Matheson,321 two gay men sought an
order requiring the registration of their marriage. The registrar had refused to issue them a marriage
licence. Philp Co.Ct. J. held that the ceremony in which the two men had participated was not a
marriage. The judge reviewed the definition of marriage in the case law, citing passages affirming
the opposite-sex requirement in the English cases of Hyde v. Hyde322 and Corbett v. Corbett.323 He
further reviewed several dictionary and encyclopaedia definitions, which all described marriage as
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An Act to amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in M. v. H., S.O. 1999, c.6 (Bill
5).

319

An Act to amend various legislative provisions concerning de facto spouses, S.Q. 1999, c.14.

320
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the union of a man and a woman. He concluded that because a valid marriage requires parties of
the opposite sex, the marriage between the two men was legally non-existent.
In Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations),324 a majority of the
Ontario Divisional Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the opposite-sex definition of
marriage. Two gay men made an application for judicial review of the refusal of the city clerk’s office
to issue them a marriage licence. The applicants argued that the common law requirement of
opposite sexes violated their equality rights under section 15 of the Charter. Justice Southey, writing
for the majority, reviewed the common law requirement that a valid marriage can only take place
between a man and a woman, citing extensively from North and Matheson. He relied on biological
difference to reject the argument that the opposite-sex requirement violated the applicants’ equality
rights:
One of the principal purposes of the institution of marriage is the founding and maintaining of
families in which children will be produced and cared for, a procedure which is necessary for
the continuance of the species…That principal purpose of marriage cannot, as a general rule,
325
be achieved in a homosexual union because of the biological limitations of such a union.

Nor did Justice Southey’s opinion accord much weight to the value of relational autonomy. He
commented that “the law does not prohibit marriage by homosexuals, provided it takes place
between persons of the opposite sex”. 326
In her dissenting opinion, Greer J. was of the view that the opposite-sex requirement of
marriage did violate the applicants’ equality rights. She took the view that the state’s interest in
promoting marriage and family should be related to function not form:
…it is surely in the interest of the state to foster all family relationships, be they heterosexual
or same-sex relationships….To say that the state must preserve only traditional heterosexual
families is discriminatory and contrary to the equal benefits and guarantees they are entitled
327
to at law.
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In her view, the common law should evolve to reflect society’s changing needs. Justice Greer
rejected the argument of the Ontario Attorney General “that there is only one societal concept of
marriage”:
One has only to examine how multiple marriages have become almost the norm in our North
American society, how step-parents have become an integral part of children’s lives in these
marriages, how divorce has become widely recognized in society, and how ‘common law’
relationships have become classified as marriages without the sanction of a marriage
certificate but with most of the benefits conferred by one. There was even a time in history
when a woman became the property of her husband. That concept of marriage became no
longer valid and the institution of marriage had to adjust to such changes. The common law
328
and legislated law both change to meet a changing society.

(ii)

Same-sex Marriage in Other Jurisdictions

The Netherlands has made a commitment to legally recognize same-sex marriages by
January 1, 2001. No other jurisdiction has taken this step. Other European countries that have
moved towards the recognition of same-sex relationships have done so primarily through the
enactment of domestic partnership regimes. In Norway, for example, politicians considered and
rejected the recognition of same-sex marriage, preferring the recognition of same-sex relationships
through domestic partnership regimes. “A homosexual relationship can …never be the same as
marriage, neither socially nor from a religious point of view. It does not replace or compete with
heterosexual marriage.”329 The constitutionality of the opposite-sex definition of marriage is a highly
contested issue in the United States. In Baehr v. Lewin,330 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the
state law denying same-sex couples access to marital status would violate the state constitution’s
equal protection clause unless the state could demonstrate that the exclusion was necessary to the
pursuit of a compelling state purpose. On remand, the Circuit Court held that the State of Hawaii
presented insufficient evidence to prove that same-sex marriages would result in adverse
consequences to the public interest. The case was appealed again to the Hawaii Supreme Court. In
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the meantime, Congress initiated “proactive” measures to defend marriage from challenges by
same-sex couples, and in 1996, passed the Defense of Marriage Act.331 The Hawaii legislature has
since passed a constitutional amendment restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples. The Hawaii
Supreme Court subsequently concluded that the coming into force of this amendment meant that
the opposite-sex definition of marriage no longer violated the state constitution.332
The Hawaii legislature’s response to same-sex couples’ struggle for legal recognition was
the passage of a reciprocal beneficiaries law, entitled An Act Relating to Unmarried Couples.333 The
stated purpose of the legislation is to extend certain rights and benefits to couples who are legally
prohibited from marrying because they are of the same sex or within the prohibited degrees of
consanguinity.334 The legislation repeats the legislature’s finding that “the people of Hawaii choose
to preserve the tradition of marriage as a unique social institution based upon the committed union
of one man and one woman.”
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled in Baker v. State that the state law excluding
same-sex couples from marriage violated the common benefits clause of the Vermont
constitution.335 It held that:
…the state is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits
and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes the
form of inclusion within marriage laws themselves or a parallel “domestic partnership” system
336
or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the legislature.

The Court thereby gave the legislature two options: it could amend the definition of marriage to allow
same-sex couples to marry, or it could introduce a domestic partnership regime which would extend
to same-sex couples all the same rights and responsibilities as married couples. The Vermont
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legislature adopted the latter approach. In April 2000, it passed An Act relating to Civil Unions, which
enables same-sex couples to register their relationships as “civil unions”. Parties to a civil union will
have the same legal status as married spouses.
Same-sex marriage remains, then, a controversial and contested issue in many Western
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding its controversial nature, however, there is a clear trend towards the
legal recognition of same-sex unions. The exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage and its
attendant rights and responsibilities is increasingly seen as discriminatory. However, legislatures
have not yet chosen to remedy this exclusion by amending the definition of marriage. Instead, they
have preferred to create a parallel civil status, like domestic partnership, to accord a package of
rights and responsibilities to same-sex couples. We will discuss domestic partnerships in more detail
below.

(iii)

Recent Supreme Court of Canada equality decisions and the
constitutionality of the opposite-sex requirement

In Canada, the approach taken by the majority of the Ontario Divisional Court in Layland is
unlikely to remain the final word on the question of the constitutionality of the opposite-sex
requirement of marriage. The issue has yet to be considered by an appellate court. Moreover, since

Layland was decided in 1993, Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence has fundamentally
transformed the constitutional landscape. Challenges to the opposite-sex requirement of marriage
are on their way to the courts in a number of provinces,337 and no doubt the issue will eventually find
its way to the Supreme Court. As we discuss in more detail below, in the aftermath of Egan,338

Law339 and M. v. H.,340 there is a strong argument that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
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definition of marriage would be found to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of
section 15. More difficult to predict is whether the Court would find the violation to be a reasonable
limit under section 1. The decision in M. v. H. in particular lends further credence to the argument,
advanced by Greer J. in dissent in Layland, that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the common
law definition of marriage violates the human dignity of gay men and lesbians. In the absence of any
other means of relationship recognition, the opposite-sex definition of marriage means that, unlike
heterosexual couples, same-sex couples are denied any legally effective means of choosing to have
their relationships recognized as spousal by their communities and the government. At the same time,
however, the Court in M. v. H. was emphatic that the constitutional validity of the definition of marriage
is a distinct issue from the discriminatory treatment of unmarried conjugal cohabitants. This statement
(not to mention the intense political and religious passions engaged by the same-sex marriage debate)
makes any attempt at predicting the constitutional future in this area a perilous exercise.

Does the exclusion of same-sex couples violate section 15 of the Charter?
In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the Supreme Court of Canada
summarized the approach the courts should take to claims that the government has violated the
equality rights in section 15(1) of the Charter. Justice Iacobucci, speaking for a unanimous Court,
affirmed that section 15(1) is to be interpreted in a purposive and contextual manner:
It may be said that the purpose of section 15 is to prevent the violation of essential human
dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social
prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as
human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally deserving of
341
concern, respect and consideration.

After reviewing the Supreme Court equality jurisprudence, Iacobucci J. summarized the three basic
elements of the Court’s approach:
First, does the law (a) draw a formal distinction between the claimant and others on the basis
of one or more personal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant’s already
disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively different treatment
between the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics?
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Second, was the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more enumerated
or analogous grounds? And third, does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a
burden upon or withholding a benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the
stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise
has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or
worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally
342
deserving of concern, respect and consideration?

In considering a constitutional challenge to the opposite-sex requirement of marriage, the first
step is to ask whether the legal definition of marriage draws a formal distinction on the basis of a
personal characteristic. The opposite-sex definition of marriage explicitly excludes same-sex
couples, and therefore draws a formal distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex
couples. The opposite-sex definition of spouse further fails to take into account the disadvantaged
position of same-sex couples within Canadian society resulting in substantively different treatment
between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples on the basis of personal characteristics. The
current position of same-sex couples imposes disadvantages on them not imposed on opposite-sex
couples.
The second step is to ask whether same-sex couples are subject to differential treatment on
the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that
343

sexual orientation is a ground of discrimination prohibited by section 15 of the Charter.

In Egan,

the majority of the Court held that sexual orientation is “a deeply personal characteristic that is either
unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs”, and is analogous to other
personal characteristics enumerated in section 15(1).344 There is little question then that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry would satisfy this step of the test.
The third, and more complicated, step is to ask whether the differential treatment of samesex couples is discriminatory in a substantive or purposive sense. In Law, Justice Iacobucci stated
that in this third step, the relevant inquiry is whether the differential treatment
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…impose[s] a burden upon or withhold[s] a benefit from the claimant in a manner that reflects
the stereotypical application of presumed group or personal characteristics, or which
otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less
capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian
345
society, equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.

Justice Iacobucci reviewed four contextual factors which need to be evaluated to determine whether
the impugned government action violates the claimant’s dignity and is thus discriminatory in the
substantive sense. We will consider each in turn.

1.

Any pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability experienced by
the individual or group
Same-sex couples have experienced a long history of disadvantage, stereotyping and

prejudice. The Supreme Court in Egan recognized the “historical, social, political and economic
disadvantage suffered by homosexuals”.346 The exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution
of marriage has contributed to the stereotype or prejudice that same-sex relationships of caring and
commitment are unworthy of public recognition and support.

2.

The correspondence or lack of it, between the ground on which a claim is based and
the actual need, capacity or circumstances of the claimant or others.
This consideration has been the focus of disagreements between Canadian courts and

judges when dealing with claims of discrimination by same-sex couples. One view, that had
significant judicial support until 1995, is that differential treatment of same-sex couples corresponds
to the actual differences in their procreative capacities.347 The contrary view is that there are no
relevant differences in the needs, capacities or circumstances of same-sex couples that justify their
exclusion from laws regulating adult personal relationships. As Cory J. argued in M. v. H., same-sex
and opposite-sex couples are no different in their ability to form intimate, conjugal relationships
characterized by economic interdependence. To exclude them from legislative definitions of spouse,
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he concluded, ignores the facts: the capacity to form intimate relationships characterized by
economic interdependence has nothing to do with sexual orientation.348
Since 1995, Canadian courts have favoured the functional equivalence approach over the
procreative difference approach. The turning point was the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in

Egan, in which a 5-4 majority firmly rejected the minority’s reliance on procreative difference to justify
a gay couple’s exclusion from the spousal allowance provisions of the Old Age Security Act. Writing
for the majority on the equality issue, Cory J. emphasized that same-sex couples “form lasting,
caring, mutually supportive relationships with economic interdependence”.349 Their exclusion from
the Act was therefore not related to any actual differences in their capacities that were relevant to
the objectives of the statutory provision at issue. More recently, in M. v. H., Gonthier J. was the lone
voice in dissent clinging to an argument founded on “biological and social realities”.350
The shaky factual and normative foundations of the procreative difference argument have
fuelled the shift in the perspective of the courts that has occurred in the past decade. Not all
opposite-sex couples have the potential and desire to procreate; many persons in same-sex
relationships do. In any case, the state’s interest in marriage is not limited to fostering procreation
and child-rearing. We have argued that the primary value underlying state regulation of adult
personal relationships is the creation of a legal framework in which relationships of caring and
commitment are recognized and supported. The courts have now accepted that the sex or sexual
orientation of the partners to a relationship has nothing to do with their capacity for care and
commitment. As a result, Canadian law now leans strongly in favour of the conclusion that the
same-sex marriage bar violates the human dignity of lesbians and gay men.

3.

Whether the impugned legislation has an ameliorative purpose or effect on a
historically disadvantaged group, and the relative advantage of the excluded group.
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Justice Iacobucci emphasized that this factor would only defeat a section 15(1) claim if the
excluded group is more advantaged than the included group. “Underinclusive legislation that
excludes from its scope the members of an historically disadvantaged group will rarely escape the
charge of discrimination.”351
The opposite-sex definition of marriage cannot be said to have an ameliorative purpose or
effect for a historically disadvantaged group. Rather, the definition exacerbates the disadvantage of
gay men and lesbians by excluding them from the community affirmation and legal recognition that
accompanies the right to marry.

4.

The nature of the interest affected by the impugned legislation, or more specifically,
whether the distinction restricts access to a fundamental social institution or affects a
basic aspect of full membership in Canadian society, or constitutes a complete nonrecognition of a particular group.
Marriage is an important legal social institution, and there is little doubt that the right to marry

is an important aspect of full membership in Canadian society. Until very recently, it has been used
as the marker for allocating a wide range of rights and responsibilities. While the passage of Bill C23 will reduce the significance of marriage as a proxy in federal legislation, several legal
entitlements and obligations will continue to be allocated on the basis of marriage. Moreover,
marriage is a ceremony through which couples can publicly state their commitment, and seek the
recognition and support of family, friends and society. Marriage, even if it is no longer as significant
in the allocation of rights and responsibilities, continues to be fundamentally important in terms of
the symbolism of legal recognition. To deny same-sex couples the right to marry is to deny gays and
lesbians the right to this legal recognition and to participate in this institution.
This brief consideration of a section 15 analysis suggest that the current definition of
marriage is very likely to be considered to be a violation of the equality rights of same-sex couples.
There is little question that a challenge to the definition of marriage would satisfy the first two steps
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of the section 15 analysis – a formal distinction based on an analogous ground. While the third step
would be somewhat more contested, it is likely that the definition of marriage will be found to violate
the dignity of same-sex couples, and therefore to be discriminatory in a purposive sense.

Is the section 15 violation a reasonable limit within section 1 of the Charter?
Assuming that the opposite-sex definition of spouse constitutes discrimination contrary to
section 15(1) equality rights, the more difficult question is whether the government could
demonstrate that the opposite-sex definition of marriage is a reasonable limit on equality rights
within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter.
The first step of the section 1 analysis requires that the Court determine whether the
objective of the legislation is pressing and substantial.352 In Vriend, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that where a law violates the Charter owing to under-inclusion, the first stage of the section 1
analysis must address the object of the legislation as a whole, the impugned provisions of the Act,
and the omission itself.353

The second step of the section 1 analysis is the proportionality

requirement, which in turn involves three steps: (1) there must be a rational connection between the
objectives of the legislation, and the means chosen by the government to implement the objective;
(2) the government must demonstrate that the impairment is no more than is reasonably necessary
to achieve its goals; and (3) the benefits that accrue from the legislation must be proportional to its
deleterious effects as measured by the values underlying the Charter. According to this third step,
there “must be proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures which are
responsible for limiting the rights or freedoms in question and the objectives, and there must be a
proportionality between the deleterious and salutary effects of the measures.”354
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While the outcome of a section 1 analysis is difficult to predict, there are several stages of
the test in which the government may have difficulty meeting its burden of demonstration. There is a
serious question as to whether there are pressing and substantial objectives underlying the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage. There is some question as to
whether the definition of marriage is rationally connected to those objectives. And there is some
question as to whether the existing regime can satisfy the requirement of minimal impairment. These
questions are explored in further detail below.

Objectives of marriage?
The first step of the section 1 test requires an analysis of the objectives of marriage, and the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. What, then, is the objective of marriage? As we
discussed above, marriage has served many objectives over time. Citizenship, property, religion,
and supporting a sexual division of labour have all been important objectives in the legal regulation
of marriage. At its most general, the objective of marriage – at least since the advent of the Church was the promotion of the integrity of a very particular adult relationship. It was the only socially,
religiously and legally sanctioned relationship, and it was the basis for the distribution of a range of
rights and responsibilities. Today, marriage is still said to be about reproduction, promoting a stable
environment for the nurturing of children, as well as promoting social stability more generally.355 The
Vermont Civil Unions Act similarly states that “the state has a strong interest in promoting stable and
lasting families. The state’s interest in civil marriage is to encourage close and caring families, and
to protect all family members from the economic and social consequences of abandonment and
divorce, focusing on those who have been especially at risk: women, children and the elderly”.356
While these may be important objectives, there is a question (discussed in further detail
below) whether these objectives are rationally connected to an opposite-sex definition of marriage.
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As common law spouses and same-sex partners are extended more and more legal rights and
responsibilities, and as these relationships assume many of the same functions of marriage,
particularly in relation to the bearing and raising of children, the question is what’s left of marriage?
What, if anything, is distinctive about marriage, if it is no longer the exclusive basis for the
distribution of rights and responsibilities, and no longer the exclusive institution within which children
are born and raised?
Marriage remains an important mechanism through which people announce their
commitment to a personal relationship. It is a ceremony through which they publicly state their
commitment, and seek the recognition and support of family, friends and society. It is the public
recognition of the commitment that remains of importance, rather than the legal entitlements that
attach. David Chambers describes it as “the single most significant communal ceremony of
belonging. It marks not just a joining of two people, but a joining of families and an occasion for tribal
celebration and solidarity.”357 The importance of marriage is then largely symbolic. It is a symbol of
commitment, and a symbol of the public recognition of the personal relationship. For some, this
symbol of commitment remains deeply imbued with religious meaning. For others, the commitment
is more secular. And as a symbol of commitment, it does remain an important, but not exclusive,
proxy for the assumption of mutual responsibilities. Entering into marriage is a statement of the
intention to assume mutual responsibility for financial and emotional well being. And as such, it
remains entirely appropriate for marriage to be one of the legal proxies for the imposition of a range
of rights and responsibilities.

Objective of the Exclusion
The question that must then be addressed is whether there is any legitimate objective being
furthered by the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage. Arguments
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defending the current definition of marriage from same-sex challenges are often cast in the
language of defending tradition, and traditional family values. The objective of the exclusion of
same-sex couples is said to be the promotion of traditional families. The question is whether
protecting marriage is a legitimate objective in its own right? It is certainly a powerful political
argument. Indeed it is frequently asserted as self-evident. For example, in introducing Bill C-23, the
Minister of Justice stated that the bill ensures the principle of equality,
…while preserving the existing legal definition and societal consensus that marriage is the
union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others….This definition of marriage,
which has been consistently applied in Canada and which was reaffirmed last year through a
resolution of the House, dates back to 1866. It has served us well and will not change. We
358
recognize that marriage is a fundamental value and important to Canadians.

The promotion of “traditional values” is closely related to the religious basis of marriage. In
the West, since the advent of the Christian Church, marriage has been intricately tied to religious
belief and practice. For some, marriage remains a sacrament; for others it continues to be practiced
according to Christian principles, and is considered to be ordained by God. The Vermont Civil

Unions Act for example recognized the continuing religious importance of the institution of marriage,
noting “the fundamental constitutional right of each of the multitude of religious faiths in Vermont to
choose freely and without state interference whom to grant the religious status, sacrament or
blessing of marriage under the rules, practices or traditions of such faith”.359
There is, however, some uncertainty as to whether the promotion of “traditional” and religious
values would withstand constitutional review. Specifically, it is unlikely that the promotion of the
traditional opposite-sex definition of marriage would qualify as a pressing and substantial objective
sufficient to justify the denial of the right to marry to same-sex couples. Giving legal support to one
sexual orientation over another violates section 15 of the Charter, and the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence suggests that objectives that run directly counter to Charter values cannot serve as
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legitimate state objectives at the section 1 stage of analysis. In R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,360 the
Supreme Court held that the purpose of Sunday closing laws was to compel observance of the
Christian Sabbath. The Court held that this purpose violated the guarantee of freedom of
conscience and religion and therefore could not serve as a justification under section 1. Promoting
Christianity was not a legitimate objective because it undermined religious freedom and equality.
Similarly, it may be argued that the promotion of marriage as an opposite-sex institution cannot be a
legitimate objective precisely because it violates the equality rights of same-sex couples.
A second, related objective for the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is often
said to be the role of marriage in reproduction. For example, echoing the majority opinion in Layland,
La Forest J., in his dissenting opinion in Egan, was of the view that the objective of marriage is
reproduction:
…its ultimate raison d’être ….is firmly anchored in the biological and social realities that
heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most children are the product
of these relationships, and that they are generally cared for and nurtured by those who live in
361
that relationship. In this sense, marriage is by nature heterosexual.

It is, in his view, this central overriding objective that justifies the exclusion of same-sex couples.
According to La Forest J., same-sex couples are not “capable of meeting the fundamental social
objectives” of marriage:
These couples undoubtedly provide mutual support for one another, and that, no doubt, is of
some benefit to society. They may, it is true, occasionally adopt or bring up children, but this
362
is exceptional and in no way affects the general picture.

While supporting the bearing and rearing of children is undoubtedly an important state
objective, it is less clear that this objective can justify the exclusion of same-sex couples.
Many couples, whether of the same or opposite sex, have children outside of marriage.
Indeed, given the increasing number of same-sex couples who have and raise children, a
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compelling argument could be made that the objectives would be better promoted by the
inclusion of these couples within the definition of marriage.

Rational connection
The opposite-sex definition of marriage might also be vulnerable under the rational
connection part of the section 1 analysis. Assuming that there are pressing and substantial
objectives underlying the current definition of marriage, it may be more difficult to establish a rational
connection between these objectives, and the means chosen to implement these objectives. The
existing definition of marriage is both over- and under-inclusive in relation to the various stated
objectives. For example, marriage is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in relation to the
objective of having and raising children. Many children are now born outside of marriage to both
opposite-sex and same-sex couples. And many married couples are choosing not to have children.
In terms of the objective of public commitment and recognition, marriage is also underinclusive. Only opposite-sex couples can access this public statement of commitment and
recognition. And only opposite-sex couples can choose to assume these mutual responsibilities
through a public statement of their commitment. There is no similar means whereby same-sex
couples can announce their commitment, and seek the public support and legal recognition of their
personal relationships. The existence of a registered domestic partnership regime in which samesex couples, amongst others, could register their relationships and seek the immediate legal
recognition of their personal relationships would go some distance to mitigate the effects of
excluding same-sex couples from marriage. But, a domestic partnership regime is unlikely to provide
the same degree of symbolic recognition and affirmation of the personal relationship as marriage.

Minimal Impairment
When legislation violates constitutional rights, the second step of the proportionality test
requires that the government demonstrate that the impairment is no more than is reasonably
necessary to achieve its goals. The exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage
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means that these couples have no way to “opt in” to the rights, responsibilities and status that is
immediately accorded to opposite-sex couples who marry. At the moment, prior to the passage of
the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, the inability to marry means that same-sex
couples cannot opt into a range of rights and responsibilities that are available exclusively to married
couples. By eliminating most but not all of the distinctions between married and unmarried couples,
Bill C-23 will significantly mitigate this unfairness. Same-sex couples who now live together in a
conjugal relationship for a period of not less than one year will be able to access many of these
rights and responsibilities. But, there are still some significant disparities between opposite-sex
couples who have the choice of marrying and opting in to these rights and responsibilities
immediately, and same-sex couples who do not have the option of marrying, and are only entitled to
these rights and responsibilities after one year of cohabitation. Moreover, there are still several rights
and responsibilities from which same-sex couples will remain excluded. As discussed above, the

Immigration Act will not be amended by the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, and
same-sex couples cannot sponsor their partners. Opposite-sex couples, on the other hand, have the
option of marrying their partners, and are thereby entitled to sponsor their partners for immigration.
As suggested in relation to the rational connection requirement, the government’s ability to
demonstrate minimal impairment would be significantly improved by the introduction of a domestic
partnership regime, whereby same-sex couples would be able to opt in to the same rights and
responsibilities as married couples.363 The constitutionality of the exclusion from marriage would
then rest on the status or symbolic arguments alone.

(iv)

Conclusion

Our discussion is intended to illustrate the potential vulnerability of the opposite-sex definition
of marriage to a constitutional challenge. It is important to emphasize that we are not predicting that
the definition will be struck down by the courts – only that there are strong arguments leading in that
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direction. There are many other variables – including the political ramifications of a court striking
down the opposite-sex definition of marriage – that might well lead the courts to pull their punches.
In the current political environment, such a finding would likely further fuel the charges of judicial
activism and the attack on the institutional legitimacy of the courts. The courts may well shy away
from this political minefield, and defer to the will of the legislature. Further, even if the courts did
strike down the opposite-sex definition of marriage, this would not be the end of the story. One
scenario that cannot be ruled out is the possibility that the federal government would invoke section
33 of the Charter to reassert the opposite-sex definition of marriage. The province of Alberta has
made it clear that it is willing to defend the definition of marriage through the use of the
notwithstanding clause (despite its dubious constitutional jurisdiction to do so).364
Our analysis is intended to illustrate that the opposite-sex definition of marriage is vulnerable
to constitutional challenge, but not that the definition will inevitably fall. However, our analysis is also
intended to suggest that a government committed to the values of caring, commitment, equality,
autonomy and privacy, and to proactively realizing its constitutional obligations, might seriously
consider amending the opposite-sex definition of marriage. Amending the definition of marriage
would be consistent – for the reasons discussed extensively above - with the promotion of
relationships of caring and commitment and with the value of equality. It would also be consistent
with the value of autonomy, by giving individuals within same-sex relationships the freedom to
choose their relational status. Finally, removing the opposite-sex requirement from the definition of
marriage would be consistent with the value of privacy. Marriage has considerable advantages over
common law status, in so far as there are no intrusive tests to determine entitlement. Rather, the
parties can publicly declare their commitment and thereby be recognized as spouses for the
purposes of a range of legal rights and responsibilities. Recognizing same-sex marriage is thus
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consistent with the normative values that we have suggested ought to guide state regulation of adult
personal relationships.
Having said that, the current political environment makes such legislative reform unlikely in
the foreseeable future. There have been many clear indications that the considerable political
reluctance to extend the existing definition of marriage has not yet abated. Examples include the
amendment of Bill C-23 in committee to include an opposite-sex definition of marriage, the Minister’s
comments on the importance of preserving the existing definition of marriage in her introduction of
Bill C-23 to the House of Commons, and the broad support garnered by the Reform Party’s motion
defending marriage in June 1999.
On the other hand, it may only be a matter of time. In less than ten years, there has been a
significant change in social attitudes towards, and legal recognition of, same-sex relationships. The
shift in Canadian attitudes reflects a more general normative shift in understandings of marriage and
family within many Western countries in the last decade. While only the Netherlands has moved to
recognize same-sex marriage, many countries have begun to set up parallel legal regimes that
approximate marriage. Same-sex couples are increasingly being given the option of entering into
domestic partnership regimes, which accord most of the same rights and responsibilities as
marriage. The shift towards the recognition of these relationships is indicative of a broader attitudinal
change, in which the legitimacy of same-sex relationships is being accepted and affirmed.
The Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act must be seen within this broader context
of changing societal norms and attitudes. If Bill C-23 is enacted, same-sex couples will have legal
benefits and obligations in federal legislation identical to those of opposite-sex common law couples.
For the moment, marriage remains the last bastion of the “traditional family”, and the last stronghold
of the constituency committed to defending “traditional family values” from same-sex relationships in
what has otherwise become a losing battle. But, as the fall-out of these reforms settles, and the

The Bill is in pith and substance in relation to the capacity to marry, a matter that falls within federal jurisdiction and
outside provincial jurisdiction in relation to the “solemnization of marriage”.
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recognition of same-sex partners is normalized in both legal and social discourse, the move towards
the recognition of same-sex marriage may seem less loaded in the future.
In the interim, a government committed to realizing its constitutional commitments to equality
and autonomy in intimate relationships, but reluctant to tackle the opposite-sex definition of marriage
in the immediate future, would be well advised to consider the enactment of a domestic partnership
regime, discussed in detail in the section that follows. As noted above, the existence of a domestic
partnership regime may reduce the vulnerability of the opposite-sex definition of spouse to
constitutional challenge. While it may not provide long-term immunity to the definition of marriage, it
might well buy a government time.

(b)

Unmarried Non-conjugal Cohabitants

It is not at all clear that marriage provides a potential solution to the needs of persons living
together in non-conjugal relationships. In our culture, the social meaning of marriage necessarily
involves conjugality, although conjugality no longer necessarily involves marriage. This is so even
though the law does not expressly exclude persons of the opposite sex from entering a celibate
union. The common law does provide that a marriage is voidable in a nullity action if it has not been
consummated through an act of sexual intercourse. However a party who has agreed to or
acquiesced in a marriage with knowledge of the other party’s inability or disinterest in engaging in
sexual intercourse is barred from bringing a nullity action. Therefore, opposite-sex cohabitants have
always had the option of marrying, whether or not their relationships have a sexual component. It
follows that if the definition of marriage were amended to permit same-sex marriage, any two
unmarried adults outside the prohibited degrees could choose to marry. However, because marriage
is so deeply associated with sexual relations, it is unlikely that any significant numbers of “nonconjugal” cohabitants, currently excluded from federal laws, would seek inclusion through this route.
Domestic partnership regimes, discussed in the section that follows, offer considerably more
promise for the inclusion of non-conjugal couples than does marriage.
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B.

Domestic Partnership Regimes
Faced with challenges to the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage,

and their consequent exclusion from a wide range of legal rights and responsibilities, an increasing
number of jurisdictions have enacted, or are considering enacting, registration schemes that
establish a civil status parallel to marriage. Such schemes enable partners to formally register their
relationships, express their commitment publicly, and voluntarily adhere to some or all of the legal
rights and responsibilities conferred on married persons. In contrast to their uniform resistance to
even considering the idea of changing the definition of marriage, the possibility of enacting such
schemes has attracted increasing attention from Canadian legislators and policy-makers across the
political spectrum.365 The political attraction of domestic partnership regimes lies in their capacity to
foster the equality and autonomy of same-sex couples and other domestic partners without altering
the traditional definition of marriage that is so deeply rooted in Western cultural and religious
traditions.
We will begin our analysis of registered partnerships by briefly describing the schemes that
have been enacted or proposed in Canada and in other countries. We will then explain the
advantages that a federal partner registration law would add to the current structure of federal
regulation of adult personal relationships. Our conclusion is that the enactment of a registered
partnership scheme at the federal level will promote the values of caring and commitment, equality,
autonomy, privacy and security that ought to guide state policy in relation to adult personal
relationships.

1.

Models in Other Jurisdictions
(a)

Registered Partnership in Europe
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In 1989, Denmark became the first country to adopt a registered partnership regime for
same-sex couples.366 To be entitled to register as partners, the two persons must be of the same
sex, although they need not share a sexual relationship, or even live together. The wish to provide
mutual security is sufficient. At least one of the partners must be a Danish resident and citizen, and
both must be over 18 years of age. Persons who are already party to a marriage or registered
partnership are not permitted to register.
In most respects, the legal effects of registered partnership are the same as those of
marriage respecting, for example, property rules, separation, divorce, maintenance, social security,
pensions and inheritance regimes. Terms such as "marriage" and "spouse" occurring in Danish
legislation are deemed to include registered partners. The conditions in Danish law relating to
separation or divorce apply to registered partnerships.
However, the Danish model does not eliminate discrimination between same-sex partners
and married spouses. In the Act as originally passed, registered partners are not permitted to adopt.
Nor are they entitled to joint custody of a child or access to assisted conception. Legislation was
passed in 1999 making “step-parent” adoption by a same-sex partner possible. A registered partner
can now adopt the other partner’s child.367 The prohibition on adoption by registered partners as a
couple, however, remains in place. Nor is there a right to apply on relationship break down for an
order of joint custody, access or child support. Finally, the legal formation of registered partnerships
cannot be carried out in church and registered couples have no claim to mediation performed by
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clergy. For these reasons, as several commentators have argued, registered partnerships are,
relative to marriage, “second class forms of relationships”.368
A number of other Nordic nations have since followed the Denmark model, including Norway
(1993),369 Sweden (1994),370 Iceland (1996),371 and the Netherlands (1998).372 With the exception of
the Dutch scheme, the other Nordic registered partnership laws replicate the essential features of
the Danish law: assimilation to marital status with some critical exceptions relating to parental status
and the religious significance of marriage.373 The Icelandic law differs from the Danish law in that it
allows registered partners to have joint custody of the biological children of one partner. The law in
the Netherlands differs from the Danish law in that it is open to opposite-sex and same-sex partners,
and all couples may apply to adopt a child. Belgium (1998), France (1999) and the Spanish province
of Catalonia (1998) have also enacted registration schemes open to two persons of the opposite or
same sex, although the rights and obligations they impose are more limited than the Danish
model.374 In the Czech Republic a bill on registered partnership failed by several votes in 1998;
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plans are underway for an amended proposal.375 In Hungary, a Constitutional Court decision in 1995
ruled that the exclusion of same-sex couples from laws recognizing unmarried cohabitants was
unconstitutional. The cohabitation laws were amended to include same-sex couples in 1996.376 The
implementation of registered partnership schemes is currently under consideration in a number of
other European countries, including Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Finland and the Czech Republic.377

(b)

Hawaii (1997)

Hawaii became the first state in the U.S. to adopt a partner registration scheme with the
passage of a “reciprocal beneficiaries” law in 1997.378 The passage of the Act was part of a series of
events in Hawaii precipitated by the 1993 ruling of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin.379
The Court ruled that the state’s opposite-sex definition of marriage constituted sex discrimination
contrary to the equal protection clause of the Hawaii State Constitution. Following the ruling, the
legislature established a Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law that recommended in 1995
that the marriage statute be amended “to allow two people to marry, regardless of their gender.” 380
The Commission also recommended that the legislature adopt “a universal comprehensive domestic
partnership act that confers all the possible benefits and obligations of marriage for two people,
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regardless of gender.”381 The legislature rejected the first option, proposing instead a constitutional
amendment to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples. The electorate ratified the marriage
amendment by a two-thirds majority in November 1998.382 The legislature chose instead to
implement a limited registration scheme for “reciprocal beneficiaries”, one that falls far short of the
Commission’s recommendation that registrants obtain all the benefits and obligations of marriage.
As noted above, the stated purpose of the reciprocal beneficiaries law is to extend certain
rights and benefits to couples who are legally prohibited from marrying because they are of the
same sex or within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity.383 The legislation repeats the
legislature’s finding that “the people of Hawaii choose to preserve the tradition of marriage as a
unique social institution based upon the committed union of one man and one woman.”384 However,
the legislature acknowledged that “there are many individuals who have significant personal,
emotional, and economic relationships with another individual yet are prohibited by such legal
restrictions from marrying.”385 It cited as examples “two individuals who are related to each other,
such as a widowed mother and her unmarried son, or two individuals who are of the same
gender".386 Registration as a reciprocal beneficiary is available to two persons who are legally
prohibited from marrying, are at least eighteen years old, and are not married nor party to another
reciprocal beneficiary relationship.387 By filing a declaration, reciprocal beneficiaries become subject
to a range of rights and obligations specified in Hawaii law, including inheritance rights and survivor
benefits, health-related rights such as hospital visitation, family and funeral leave, private and public
employee prepaid health insurance coverage, motor vehicle insurance coverage, jointly held
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property rights, legal standing for wrongful death and crime victims rights, and other benefits related
to the use of state facilities and state properties. The state auditor reported that 435 reciprocal
beneficiary relationships were registered in the first year of the law’s operation.388
The Hawaii “reciprocal beneficiaries” legislation rests on several normative assumptions
inconsistent with Canadian understandings of relational equality. One is the view that rights and
obligations should not be extended to unmarried opposite-sex couples unless they are legally barred
from marrying. Another is the explicit creation of second-class status for same-sex couples and
other “reciprocal beneficiaries”. The legislation provides that “unless otherwise expressly provided by
law, reciprocal beneficiaries shall not have the same rights and obligations under the law that are
conferred through marriage.”389 By maintaining a privileged legal status for marriage, the Hawaii
legislature has chosen a discriminatory approach that stands in stark contrast to the principle of
equal status adopted by the Vermont legislature three years later.

(c)

Vermont (2000)

As in Hawaii, the Vermont “civil unions” bill was precipitated by a court ruling declaring the
opposite-sex definition of marriage to be contrary to the State Constitution. On December 20, 1999,
the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled in Baker v. State that
…the state is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits
and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes the
form of inclusion within marriage laws themselves or a parallel “domestic partnership” system
390
or some equivalent statutory alternative rests with the legislature.

The legislature has chosen to pursue the latter option, that is, the creation of an “equivalent statutory
alternative”. In April 2000, the House of Representatives and the Senate approved a bill that will
enact a new civil union status with legal consequences that run parallel to those of marriage. The
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legislative findings reported with the bill set out the reasons for choosing the creation of a new status
rather than amending the definition of marriage:
Changes in the way significant legal relationships are established under the constitution
should be approached carefully, combining respect for the community and cultural institutions
most affected with a commitment to the constitutional rights involved. Approaching the
granting of benefits and privileges to same-sex couples through a system of civil unions will
provide due respect for tradition and long-standing social institutions, and will permit
391
adjustment as unanticipated consequences or unmet needs arise.

Like the registered partnership regimes enacted in the Nordic European countries, parties to a
civil union would have to be of the same sex, at least 18 years of age, not be party to another civil
union or marriage, and not be related to each other (s.1202-3, s.5163). Civil unions would be
certified according to the same procedures as civil marriage, and could be dissolved following “the
same procedures” and “subject to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved in
the dissolution of marriage in accordance with” the divorce laws of the state.392
In contrast to the European and Hawaii laws, the Vermont bill reflects a stronger commitment
to conferring equivalent legal rights and obligations on same-sex partners. The bill provides that
parties to a civil union would have all the same rights and obligations of married couples pursuant to
Vermont law (s.1204). The legislature took care to reduce the risk that the creation of a status
“separate but equal” to marriage might be interpreted by the courts as conferring unequal rights and
obligations on parties to a civil union. The bill adds an interpretive provision directing the courts to
confer the same rights and obligations on parties to a civil union as are conferred on parties to a
marriage. The only exception is
…when clearly necessary because the gender-based text of a statute, rule or judicial
precedent would otherwise produce an unjust, unwarranted, or confusing result, and different
treatment would promote or enhance, and would not diminish, the common benefits and
393
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.
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The Vermont “civil unions” law is the first registered partnership statute in the world to eliminate all
differences in the legal rights and obligations of married and same-sex couples. Its emergence from
the legislative process with the principle of equal status intact thus represents a breakthrough in the
protection of the equal rights of gay and lesbian couples.
The Vermont “civil unions” law does share with all other registered partnership legislation a
preoccupation with preserving the traditional definition of marriage, and thus falls short of a full
commitment to equality. While other registered partnership schemes are separate and unequal, the
Vermont law creates a status that is separate yet truly equal. Because marriage has cultural,
symbolic importance that transcends the legal consequences attached to it, a full commitment to the
value of equality requires the removal of the opposite-sex requirement from the definition of
marriage as well.

(d)

Canadian Proposals

Canadian governments have not yet enacted a registration scheme for domestic partners,
although several are considering doing so, and several reports have recommended their adoption.

(e)

Ontario Law Reform Commission (1993) 394

The OLRC recommended the establishment of a registered domestic partnership scheme
that would be open to any two individuals regardless of the nature of their relationship395 so long as
they were 18 years of age and not party to another marriage or domestic partnership.396 Partners
would be subject to the same rights and responsibilities as married couples pursuant to the Family

Law Act (these include rights and obligations in relation to property division, spousal support,
cohabitation contracts, and the family members’ tort claim). The Commission defended its
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recommendation by reference to the values of equality, autonomy and privacy,397 and noted that the
creation of a new civil status preserves the “particular cultural and religious significance of
marriage”.398 Registered partnerships could be revoked unilaterally with notice to the other
partner.399
(f)

British Columbia Law Institute (1998)

In its Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status, the BCLI recommended that the
provincial government enact a Domestic Partner Act.400 The proposed Act would enable any two
persons over the age of majority (nineteen) to agree to have rights and obligations equivalent to
those of married spouses by making a formal declaration. The Report recommends that domestic
partners be added to definitions of spouse and related terms in all British Columbia legislation.
Partnership status would be open to conjugal and non-conjugal couples, whether or not they are
living together. The Report noted that “[j]ust as with marriage, it would be theoretically possible,
although highly unlikely, that people making a domestic partner declaration would not live together.”
401

Partners must not be party to another domestic partnership or marriage (unless, in the latter

case, they have been separated for more than one year and the separation is intended to be
permanent). The partnership could be terminated by a separation agreement or by living separate
and apart for more than one year with the intention that the separation be permanent.402
Like the Ontario Law Reform Commission, the BCLI defended its recommendations by
reference to principles of autonomy, privacy and non-discrimination.403 To protect the principle of
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privacy, partners would have the option of not registering their partnership declaration, in which case
it would still have legal significance as between them during their lives, but limited significance as
against third parties.404

2.

The Current Federal Legislative Context

The definition of common law partners included in nearly the full range of federal statutes
after Bill C-23 requires cohabitation in a conjugal relationship for one year. It could be argued that
this short period of cohabitation has made it unnecessary to consider enacting a domestic
partnership scheme at the federal level, since cohabiting conjugal couples will be included in all
federal statutes after a relatively short period of cohabitation. In the jurisdictions described above
that have adopted or are considering adopting registered partnership schemes, same-sex couples
do not have the extensive package of rights and obligations that exist in federal legislation after Bill
C-23.
It is true that the need for a domestic partnership scheme at the federal level is less pressing
after the enactment of Bill C-23. Nevertheless, when one compares the operation and scope of the
common law partner definitions with the potential scope and operation of a domestic partnership
scheme, it is clear that the latter continues to offer a number of advantages.
First, a domestic partnership law would promote the equality and autonomy of non-conjugal
cohabitants by permitting them to choose to subscribe to the package of spousal and partnership
benefits from which they are currently excluded. The only other means of effectively accommodating
the interests of non-conjugal cohabitants is by ascribing legal consequences to their relationships by
enacting legislative definitions that would capture a broader range of economically and emotionally
interdependent adult relationships, an option we discuss in greater detail below. Given the diversity
of non-conjugal relationships, and our lack of knowledge regarding their needs and expectations, it
is likely that governments will continue to exercise caution before ascribing legal consequences to
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them. Precisely because registration as domestic partners would be based on a mutual, voluntary
decision to assume legal consequences, it avoids many of the difficulties and uncertainties of
ascribed legal status.
Second, the possibility of registering as domestic partners would be a welcome option even
for those unmarried couples living together in conjugal relationships. Once they have lived together
for one year, these couples are now automatically included in the definition of common law partners
in nearly the full range of federal statutes that apply to married couples. Nevertheless, a registration
option would enhance these couples’ autonomy and privacy, permit them to express their
commitment publicly, and would promote the protection of their reasonable expectations.
One of the disadvantages of common law partner status is that it is imposed involuntarily,
without any formal declaration of commitment apart from the fact of living together. The ability to
formalize a relationship through a public declaration of commitment should not be underestimated. It
gives the partners and their relationship a degree of public visibility, acceptance and accountability
that is simply lacking with common law partnership status. There are innumerable ongoing events in
one’s community – from small, day to day acts of recognition to the celebration of anniversaries –
that continually reaffirm community acceptance and support of formalized unions. Registration
schemes are thus preferable to ascribed relational status in promoting caring commitments in
domestic relationships.
Moreover, the definition of common law partnerships is not self-executing. It involves
interpretation by legal decision-makers regarding the duration of cohabitation and the presence or
absence of a conjugal relationship. These aspects of the definition of common law partners will give
rise to potential uncertainties and intrusive inquiries into partners’ lives as part of the administration
of federal legislative schemes, just as definitions of common law spouses have in the provincial
context.405
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Registered partnership status, in contrast, comes into effect immediately and voluntarily at a
time consciously chosen by the partners themselves. There is no uncertainty about their legal status
and no need for invasions of privacy to determine whether or not partners fall within relational
definitions employed in statutes. These attributes of registered partnerships promote the value of
equality because they confer on partners all of the same advantages that marriage provides to
opposite-sex couples. They also promote autonomy and security to a greater degree than common
law partnership status does. A registered partnership scheme enables partners to choose to take on
a more secure set of legal rights and obligations that correspond to the aspirations and reasonable
expectations of registering partners.406
For these reasons, the federal government should enact a registered domestic partnership
scheme that would be open to any two people who are at least 18 and who are not married or party
to another registered partnership. Registered domestic partners should be added to all federal
statutes alongside married spouses and common law partners. The registration of a domestic
partnership will signal the partners’ commitment to each other and immediately subject them to
rights and obligations under federal law. There should be no difference in the legal status of married
couples and registered domestic partners. The equality principle embodied in the Vermont Bill
should be preferred over the discriminatory elements of the European laws and the Hawaiian
reciprocal beneficiaries law. The prohibitions on marital status and sexual orientation discrimination
in s.15 of the Charter would render any differences in treatment unconstitutional since there could
not be said to be any relevant differences in the qualitative nature of partnership relationships and
marital relationships.

Forms (Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1993) at 80 (“The requirement of a ‘conjugal’ relationship involves an
unnecessary and distasteful inquiry into the intimate details of the partners’ lives, including their social and sexual
habits.”). See discussion infra at note 429.
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For a similar description of the advantages of registered partnerships, see Thomas Anderson, “Comment on the
Report of the BCLI on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status”, Domestic Partnerships Conference Papers
(Queen’s University, 1999), at 96.
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Because of the limits on federal jurisdiction, the implementation of a registered partner status
for the purposes of federal laws could have no direct or immediate impact on provincial laws.
Registered partners would remain unrecognized (except as common law spouses if they meet the
cohabitation and conjugal requirements) in provincial laws dealing with the rights and responsibilities
of family members until those laws are also amended to accommodate the new civil status. The lack
of correspondence between federal and provincial relational definitions would be an unfortunate and
inconvenient situation. The best situation would be for federal and provincial governments to move
forward in a coordinated fashion. However, in the absence of federal/provincial agreement, the
advantages of federal leadership on this issue outweigh the disadvantages of a lack of
correspondence between federal and provincial relational definitions. The same problems exist now
for persons recognized as common law partners in federal legislation. For example, same-sex
couples, included in the definition of common law partners in federal statutes, are not recognized in
the legislation of seven provinces. But just as this difficulty did not prevent the government from
moving ahead with Bill C-23, neither should the challenges of divided jurisdiction inhibit the federal
government from establishing a registered partnership scheme.
There is no compelling reason to limit registered partnerships to same-sex couples, conjugal
couples, or even to cohabiting couples. The value of autonomy suggests that the choice of relational
status should only be limited for good reasons. The experience in the Netherlands indicates that a
significant number of opposite-sex couples have chosen to register as partners rather than marry,407
and that 62% of registered same-sex couples would prefer to marry if that option were open to
them.408 It should not surprise us that the meanings that particular couples attach to the institutions
of marriage and domestic partnership are personal and variable. Marriage has deep historical and
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Martha Bailey reports that during the first ten months of the operation of the new law about one third of the total of
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276. See also Forder, “Models of Domestic Partnership Laws: The Field of Choice”, supra note 374 at 61-2.
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religious roots; domestic partnership is a product of the secular aspirations of contemporary liberal
democracies. Ideally, individuals seeking to formalize their primary adult personal relationships
should be free to choose the relational status that carries the combination of meanings and legal
consequences that provides the best fit with their own beliefs, attitudes and aspirations. Moreover,
the principle of equality leans against the creation of a new legal status defined by reference to a
prohibited ground of discrimination.
The enactment of a federal domestic partnership law would do much to advance the values of
caring and commitment, equality, autonomy, privacy and security that ought to guide state regulation
of adult personal relationships. Registering couples would be able to publicly declare their
commitment, formalize their relationships, and freely assume the package of legal rights and
obligations that are currently extended to husbands, wives and common law partners. However, a
domestic partner registration scheme does not provide a complete answer to the needs of persons
living together in relationships of care and commitment. For a variety of reasons, just as many
cohabiting opposite-sex couples are not married, a number of persons living together in
relationships of caring and commitment will not register as domestic partners. Even if privacy
protections are built into the new law along the lines of the BCLI recommendations, some couples
will be reluctant to choose a greater degree of public disclosure of their relationships than required
by the definition of common law partners. Further, as McCarthy and Radbord have argued, “a
comprehensive registered domestic partnership regime, without default protections in the event of a
failure to register, offers no recourse to vulnerable spouses who did not have sufficient knowledge or
power in a relationship to protect their interests by registration.”409 In other words, registered
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partnership schemes are “under-inclusive” in not meeting the needs of all persons living in
relationships of caring and commitment. Therefore, to fully promote the values of equality and
security in the regulation of adult domestic relationships characterized by caring and commitment,
the state must consider ascribing or imposing legal status on persons living with others outside
marriage or a registered partnership. At the same time, careful consideration must be given to not
interfere unduly with the privacy or autonomy of unmarried and unregistered couples. With the
passage of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, the federal government will add
common law partners to the vast majority of federal statutes. Thus, a “default scheme” will already
be in place for unmarried or unregistered conjugal couples. In the next section, we will consider the
adequacy of the current definition of common law partner and related terms in federal statutes, and
advance the argument that the government should consider including non-conjugal domestic
relationships involving care and commitment in federal legislation to a greater extent.

C.

Deemed or Ascribed Spousal/Relational Status
1.

Ascribed Spousal/Partner Status
(a)

Current Definitions

At the moment, prior to the expected passage of the Modernization of Benefits and

Obligations Act, federal pension and tax laws include deemed or ascribed spousal status provisions.
These definitions generally have residency, duration and conjugality requirements. For example, the

Old Age Security Act defines spouse as including “a person of the opposite sex who is living with
that person, having lived with that person for at least one year, if the two persons have publicly

without much thought to the legal consequences or on the expectation that the law will impose an equitable resolution
of their affairs on the break down of the relationship.”).
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represented themselves as husband and wife”.410 Similarly, the Pension Benefits Standards Act
defines spouse as including “a person of the opposite sex who is cohabiting with the member/former
member in a conjugal relationship…having so cohabited with the member/former member for at
least one year”.411 The duration of residence required in federal definitions of common law
cohabitants has steadily decreased over time, and has now settled on a uniform requirement of a
year in duration.412 The definition of spouse is also restricted to opposite-sex couples.
Bill C-23 will replace these definitions of ascribed spousal status with one uniform definition.
According to the approach in the Bill, a person cohabiting with another in a conjugal relationship for
at least a year will be referred to as a “common law partner”. Most significantly, the new definition
eliminates the opposite-sex restriction, thereby extending ascribed “partnership” status to same-sex
couples. The definition retains the co-residency requirement and the uniform duration for this
residency of one year. The definition also retains the conjugality requirement, although it does not
define the meaning of “conjugal”. Therefore, the definition of conjugality continues to be governed by
the case law. Apart from the removal of the opposite-sex requirement, the definition of common law
partner is identical to the definition of common law spouse previously employed in federal pension
and tax laws.
Several approaches to the interpretation of cohabitation and conjugality are found in the
case law. One approach emphasizes the economic relationship between the parties, and examines
whether there is a relationship of economic dependency.413 A second, and more prevalent approach
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considers whether the relationship is functionally equivalent to marriage. In Re Feehan and Attwells,
an Ontario County Court held that “cohabit” means “living together in a marriage like relationship
outside marriage”,414 an approach that was subsequently affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in

Sanderson v. Russell.415 This approach has required the courts to identify the basic dimensions and
functions of a marital relationship, and then determine whether the relationship in question
sufficiently approximates a marital relationship. In this approach, the economic relationship between
the parties is seen as one among a number of factors to be considered, including shelter, sexual
and personal relationships, domestic services, social activities, and children.416
Both of these approaches to cohabitation and conjugality have been the subject of criticism.
As we have argued elsewhere, the economic dependency approach is based on the stereotype of
marriage as a relationship of inequality and dependency. 417 This approach to cohabitation, which
defines the spousal relationship in terms of the economic dependency of women, seems to be at
odds with the partnership model of spousal relationships that increasingly informs family law. While
the economic relationship is an important dimension of the relationship, the emphasis should be
placed on interdependency and equality, rather than dependency.418 It is, however, possible to shift
the conceptualization of this model slightly, from an economic dependency model to an economic
interdependency model. In many respects, the emphasis on economic dependency simply reflected
the discourse of spousal support at the time. Moreover, the Court in Stoikiewicz did speak of mutual
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obligations (i.e. whether the individuals in question “have each assumed an obligation to support
and provide for the other in the same manner that married spouses are obliged to do”).419 The model
could without difficulty be updated to reflect post-Moge understandings of spousal support and
family obligations more generally, with its emphasis on economic interdependency. Within such a
reconceptualized economic interdependency model, the main factor for determining the existence of
a spousal relationship would be economic – did they live in a relationship of economic
interdependency or economic partnership? The limitation of this approach is, however, that it still
risks placing too much emphasis on the economic relationship to the exclusion of other factors that
contribute to a spousal relationship.
The functional approach – which does take into account a broader range of factors that
contribute to a spousal relationship - has also been criticized, primarily for the extent to which it
measures all relationships against a norm of an idealized marital relationship.420 This approach runs
the risk of assuming that there is a single model of marriage. As we have argued, “the idealized
functional approach sets up a monolithic and mythical image of the marital relationship, against
which all relationships are evaluated”.421 Further, reliance on a functional approach may also lead
courts “to engage in inquiries into the intimate details of relationships, intruding on personal privacy”.
422

At the same time, it is not at all clear that it is possible to avoid a functional definition of spouse, if

spousal status is ever to be ascribed by statute. There needs to be some basis on which to
distinguish between those relationships to be included within the legislation, and those that are not.
It is, after all, the functional similarities of the relationships that has led to the steady expansion of
rights and responsibilities to cohabiting couples. A functional approach might identify the different
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dimensions and functions of family life, without insisting that all relationships fit perfectly within this
norm.
In M. v. H., the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed, with little consideration, the functional
approach to conjugality. In particular, Cory J. described the approach in the 1980 Ontario District
Court case of Molodowich v. Penttinen as setting out “the generally accepted characteristics of a
conjugal relationship.423 They include shared shelter, sexual and personal behavior, services, social
activities, economic support and children, as well as the societal perception of the couple”.424 The
Supreme Court seemed to be taking into account the criticisms of this functional approach to the
family, in noting that these dimensions of family life will be present in varying degrees, and that it will
not be necessary for a couple to satisfy all of these dimensions for their relationship to be conjugal.
“In order to come within the definition, neither opposite-sex couples nor same-sex couples are
required to fit precisely the traditional marital model to demonstrate that the relationship is
‘conjugal’”.425 The Supreme Court noted that an opposite-sex couple might be considered “to be in a
conjugal relationship although they do not have children nor sexual relations”.426
[T]he weight to be accorded the various elements or factors to be considered in determining
whether an opposite-sex couple is in a conjugal relationship will vary widely and almost
427
infinitely. The same must hold true of same-sex couples.

The Court held that the approach to determining whether a relationship is conjugal must be
“flexible”, since the “relationships of all couples will vary widely.”428

(b)

Critique of Current Definitions
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There are then a number of criticisms that may continue to be directed to the current
definitions for ascribed spousal status. First and foremost is the lack of clarity in the prevailing
definition of cohabitation and conjugality. Following M. v. H., the test for conjugality involves a
consideration of the various factors in Molodowich, which according to the Court, “may vary widely
and almost infinitely”.429 The Supreme Court has given very little guidance on the question of what, if
anything, makes a spousal relationship unique. How many of the factors must a couple meet before
they are considered spouses? Are any factors more important than others? The Court gives little
guidance, other than to emphasize flexibility and diversity. Indeed, it has said that a conjugal
relationship may exist, even in the absence of a sexual relationship, which is often assumed in
ordinary parlance to be a central if not defining feature of a “conjugal relationship”.
There is good reason not to give primacy to the existence of a sexual relationship in
determining entitlement to a range of rights and responsibilities. Making sexual behaviour part of the
definition inevitably entails serious invasions of privacy. Moreover, the presence or absence of a
sexual relationship is in itself not relevant to any legitimate state objectives. Sex is a poor indicator of
a couple’s entitlement to the range of federal rights and responsibilities. It is both over- and underinclusive. Many couples who have a sexual relationship do not have a close economic relationship.
And conversely, many couples who do not have a sexual relationship may have an economically
and emotionally interdependent relationship. However, once the existence of a sexual relationship is
no longer a factor that distinguishes between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships, the exclusion
of many non-conjugal couples becomes more and more difficult to sustain.
In the aftermath of M. v. H., there is little clarity to the meaning of conjugality. The Court’s
approach, while an improvement over a functional approach that holds fast to the idealized norm of
marriage, sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility and diversity. The approach to conjugality
now appears to be an “I know it when I see it” approach. And in extending conjugality to
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relationships that do not involve a sexual relationship, the definition of spouse begins to undermine
the very distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. While the definition of spouse
does not specifically contemplate the inclusion of relationships between adult siblings, or adult
children and their parents, it becomes harder and harder to justify the exclusion of these
relationships. These relationships may be characterized by joint residence, emotional intimacy, and
economic interdependency. One may provide domestic services for the other. One may be entirely
economically dependent on the other. While they would not hold themselves out as spouses, their
relationships may be characterized by many of the dimensions of family life that give rise to legal
rights and responsibilities.
A related concern is that the definition of conjugality is not self-executing. As mentioned
above, it requires interpretation by legal decision-makers. Administration of the definition may
require a detailed and intrusive investigation into the lives of the individuals involved. The functional
definition of conjugality after M. v. H. still requires that a decision-maker consider the most intimate
details of people’s lives, including their sexual and emotional relationships. Such an inquiry
constitutes a significant invasion of privacy. One might argue that individuals seeking government
benefits must be prepared to compromise their privacy. However, the same invasive procedures are
used to impose government obligations. In other words, it is not simply a question of choosing to
subject one’s self and one’s relationship to scrutiny in exchange for potential benefits. Often, it is not
a matter of individual choice at all.

(c)

Towards a new Definition for Ascribed Status

The current definition of ascribed spousal status lacks clarity, is still under-inclusive of the
range of relationships that might warrant protection, and is potentially unduly intrusive of individual
privacy. One option would be to attempt to introduce a new definition of cohabitation or conjugality.
While the test would have to retain a functional component, it may be possible to better capture the
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particular dimensions of personal relationships that give rise to the need for legal recognition, and
the allocation of legal rights and responsibilities. In our view, there are two factors that are
particularly salient: economic interdependence and emotional intimacy. As we have argued
elsewhere:
It is the combination of emotional intimacy and economic partnership that creates the unique
vulnerability of spouses to harsh consequences arising on the break down of a lasting
relationship. Emotional intimacy is founded on the kinds of trust that tend to prevent people
from taking seriously the possibility of economic deprivation if the relationship falters. And a
high degree of economic interdependence potentially creates a high degree of economic
430
vulnerability.

In our study on the spousal definitions in Ontario family law, we previously recommended that the
definition of cohabitation for the purposes of ascribed spousal status be amended. We
recommended that “spouse” include “either of two persons who have lived together in a relationship
of primary importance in each other’s lives.” We further recommended that “live together” be defined
as “living together in an economic partnership whether within or outside of marriage”.431 The
Ontario Law Reform Commission was of the view that this definition was problematic. “First, the
meaning of the term ‘economic partnership’ is unclear. Individuals may have difficulty demonstrating
to a court that such a partnership existed. Second, even when modified by the phrase ‘in a
relationship…of primary importance in each other’s lives” the proposed definition potentially applies
to many relationships that are not currently within the purview of the Family Law Act. It could
conceivably apply, for example, to business partnerships, as well as to relationships between
parents and their children, or between friends.”432
We continue to believe that the general approach of focusing on emotional intimacy and
economic interdependency has much to commend it. First, we do not believe that proving the
existence of a economic partnership, or a relationship of economic interdependence is any more
difficult to establish than the interrogation of an economic relationship in the current approach to
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conjugality. The test in Molodowich involves an examination of the financial relationship between the
parties regarding the necessities of life, the arrangements concerning the acquisition and ownership
of property, and any special financial arrangements agreed to between the parties. It also involves
an examination of any domestic services provided by one of the parties. These are in any case the
kind of factors that go towards the existence of a relationship of economic partnership or economic
interdependency.
However, there is merit to the OLRC’s concern that the definition will apply beyond traditional
“conjugal” couples. We do not agree that the definition would apply to business partnerships.
However, a focus on emotional intimacy and economic interdependency could well include a broad
range of adult relationships within its purview. It could include the relationship between two elderly
sisters who have lived together for 20 years, or the relationship between a parent and adult child
who have lived together for many years. Adult siblings or parent/child relationships certainly seem to
fall outside of the scope of a definition of ‘spouse’. However, the potentially broad scope of the
definition may go more to the fact that the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships is increasingly difficult to sustain. The purpose of expanded definitions of spouses was
to recognize relationships that are functionally equivalent to marriage – and thereby characterized by
the same degree of emotional and economic interdependence. While the existence of a sexual
relationship was one of the factors that continued to characterize the uniqueness of conjugal
relationships in the functional approach under Molodowich, the Supreme Court has now made it
clear that the test for conjugality no longer requires a sexual relationship. As we have argued, in the
aftermath of M. v. H., the very distinction between conjugality and non-conjugality has in fact begun
to come undone within the test itself.
A question, then, that needs to be addressed is whether it is possible and/or desirable to
provide a revised definition of spouse and/or cohabitation that would maintain the distinction
between conjugal and non-conjugal couples. If so, then the question of the legal recognition of nonconjugal relationships would proceed as a separate issue. If not, then it would be necessary to
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develop a broader term for the ascription of relationship status that applied to conjugal and nonconjugal couples alike. After considering this issue, we will then return to the more specific question
of the appropriate definitions to apply to these relationships.

Models in Other Jurisdictions
At least two other jurisdictions have seriously considered this question of ascribed relational
status, and the distinctions between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. We briefly review
these two models.

New South Wales
In New South Wales, the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999
introduced a detailed definition of de facto relationships, as well as a definition of close personal
relationships and domestic relationships.433 The Act amends the definitions contained in the De

Facto Relationships Act 1984. It further extends the rights and responsibilities in a range of statutes
to de facto relationships , and in some circumstances, to close personal relationships. Section 5 of
the Act defines domestic relationships as “a de facto relationship or a close personal relationship
(other than marriage or a de facto relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by
family, who are living together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic services and
personal care.” 434 Section 4(1) of the Act defines a de facto relationship as “a relationship between
two adult persons (a) who live together as a couple, and who are not married to one another or
related by family.” Section 4(2) states that:
…in determining whether two persons are in a de facto relationship, all the circumstances of
the relationship are to be taken into account, including such of the following matters as may
be relevant in a particular case:
(a) the duration of the relationship
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persons where one of them provides the other with domestic support and personal care: (a) for a fee or reward, or (b)
on behalf of another person or an organisation.”
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(b) the nature and extent of common residence
(c) whether or not a sexual relationship exists
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for
financial support, between the parties
(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of property
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life
(g) the care and support of children
(h) the performance of household duties
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationships.

Section 4(3) specifically provides that “no finding in respect of any of the matters mentioned in
subsection 2(a)-(i), or in respect of any combination of them, is to be regarded as necessary for the
existence of a de facto relationship, and a court determining whether such a relationship exists is
entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem
appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.”
The Act thus maintains a distinction between de facto relationships and close personal
relationships, although both are included within the broader idea of domestic relationships. A de

facto relationship can be seen as the equivalent of an ascribed spousal definition – it applies to
unmarried couples who are living together in a common law or conjugal relationship, although it
carefully avoids this language. The Act provides a functional definition of de facto relationships –
setting out the kinds of factors that the courts should take into account in determining the existence
of such relationships. At the same time, the Act is attentive to the problems of an idealized
approach, insisting that a relationship need not meet all of these factors, nor indeed any specific
factor, in order to be regarded as a de facto relationship. The definition of de facto relationship bears
some resemblance to the Canadian definition of ‘conjugal’ relationships in the aftermath of M. v. H.
– a flexible and functional approach that considers residence, sexual, economic, parenting,
domestic, and social relationships. But, the New South Wales legislation has the advantage of
avoiding the baggage of the language of “conjugality”, and its seemingly inescapable association
with sexual relationships.
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A close personal relationship, on the other hand, applies to individuals who live together in
‘non-conjugal’ relationships (again, carefully avoiding this language). It is not the marriage-like
nature of the relationship that is significant, but rather, whether the relationship involves “domestic
support and personal care”. The definition is functional, in so far as it is concerned with particular
features of the relationship, but it potentially includes a much broader group of individuals, such as
parent/adult child, adult siblings, as well as two unrelated adults who live together. Individuals in a
“close personal relationship” are considered to be living in a domestic relationship, and have a range
of rights and responsibilities, although a much more limited set of rights and responsibilities than
those imposed on de facto relationships.

British Columbia Law Institute (1998)
In its Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status, the BCLI recommended that the
provincial government enact a Family Status Recognition Act, which would define family
relationships.435 The Report considered the extent to which the law does and should recognize nontraditional spousal relationships and non-traditional family relationships. In terms of spousal
relationships, the Report recommended that three kinds of relationships involving spouses or
partners be recognized: married spouses, domestic partners

436

and “people in marriage like

relationships”.437 The BCLI recommended that the three different spousal relationships consist of the
same rights and obligations while the relationship is subsisting. However, it recommended some
distinctions in rights and responsibilities between these different relationships when the relationship
ends, that is, on separation or death. 438

435

BCLI, Report on Recognition of Spousal and Family Status, supra note 400.

436

The BCLI recommendations in relation to domestic partners is discussed supra at note 400-404.

437

British Columbia Law Institute, draft Family Status Recognition Act, section 1, supra note 400.

438

People in marriage like relationships would not be treated the same as spouses who have voluntarily assumed
spousal status (i.e. through marriage and domestic partnership). They would have the right to apply for support, a
right to apply for a share of property under the draft Family Relations Act (but no automatic right to property); and a
right to apply for a share of the estate under the Wills Variation Act (but no automatic right).
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The Report specifically recommended that the term “marriage-like relationship” include
same-sex couples439; that it not require sexual intimacy; 440 and that it not require a duration test441,
except in specially defined circumstances.442 The draft Act provides a list of relevant factors to take
into account in determining whether a “marriage like relationship exists between people who are not
married”, including “the duration of the relationship, the nature of the relationship, the extent to which
the financial interests of the parties have been merged, the extent to which direct and indirect
contributions have been made by either party to the other or the mutual well-being of the parties, the
extent to which the parties are socially and emotionally interdependent, whether the parties hold
each other out as partners, and whether the parties have together taken responsibility for raising
children”.443
In terms of family relationships, the Report recommended that the law should “recognize
people (including non-relatives) who live with another in a close relationship that is the equivalent of
a family relationship.” Family is defined broadly to include “a person’s spouse and household
member”. A “household member” means “a relative or non-relative of a second person who lives
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Including support and property rights at the end of the relationship, qualifying for special tax status or government
grants and entitlements, pension rights and succession rights, and to assert entitlement to a relational claim, where
the relationship must have lasted for 2 years before it will be recognized.

443

Ibid., section 3. The draft further states in section 3(2) that “a determination…of whether a relationship is marriagelike must be based on objective factors, not the subjective intent of the parties.” Section 3(3) provides that “the
absence of an express or implied life-long commitment between persons, or the finding that the parites expressly or
impliedly intended their mutual commitment to be temporary, does not prevent a finding that the relationship is
marriage-like if the parties have, on an objective assessment, a relationship that is equivalent to marriage”. Section
3(4) states that “a marriage like relationship does not arise between persons who cohabit if they keep their finances
separate and one of both parties throughout the relationship expressly denies that the relationship is marriage-like”.
In the notes, the Institute describes the distinctions between section 3(3) and 3(4): “subs.3(3) provides that the
absence of the subjective intent to form a marriage-like relationship does not prevent a finding of a marriage like
relationship. Subs.3(4) provides that a finding of an express subjective intent against the formation of such a
relationship would be conclusive where the parties did not merge their finances”.
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with the second person in a close association that is the equivalent of a family relationship”.444
According to the BCLI, “the policy is to recognize the family status of people, including non-relatives,
who live together as family (as opposed to roommates, boarders, or live-in employees, such as a
housekeeper or other kinds of domestic staff).”445 The Report stated that it will be up to the courts to
determine whether or not the relationship is sufficiently close to qualify as a family relationship.
“Clearly, simply sharing a residence is not in itself sufficient to create a relationship that is equivalent
of family. In most cases, something more in terms of how the parties regard each other, and conduct
their domestic and financial affairs, would be required.”446 The BCLI thus recommends the inclusion
of a much broader range of relationships within the concept of “family”. The phrase “close
relationship that is the equivalent of a family relationship” is intended to capture relationships that
are neither spousal, nor blood-relatives. It is an open-ended definition, with considerable judicial
discretion.
The Continuing Viability of the Conjugal/Non-conjugal Distinction?
The New South Wales legislation and the British Columbia Law Institute study suggest that it
is both possible and desirable to maintain a distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships, although both abandon the language of conjugality. The New South Wales legislation
distinguishes between de facto relationships and close personal relationships. The BCLI Report
distinguishes between a spousal (marriage like) and family relationship (close relationship that is
equivalent to family). Both are effectively maintaining a distinction between spousal relationships
and other familial relationships, while still recommending that a range of legal rights and
responsibilities be extended to non-traditional relationships. However, neither use the language of
conjugality/non-conjugality. And both attempt to move away from the implicit association of spousal
status with a sexual relationship. Under both the New South Wales legislation and the BCLI
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BCLI Report, supra note 400.
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recommendations, a sexual relationship would not be required to establish a de facto or marriagelike relationship.
The advantage of an approach that maintains a distinction between conjugal and nonconjugal is that it would cause the least disruption within the existing federal legal landscape. If Bill
C-23 is enacted, the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act will extend legal rights and
responsibilities on the basis of conjugality. It will define common law partner based on the idea of
cohabiting in a conjugal relationship. Maintaining a distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal
couples would allow the expansion of the legal framework to include non-conjugal couples, where
appropriate, without requiring substantial reform to the recognition of conjugal couples.
There are, however, a number of disadvantages with this approach to which we have already
alluded. There is the increasingly conceptual difficulty of sustaining the validity of the distinction. As
we have argued above, in the aftermath of M. v. H., it is clear that the legal distinction is not simply
the existence of a sexual relationship, and the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal has
become more elusive. The fact that our law retains this distinction begs the larger, and perhaps
increasingly unanswerable question: What is the difference between conjugal and non-conjugal
couples, and what significance if any should attach to this difference? Despite the legal tests, is the
difference still about the existence of a sexual relationship or perhaps the possibility of an otherwise
legitimate sexual relationship? For example, even if a couple does not currently have a sexual
relationship, is it about having had one in the past? Is it about the possibility (or expectation) that
they could have a legitimate sexual relationship (thereby excluding a range of familial relationships
from the scope of “spouse”)? 447
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The extent to which conjugality continues to be associated with sex was evident in the debates surrounding Bill C-23.
For example, Reform Party MPs argued at some length that the existence of a sexual relationship was an
inappropriate basis for the allocation of rights and responsibilities. This argument can be seen as a thinly veiled effort
to oppose the extension of rights and responsibilities to same sex couples, particularly given their support for limiting
the definition of marriage to oppose sex couples (Svend Robinson, MP, makes this point in his comments on Second
Reading: “I would note as well that each and every one of those members of parliament who is now speaking out
against this bill is saying that they should oppose this bill because it does not go far enough, it does not recognize
other dependent relationships like two sisters living together or two elderly gentlemen sharing a home. Without
exception each and every one of those members has spoken against basic equality for gay and lesbian people. That
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Is it also a question of commitment? Married spouses and domestic partners can be seen to
have publicly and voluntarily assumed a mutual commitment to one another that may be absent in
other kinds of relationships. However, the very nature of an ascribed spousal status is that it
imposes spousal status, and its concomitant rights and responsibilities in the absence of such a
publicly and voluntarily assumed commitment. Is it a question of expectation, or reasonable
expectations? Persons in “relationships tantamount to spousal”448 have increasingly come to have a
set of expectations about what the relationship involves – particularly, expectations about economic
interdependency; expectations about economically intertwined lives that extend indefinitely into the
future. These are at the same time expectations that are partially, but not fully reflected in the law.
As we have suggested above, popular opinion seems to be that the law already includes these
common law relationships on the same basis as marriage.449 These expectations – partially created
and reinforced by the law itself – may not extend to the same extent to other types of adult
relationships. Individuals in non-conjugal relationships may not have the same expectation that their
lives will remain economically intertwined indefinitely into the future. Or they may not have the same
expectation about the legal implications of their relationships.
However, such expectations may more appropriately be a question of fact – some of those
who live in these non-conjugal relationships may well expect that their lives will remain economically
intertwined indefinitely into the future. Moreover, the fact that they do not expect the law to protect

is their agenda. They do not believe in it.” House of Commons Debates (Hansard 049) 15 February 2000 at 1245.)
Nevertheless, it does raise a serious question about the ongoing distinction between conjugal and non conjugal
couples. Reform Party MP Eric Lowther, after speaking at length about the importance of the traditional definition of
marriage and of promoting the institution of marriage, stated: “There are many types of gender relationships: siblings,
friends, roommates, partners, et cetera. However, the only relationship the government wants to include is when two
people of the same gender are involved in private sexual activity, or what is more commonly known as homosexuality.
No sex and no benefits is the government’s approach to this bill. Even if everything else is the same, even if there is a
long time cohabitation and dependency, if there is no sex there are no benefits. Bill C-23 is a benefits for sex bill. It is
crazy.” Ibid. at 1135-1140. The Honourable Member misstates the scope of the Bill (which extends benefits and
obligations to same sex and opposite sex common law couples) and misrepresents the current test for conjugality
(within which following M. v. H. a sexual relationship is but one potentially relevant factor). However, his comments do
capture the extent to which, in the public imagination, conjugality continues to be associated with a sexual
relationship, as well as the extent to which the mere existence of a sexual relationship increasingly seems to be an
inappropriate marker for the extension of rights and responsibilities.
448

Petkus v. Becker, supra note 104.
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them may say more about the inadequacy of the law than it does about the actual distinctions
between conjugal and non-conjugal couples. And this argument may overstate the extent of the
legal exclusion of these non-conjugal couples. It is simply not the case that conjugal relationships
are included, and non-conjugal excluded. As we reviewed above, federal law already ascribes
relationship status in a broad range of non-conjugal relationships (i.e. through the language of
dependants, related persons, etc).
The theme that runs throughout our discussion is that the distinction between conjugal and
non-conjugal couples is dissolving. It is increasingly difficult to find a sustainable basis for this
distinction – beyond a basic “I know it when I see it” approach that seems to inform much of the
debate. Our discussion would suggest that we are of the view that the distinction should be
abandoned, and that the law ought to move towards a more expansive definition of ascribed
relationship status that would include both conjugal and non-conjugal couples. We could return to
our earlier recommendation of replacing the term “cohabiting in a conjugal relationship” with a more
specific definition, such as “living together in a relationship of economic interdependency and
emotional intimacy” – or, in a close personal relationship of economic interdependency.
However, there remains the political reality that Bill C-23 will extend legal recognition on the
basis of conjugality. The debates around the Bill suggest that conjugality is for some a meaningful
social and legal category, and that any further extension of rights and obligations to other adult
relationships should leave this category intact. In introducing the Bill for second reading in the House
of Commons, Minister of Justice Anne McLellan specifically stated her commitment to this
distinction. “[T]here is a qualitative difference between the relationships addressed in Bill C-23 and
the types of relationships that may exist among relatives, siblings or friends living under the same
roof and sharing household expenses”.450 The Minister then noted that adult Canadians who
currently live in these dependency relationships may welcome the extension of benefits, but perhaps
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not the accompanying legal obligations, and raised a series of important questions about how these
relationships of dependency ought to be recognized. While these are indeed important questions,
the significance of the quotation here lies in the blanket assertion of the “qualitative difference”
between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships. 451
There also remains the political reality that Bill C-23 does not include a definition of
conjugality, and it seems unlikely that political interest in embracing the challenge will arise in the
future. It would appear that the government prefers to leave this perplexing issue to the courts. It is
likely that, at least for the foreseeable future, it will remain for the courts to develop and apply a
reasonable definition to conjugality.

2.

Ascribing Non-conjugal Relationship Status

As we discussed above, federal law already ascribes relational status in non-conjugal
contexts, through a range of relational definitions. The terms “dependant” and “related person” are
used broadly in federal statutes to include both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships.
“Dependant” for example might include married spouses, common law partners, parents and
children, as well as other “relatives” living in the same household. “Related persons” often includes
persons related to marriage, blood or adoption. “Immediate family” and “near relative” are also used
to describe and include a number of non-conjugal relationships. The problem therefore is not one of
the total exclusion of non-conjugal relationships, but rather, the partiality and inconsistency of their
inclusion. Some relationships are included for some purposes and not others. And these
relationships are defined in different ways for different purposes. A strong case can be made for the
need to rationalize the state’s approach to these relationships. The lack of consistency and
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See, House of Commons Debates (Hansard 049), 15 February 2000 at 1110.
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The debates over Bill C-23 included a number of similar assertions. For example, Svend Robinson, MP, said “I do not
know if the honourable member has brothers or sisters, but if he is suggesting that his relationships with his brother
or his sister is qualitatively the same as his relationship with his wife, that is a ludicrous suggestion. We can look at
other relationships of dependency, but the fact of the matter is that they are qualitatively different from the relationship
that gay or lesbian people have with their partners”. Ibid. at 1300. At the same time, however, Robinson emphasized
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uniformity makes it difficult for individuals to know when their relationships are included, and when
they are not.
Further, non-conjugal relationships tend to be included only if they involve individuals who
are related to one another. “Dependant”, “related person” and most of the other relational terms
deployed in federal statutes only include individuals who are related in some way (for example, by
blood, marriage, common law partnership or adoption). Very few federal statutes include a relational
term that could apply to individuals who live together but who are not related.452 If two unrelated
individuals live together in a close, but non-conjugal relationship, pool their economic resources and
become economically interdependent, there is a strong case to be made that they ought to be
included for the purposes of at least some federal laws.453 While it is unlikely that a single term can
be deployed to replace the range of existing relational terms, it may be possible to develop a less
confusing and haphazard approach to ascribing relational status.
As noted above, the New South Wales legislation uses the broad term of “domestic
relationships” to include both conjugal and non-conjugal couples, and the term “close personal
relationship” to ascribe relational status, and in turn, a number of rights and responsibilities, to nonconjugal couples. Section 5 of the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999
describes a domestic relationship as including “a close personal relationship (other than marriage or
a de facto relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by family, who are living
together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic services and personal care.”454
The BCLI Report similarly recommended that the state “recognize people (including nonrelatives) who live with another in a close relationship that is the equivalent of a family

in his remarks that a conjugal relationship is not simply about a sexual relationship, and cited the test for conjugality
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H.
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For example, the Witness Protection Program Act uses a very broad relational term - “a person who because of their
relationship to or association with a person”. Section 42(1) of the Pension Act defines “dependant” as any person
entitled under court order to support. See supra at note 313 and Table Five.
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See Section B below for a discussion of the specific laws within which such relationships ought to be included.

454

Section 5, Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999.

162

relationship”.455 As noted above, it did not recommend a detailed definition, but rather, would leave it
to the courts to determined whether the relationship was sufficiently close to qualify as a family
relationship. In the Institute’s view, a shared residence would not suffice; rather “something more in
terms of how the parties regard each other, and conduct their domestic and financial affairs, would
be required.” 456
A similar definition was suggested by the Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia for the
purposes of the division of property legislation. The Commission borrowed from the definition
included in the Australian Capital Territory Domestic Relationships Act 1994, which refers to a “a
personal relationship (other than a legal marriage) between two adults in which one provides
personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic nature for the benefit of the other”.457
(a)

A new relational term

We are of the view that federal law should consider a new relational category that captures a
broad range of non-conjugal relationships, including non-familial relationships (that is, individuals
who are not related by blood, marriage, common law partnership or adoption) . There are a number
of terms that could be used, such as a “domestic relationship”, a “household relationship”, or a
“close personal relationship”. There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these terms.
A household relationship signals that the individuals must be living together, but in no way
suggests that they must be conjugal or familial. However, the term may be overly broad, since it may
leave the impression that it applies to any group of individuals who live together in a shared
household, regardless of the nature of the relationships between them. It could accurately describe
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Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia Final Report, Reform of the Law Dealing with Matrimonial Property in Nova
Scotia March 1997, at 25. The Law Commission seems to have been specifically contemplating the inclusion only of
cohabiting relationships that were functionally similar to marriage. For example, at 21, the Commission writes: “…the
Commission has reached the view that most cohabitation relationships are functionally similar to marital relationships,
and deserve to be treated similarly by the law. Human beings seek out long-term relationships for a variety of
reasons, including companionship, love, emotional support, sexual intimacy, procreation, economic need and social
expectation. Such relationships, especially but not exclusively where there are children, often generate patterns of
economic dependency”. However, the proposed definition does not appear to be limited to conjugal couples.
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relationships such as roommates or boarders, who do constitute a single household, but whose lives
may not be at all intertwined or interdependent.
A close relationship, or close personal relationship, approximates the language adopted in
the New South Wales legislation, and the language suggested in the BCLI Report. It does not in and
of itself signal that individuals must be living together, although this could be part of the definition.
The term “close” is vague. While the definition could attempt to give more precise content to the
term, it might remain a vague and confusing concept.
A ‘domestic relationship’ closely approximates the term ‘domestic partner’, which we have
recommended in relation to domestic partnership regimes. This may have both advantages and
disadvantages. Since we recommend that both conjugal and non-conjugal couples may register
their relationships as domestic partners, the term “domestic relationship” may appropriately and
consistently signal that the term is not restricted to conjugality. However, the similarity of “domestic
partner” and “domestic relationship” may lead to some confusion. “A person in a domestic
relationship” would not have the same meaning as a “domestic partner”, since the former would be
an ascribed status and the latter, a voluntarily assumed status.
While each term has its relative advantages and disadvantages, we are inclined to suggest
the adoption of the term “domestic relationship.” We deploy this term in the discussion that follows.

(b)

A new relational definition

The next question would then be the definition of this new relational category. The term could
be defined as ‘living together in a close relationship’ (New South Wales), or ‘a close relationship that
is equivalent to a family relationship’(BCLI). Both of these open-ended definitions leave much to the
courts, to define the nature of “close relationships” or the nature of a relationship “equivalent to a
family relationship”. In our view, it would be preferable, if possible, to provide somewhat more
guidance to the courts as to the kinds of factors that might be relevant in deciding whether the
relationship is sufficiently “close” or sufficiently “equivalent to a family relationship”’.
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It might be helpful to revisit the proposals in our earlier work for redefining conjugality.458 The
crux of the definition was the combination of emotional intimacy and economic interdependency.
The criticism of this definition was that it was potentially over-inclusive; that it would include
relationships that were not conjugal, such as adult siblings or other unrelated individuals who shared
a household.459 As such, it may be that these elements of the definition are quite appropriate to
describe the non-conjugal relationships to be included within the term “domestic relationship”. It is
the combination of joint residence, emotional intimacy and economic interdependency that gives rise
to the unique nature of the relationship, such that these relationships ought to be included in at least
some legal rights and responsibilities. A fourth element that may also be relevant is a commitment to
continue to live together in this interdependent relationship. While this commitment is an important
reason that we recognize adult relationships, it is difficult to measure. It is inherently subjective, and
particularly when relationships break down, the parties may have very different versions of the
degree of their long term commitment to one another. This element of commitment could be
captured by a duration requirement – that is – that the individuals have lived together for a specified
period of time before they are included within the definition. However, even a duration requirement is
an imperfect measure of commitment, in so far as it uses past history to measure potential
commitment into the future.
While the precise drafting needs further consideration, we are of the view that the definition
should include joint residence, emotional intimacy and economic interdependency. It could be
phrased in a number of ways, such as “living together in a close emotional and economic
relationship”, “living together in an emotionally and economically interdependent relationship” or
“living together in a close relationship, characterized by economic interdependency”. But, the crux of
the definition would be three fold: a shared residential relationship, a close emotional relationship,
and an economically intertwined relationship. These three factors capture the basic value that
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should underlie the legal recognition of adult relationships: the promotion and protection of
relationships of care and commitment.

3.

Conclusion

Ascribing relationship status is an exercise fraught with difficulty. First, there is the threshold
question of when it is appropriate to ascribe a relational status. This is particularly challenging in the
spousal context, where individuals have not chosen to voluntarily assume the status through
marriage. When should the state ascribe spousal status to individuals who have not voluntarily
assumed spousal status? If domestic partnership regimes are enacted that allow non-conjugal
couples to register their relationships as well, this threshold question will similarly apply to ascribing
relational status. When should the state ascribe relational status to individuals who have not
voluntarily assumed relational status? The values of autonomy and privacy must be balanced
against the values of equality and security.
Secondly, a basic distinction in federal law between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships
is increasingly difficult to sustain. Developing and applying a clear and predictable definition of
conjugality has long been, and remains, elusive. Given the difficulty if not impossibility of making any
broad conclusions about the differences both between and among conjugal and non-conjugal
relationships, it is imperative that the question of the legal rights and responsibilities of adult
relationships be addressed much more specifically. In what policy contexts should what kinds of
relationships be recognized? If the question can not be answered generally, it must be answered
specifically - on an objective by objective, statute by statute, basis. To the extent that specific
legislative objectives are considered to appropriately apply to these non-conjugal relationships,
many of the difficulties of the conjugal/non conjugal distinction may be avoided altogether. If a
particular objective – such as recognising the potential existence of shared economic interests in
family relationships giving rise to potential conflicts of interest – is considered to appropriately apply
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to both conjugal and non-conjugal relationships, then it will not be necessary to engage in the
increasingly difficult exercise of distinguishing between these relationships. However, if a particular
objective is considered appropriate for conjugal, but not for non-conjugal relationships, then a
workable definition of conjugality will continue to be required. Again, these are questions that can
only be addressed specifically – a task to which we turn in the section that follows.

II.

Evaluating Legal Options in the Context of Specific
Legislative Objectives
In this section, we return to specific statutes and specific legislative objectives, for the

purpose of recommending appropriate relational criteria. In our view, no one of the three models, or
no single combination of the three models – marriage, registered domestic partnerships or ascribed
status – is appropriate for realizing all of the objectives of federal legislation. The solution lies in
finding the particular combination of the legal options that can best accomplish the legislative
objectives listed in Part I while respecting the values of autonomy, privacy, equality and security. We
return to the legislative provisions singled out for detailed examination in Part I above, and attempt
to formulate recommendations appropriate for each.

A.

Regulating the Formation and Dissolution of Adult Personal
Relationships
Bill C-23 will not affect the law of marriage or divorce. The Bill defines marriage as the union

of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others, which confirms the common law rule
regarding the opposite-sex requirement of the capacity to marry. Marriage continues to be governed
by these and other common law rules regarding the capacity to marry. Divorce in turn continues to
be governed by the Divorce Act, which by definition only applies to couples who have been married,
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and who have applied to terminate their marital status. As a result, the government objectives of
regulating the formation and dissolution of adult personal relationships continue under federal law to
apply only to married couples. Unmarried conjugal couples, whether of the same or opposite sex,
are not included within the ambit of these provisions. Nor are non-conjugal relationships.
An argument could be made that these conjugal and non-conjugal relationships might be
assisted by rules or procedures that more clearly demarcate the beginning (or end) of their
relationships. Federal jurisdiction in this field will however be limited to demarcating relational status
for the purposes of determining entitlement to rights and obligations within federal areas of
jurisdiction. The scope of federal jurisdiction is analogous to the federal government’s ability to pass
laws putting in place definitions of common law spouses or partners, and should not be confused
with the scope of federal jurisdiction over marriage and divorce.
Under section 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867, Parliament has the power to make laws
in relation to “marriage and divorce”. The courts have held that this jurisdiction includes the power to
legislate with respect to matters corollary to divorce, such as spousal support, child support and
child custody. In our view, it is unlikely that the courts would hold that Parliament has jurisdiction to
make laws in relation to these matters for unmarried conjugal cohabitants or non-conjugal
cohabitants. In accordance with the “living tree” principle of constitutional interpretation, it could be
argued that federal jurisdiction in relation to marriage and divorce needs to evolve to reflect the
demographic and normative transformations in the ways in which individuals form and leave
conjugal relationships, which has transformed significantly since the division of powers was
established in the Constitution. Federal jurisdiction in relation to marriage and divorce could perhaps
be argued as broadly including jurisdiction in relation to conjugal relationships.
However, this argument – admittedly precarious in its own right – could not be extended to
include non-conjugal relationships. It would be incredulous to argue that the federal jurisdiction over
marriage and divorce extended to the regulation of all adult personal relationships. Moreover, any
effort to extend federal jurisdiction over marriage and divorce to include unmarried cohabitants
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would amount to a serious incursion on provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights in
the province.
Even if the federal government cannot regulate entry and exit from non-conjugal
relationships pursuant to its jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, its other heads of power enable it
to regulate entry and exit from a civil status for the purposes of determining the scope of rights and
obligations within validly enacted federal legislation. Consider, for example, the constitutional basis
of Bill C-23. The Bill is not valid as an exercise of the federal power in relation to marriage and
divorce. Rather, it is valid as an exercise of the federal government’s jurisdiction in relation to
pensions, criminal law, banking, bankruptcy and so on. Just as the federal government must
necessarily have jurisdiction to ascribe relational status to spouses and partners for the purposes of
federal statutes, so too must it have the jurisdiction to add new relational categories to federal
statutes. Therefore, the federal government could enact a registered domestic partnership regime
for the purposes of including partners within federal laws that are in pith and substance in relation to
matters within federal jurisdiction.
Individuals could register their domestic partnerships and thereby be entitled to the range of
rights and responsibilities within federal law. Within such a scheme, it would be important to have
clearly demarcated rules for the entry into and exit from these relationships. A registered domestic
partnership scheme would have to set out who could enter into domestic relationships (for example,
any two individuals who have reached the age of 18 years), and the procedural and evidentiary
requirements (for example, signed and witnessed registration forms). Similarly, the scheme would
have to set out the rules and procedures for exiting a domestic relationship (for example, unilateral
termination by appropriate notice to the other party, effective date of the termination).460
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However, as mentioned above, the implementation of a registered partner status for the purposes of federal laws
would could have no direct or immediate impact on provincial laws. Registered partners would remain unrecognized
in provincial laws until they are also amended to accommodate the new civil status. While a coordinated
federal/provincial/territorial initiative would be preferable, in the absence of such agreement, the federal government
could proceed on much the same basis as it did with Bill C-23, creating a new partnership status that is not yet
recognized within provincial legislation.
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Finally, the federal government does have jurisdiction to change the definition of marriage to
include same-sex couples, who could be included with the definition of marriage, and who could
then be included in the Divorce Act. If the definition of marriage was amended to include same-sex
couples, then the definition of spouse in the Divorce Act would require amendment. Spouse is
currently defined as “either a man or woman who are married to each other”. This definition would
have to be changed to “either of two persons who are married to each other”. 461
As discussed extensively above, there is a strong equality argument in favour of the inclusion
of same-sex couples within the definition of marriage.462 Same-sex couples have an equal claim to
the importance of being able to publicly announce their commitment, voluntarily assume mutual
responsibilities, and seek legal recognition of their personal relationships. As we discussed above,
amending the definition of marriage would also be consistent with the value of recognizing
relationships of care and commitment in a manner that respects autonomy, privacy, equality and
security. A government committed to promoting these normative values in the legal regulation of
adult relationships ought to recognize same-sex marriage. However, as we also discussed above,
the political will to do so has not yet materialized. The inclusion of a definition of marriage in Bill C-23
is a regressive step that demonstrates that Parliament is not yet prepared to respond to the shifting
public opinion polls that demonstrate that the majority of Canadians now support the recognition of
same-sex marriage.

B.

Responding to the Consequences of Emotional and Economic
Interdependence in Adult Personal Relationships
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Some attention would also have to be directed to the adultery provisions in the current Divorce Act. According to
section 8(2)(b)(i), adultery is a ground for establishing marital break down. However, adultery has been defined over
the years by the courts as requiring heterosexual intercourse. Homosexual sex does not constitute adultery. If same
sex couples were to be included within the Divorce Act, they would have to be subject to the same grounds for
divorce. If adultery was to be maintained as a ground for divorce, it would have to be extended to include homosexual
sex. However, this would result in a significant rewriting of the common law requirements for adultery – broadening it
to include anal and/or oral sex, for same and opposite sex couples. The preferable route would be to revisit and
abandon the fault based grounds for divorce altogether.
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1.

Supporting the integrity and stability of Interdependent Relationships
(a)

Immigration

The Immigration Act will not be amended by Bill C-23. As a result, same-sex and oppositesex cohabiting couples are still excluded from the definition of spouse within the sponsorship
provisions. Because of the prohibition on same-sex marriage, and the lack of any domestic
partnership regime whereby same-sex couples can opt in, they are completely excluded from any of
the sponsorship provisions. This blanket exclusion cannot be justified. These couples have the
same needs for family reuniification as other conjugal couples, and the same entitlement to have the
integrity of their relationships recognized. Common law opposite-sex couples are also excluded from
the definition of accompanying dependants, family class or assisted relatives – although at least
some of these couples might be able to marry in order to qualify for sponsorship.
However, the Minister of Citizenship has recently introduced Bill C-31, the Immigration and

Refugee Protection Act,463 and has promised supporting regulations in the coming months that will
expand the “family class”. This will include “modernizing the definition of family class to ensure
consistency in accordance with government legislation under consideration – family class will
include spouses, common-law and same-sex partners.”464
No additional information is available at this time as to how the regulations will be drafted.
However, the commitment seems to follow from the recommendations of the Advisory Committee to
the Immigration Legislative Review, entitled Not Just Numbers: A Canadian Framework for Future

Immigration.465 In their view, “the defining principle in using the term ‘spouse’ must be emotional
dependency as demonstrated through cohabitation”.466 Accordingly, the Report recommended that
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the definition of spouse for the purposes of immigration and citizenship be redefined to include not
only married partners, but also “a partner in an intimate relationship, including cohabitation of at
least one year in duration, with the burden of proof resting on the applicant.”467 Given the approach
taken in Bill C-23, it is likely that the inclusion of these cohabiting couples will take the form of
adding “common law partner” to the regulatory scheme.

Non-conjugal relationships
Many non-conjugal relationships are recognized, under the provisions for family class
sponsorship as well as assisted relative immigration. Only non-conjugal couples who are not
relatives within the meaning of the family class or assisted relatives are excluded. There is no
provision whereby an individual may be able to sponsor their closest friend, with whom they may
have lived in a long term relationship of economic and emotional interdependency. Rather, only
relationships of blood, marriage and adoption are recognized under the Act.
In the Not Just Numbers report, the Advisory Committee recommended a number of
amendments to the relational terms used in the Immigration Act that would include these excluded
non-conjugal relationships. The Report was critical of the ways in which the Immigration Act sets out
to define in considerable detail the degrees of relationship that can serve as the basis for
sponsorship within the Family Class. “We prefer that family reunification be achieved on a functional
rather than a purely categorical basis.”468 After quoting from Justice L’Heureux Dubé’s minority
opinion in Mossop regarding the increasing diversity of Canadian families, the Report concluded that
“individuals best understand where their emotional priorities lie, and consequently what constitutes
their family”. 469
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The Report recommended that the Family Class “be divided into three broad groupings,
reflecting the varying degrees of emotional intimacy and dependency found in family relationships”.
The first tier would include “those in the most intimate family core: spouses and dependent children”.
The second tier would include fiancé(e)s, parents and when a sponsor’s parents are deceased,
grandparents. The third tier would be a significantly broader category than currently found in the
family class:
Many individuals form strong emotional bonds with persons who are not their intimate
partners or spouses, nor their biological parents, nor even blood relatives. More to the point,
some people will be willing to demonstrate the importance of these other bonds by making a
long-term financial commitment to assist the arrival, establishment and integration of these
individuals into the Canadian community and economy. We believe that permitting such
sponsorship can only contribute to our goal of strengthening the role of the family in its many
470
forms as a primary unit of self-sufficiency and security.

The Report stated this “third tier” family class “will permit sponsors to decide who is most important
to them, and who is part of what they consider family in the broadest sense. It could even include a
best friend.”471 It recommended that third tier sponsors “be required to demonstrate that the
individual they are sponsoring is known and emotionally important to them.”472 The crucial aspect of
this third tier is that the sponsor be prepared to assume “a long term enforceable sponsorship
commitment”.473
We believe that there is considerable merit to these recommendations. Non-conjugal
relationships that currently fall outside of the family class may be characterized by the same strong
emotional intimacy that justifies sponsorship within the family class. Individuals in relationships of
caring and commitment, including registered partners and domestic relationships should also be
entitled to recognition and protection. Individuals should be able to decide who is most important to
them, to define their own sense of family, and to then undertake the very serious financial

470

Ibid. at 47.

471

Ibid.

472

Ibid. at 48.

473

Ibid. at 45. The Report recommends some additional restrictions on this third tier, namely, that principal applicants in
this tier be required to have successfully completed secondary school, and either be proficient in French or English, or
pay a language tuition fee reflecting the cost of language training in Canada.

173

commitment that accompanies sponsorship. It is an approach that balances the values of autonomy
and equality, while promoting the value of caring and committed relationships.

(b)

Privileged Relational Communications

We argued above that the special evidentiary rules regarding spousal competence and
compellability should be abrogated so that all witnesses are placed on the same footing without
regard to any relationship they have with an accused person. The reason for this recommendation is
that the objectives of promoting the search for truth, respecting autonomy and fostering the physical
and emotional security of witness spouses, outweigh the uncertain contribution the current rules
make to the promotion of marital harmony or integrity. However, we recommended that the marital
communication privilege be retained and extended, because it is more firmly grounded in the
protection of privacy and the promotion of candour essential to the integrity of adult personal
relationships.
At present, the privilege set out in s.4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act applies only to marital
communications. One implication of Bill C-23 is that federal public policy has rejected a hierarchy of
values between marriage and common law partnerships. There can be no assurance that any
particular marriage or partnership will in fact embody the ideals of companionship, commitment,
intimacy and mutual support that the state is seeking to support. However, marriage and common
law partnerships have equivalent potential to do so and attempting to draw qualitative distinctions
within categories of relationships, while sound in principle, in practice would involve significant
invasions of privacy. Therefore, the privilege should attach to all private communications between
spouses and between common law partners. Similarly, the relationships of registered domestic
partners are likely to be the relationships of primary emotional significance in the partners’ lives. This
is also true of domestic relationships, i.e., persons who are living together in non-conjugal
relationships characterized by emotional and economic interdependence for at least one year. The
state has a strong interest in protecting the privacy and promoting candour and intimacy in each of
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these categories. For these reasons, we recommend that the privilege in s.4(3) be retained and
extended beyond marital communications to include private communications between common law
partners, registered domestic partners, and persons who have lived together in a relationship of
economic and emotional interdependence for at least one year.
A case could be made for an even broader definition of the persons entitled to claim the
privilege. Instead of imposing a “living together” requirement, the definition could be extended to any
two persons who have a relationship of emotional interdependence that is of primary importance in
each other’s lives. Such a definition would recognize that some people’s most emotionally
supportive and intimate relationships are with persons with whom they do not share a household.
They can rightly assert that their communications with their confidante should be no less privileged
than communications between spouses, partners or persons living together in non-conjugal
relationships. However, such an approach has the significant disadvantage of giving rise to
uncertainties in its administration that are much larger than if the definition is limited to persons living
together. In the context of criminal trials, uncertainties about whether or not evidence is admissible
should be avoided if at all possible.

2.

Recognizing the Potential Existence of Shared Economic Interests in
Interdependent Relationships

In general we believe that the state should define relationships that give rise to potential
conflicts of interest broadly, so long as basic entitlements are not at stake, and so long as relational
presumptions can be rebutted through the presentation of evidence. It is inappropriate to put in
place inflexible rules that presume, for example, that spouses or partners never deal with each other
at arm’s length because there will in fact be a great diversity of relationships within any particular
legal category.
An example of a statutory context where it is desirable to cast the relational net broadly is
s.632(b) of the Criminal Code, the provision that enables judges to exclude a person from a jury if he
or she has a “relationship” with one of the participants in the trial. In contrast to many other statutory
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provisions seeking to identify shared interests in personal relationships, this provision of the Code is
notable in not specifying the kinds of relationships that should excuse jurors. By leaving out a
definition, Parliament has wisely left the matter to the discretion of trial judges and made it possible
to respond to any kind of personal relationship, including friendships. Such a broad sweep is
appropriate in this context for two reasons. First, the exclusion of related jurors has no negative
consequences. The right to a jury trial does not include the right to have any particular person serve
on the jury. Similarly, the right to serve on a jury does not require service on any particular jury.
Second, where both fairness and the appearance of fairness are at stake, it is desirable to cast the
relational net as broadly as possible.
Consider also provisions of laws, like the Bank Act, that place restrictions on the ability of
persons related to directors or officers of financial institutions to enter into financial transactions with
those institutions. These laws are designed to prevent the possibility that transactions between
related parties will give rise to preferential treatment or the appearance of preferential treatment.
There is a strong argument for casting the relational net broadly in this context as well. The objective
of these statutes apply to anyone in a close personal relationship – spouses, relatives, common law
partners, registered domestic partners and domestic relatives. Fundamental interests are not
normally at stake, since the related party has the option of approaching another institution. The
negative consequences of a presumption against fair dealing between related parties can be
avoided if the presumption is rebuttable, that is, if the related parties are free to present evidence
that their interests are not intertwined or that the proposed deal is in fact fair.

3.

Tailoring Financial Benefits and Penalties to Recognize the
Consequences of Relationships of Economic Dependence or
Interdependence
(a)

Guaranteed Income Supplement of Old Age Security Act

According to the current provisions of the Old Age Security Act, as described above in Part I,
whether a pensioner is entitled to a guaranteed income supplement (GIS) is determined by a
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formula that uses relational criteria. If a pensioner does not have a spouse or common law partner
who is also a pensioner, then the GIS is calculated at the higher “single rate”, whether or not the
pensioner is living with another person in a conjugal or non-conjugal relationship. The amount of the
pensioner’s entitlement will be reduced by a formula that takes into account his or her income, or, if
the pensioner has a spouse or common law partner, the combined income of the pensioner and his
or her spouse/partner. If two pensioners are living together, then the amount of the GIS depends on
whether the relationship is conjugal or non-conjugal. If the relationship is conjugal (i.e., the
pensioners are spouses or common law partners), then the two pensioners each receive the lower
“conjugal rate”, reduced by a formula that takes into account their combined income. If their
relationship is non-conjugal, the two pensioners both receive the higher “single rate”, reduced by a
formula that takes into account the claimant’s income alone (the income of non-conjugal cohabitants
need not be declared).
Two assumptions explain the use of relational criteria in the scheme. The first is the
assumption of economies of scale among cohabiting pensioners. The second is the assumption that
the combined income of cohabiting persons is available to meet their needs. The troubling effect of
these assumptions is to reduce or eliminate the GIS entitlements of old age pensioners if they are
living with another pensioner in a relationship of caring and commitment.
The economies of scale assumption that underlies the lower conjugal rate can be supported
by empirical evidence: housing and food costs for two persons living together are less than those
incurred by two single persons living in separate households. The difficulty with the lower conjugal
rate is that it may operate in practice to discourage the formation of valuable domestic relationships.
The problem here is one that must be faced in the design of any income or means tested
programme of social assistance: the principle of adjusting benefits according to actual needs
clashes with the value of supporting the formation and maintenance of relationships of caring and
commitment. One approach to this dilemma, adopted by the Ontario Social Assistance Review
Committee in 1988, is to provide the same benefits to a couple as two individuals. This approach
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can be defended on the grounds that “a major disincentive to family life” is removed “without
seriously violating the principle of need.”474 The GIS provisions of the Old Age Security Act, on the
other hand, appear to give precedence to the principle of need over the value of promoting
relationships of caring and commitment.
In our view, rather than give either principle precedence over the other, the best approach
would be to design the GIS provisions so that they balance the principles of need and relationship
support. The principle of need does dictate that persons sharing accommodations with others
receive benefits at a lower rate than persons living alone. However, the principle of relationship
support suggests that the gap between the single and cohabitant rates should be set at a level that
eliminates the risk that pensioners will be financially disadvantaged if they choose to live together in
a relationship of caring and commitment. The gap between the single and cohabitant rates should
be set at an amount significantly smaller, therefore, than the best estimate of the difference in per
capita household costs based on the available empirical evidence.
Because we are not familiar with the empirical evidence, we are not equipped to judge
whether the current rates are set at levels that eliminate, or at least minimize, the risk of negative
consequences for the principle of relationship support. Currently, the conjugal rate is set at 65% of
the single rate. The question is whether we can be confident that low income seniors reduce their
living expenses by more than 35% when they share accommodation. If not, the current rate structure
gives inadequate weight to the value of supporting relationships of caring and commitment. The
35% gap should be re-evaluated to determine whether it gives too much precedence to the principle
of need over the principle of relationship support.
Another difficulty with the current scheme is that it applies the lower conjugal rate only in the
case of two pensioners living together in a conjugal relationship. The economies of scale
assumption applies equally to any persons who are sharing a household. At the moment, however,
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pensioners who are non-conjugal cohabitants and pensioners who are cohabiting in conjugal
relationships with non-pensioners may claim the higher single rate. In our view, if the difference in
the rates is grounded on valid empirical evidence regarding economies of scale, and if the rate is set
at a level that achieves a balance between the principles of need and relationship formation, then
the lower rate for cohabitants should apply whenever a pensioner is living with another person in a
relationship of caring and commitment, including registered partners and domestic relations.
The second area of concern with the GIS is the use of the combined income of cohabiting
spouses and partners to determine their entitlement. These provisions are based on the
presumption that the combined income of cohabiting spouses and partners is available to meet the
individual needs of a particular cohabitant. The reliance placed on this assumption is problematic for
two reasons. First, the pooling of resources may not occur in all marital and non-marital conjugal
relationships. Second, resources may be pooled by non-conjugal cohabitants living together in
relationships of caring and commitment.
In our view, the presumption that combined income is available to meet the needs of persons
in cohabiting relationships should not be retained in its current form. With appropriate modifications,
however, we believe that it should be extended to cohabiting registered partners and domestic
relationships. The problem with the current scheme, in our view, is that the presumption regarding
pooled income cannot be rebutted except in the case of spousal separation. Section 15(4) of the Act
provides that the Minister may treat a pensioner with a spouse as entitled to the “single rate” if the
Minister is satisfied that the pensioner is separated from his or her spouse. Separation, however, is
not the only circumstance that can prevent a pensioner from having access to the income of a
cohabitant. Section 15(4) should be amended to enable the Minister to treat a pensioner as entitled
to the “single rate” whenever the Minister is satisfied that the income of the person’s spouse,
common law partner, registered partner or domestic relation is not available to meet the applicant’s
needs.

179

Enabling pensioners to present evidence displacing the presumption of access to pooled
income would prevent the presumption from operating in circumstances where its factual
assumptions do not exist. Creating a rebuttable presumption has other advantages as well. We
have already mentioned our concern about the perverse incentives generated by a scheme that
accords single persons a higher OAS/GIS entitlement that they would receive if they were living with
others in relationships of caring and commitment. As a general principle, we do not believe it is
sound policy to deny benefits designed to meet basic individual needs simply because of the
existence of an adult personal relationship per se. Such a scheme creates an unacceptable risk that
the formation and maintenance of relationships of caring and commitment will be discouraged. This
concern will be greatly alleviated if the OAS/GIS entitlement will be reduced only if the pensioner
actually is receiving financial support out of the income of a cohabiting spouse, common law partner,
registered partner or domestic relation. While this will ordinarily be the case, it will not always be so.
Thus, the irrebuttable presumption that conjugal cohabitants have access to each other’s combined
income in the current scheme should be replaced by a rebuttable presumption that all cohabitants,
conjugal or non-conjugal, have access to each other’s combined income.

(b)

Survivors’ Benefits in Pension Legislation

As described in Part I above, the multitude of federal employment and veterans pension
laws, the Canada Pension Plan, and the Pension Benefits Standards Act all make survivors’
benefits available to spouses and common law partners on the death of contributors, veterans or
employees. Survivors’ benefits can be claimed regardless of gender. Nor is it necessary to establish
need or dependency. Indeed, a common law partner is entitled to survivor’s benefits if at least one
year of cohabitation preceded the death of the contributor. While the original rationale of survivor’s
benefits was the presumed economic dependency of widows, the current schemes plainly serve
compensatory as well as dependency objectives. Survivors’ pensions seek to compensate
dependent spouses/partners for the sudden loss of income on which they have depended to meet
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their financial needs. And, survivors’ pensions seek to compensate all spouses/partners, including
those who are economically independent for facilitating the employment earnings of deceased
contributors.
The most obvious difficulty with the current rules of entitlement in federal legislation is that
survivors’ benefits are limited to persons who are spouses or common law partners of the
contributor at the time of death. The dependency and compensatory objectives of survivors’ benefits
are also relevant where a person was living with a contributor in a non-conjugal domestic
relationship at the time of death.
The possibility of allowing individuals in domestic relationships to receive survivors’ benefits
should be seriously considered. The nature of their relationships may give rise to dependency or
interdependency that is comparable to that arising between spouses or common law partners. As
we have emphasized throughout this report, conjugal relationships are not unique in possessing the
functional attributes relevant to state policy objectives. Federal pension laws fail to reflect the fact
that conjugal relationships do not uniquely give rise to the kinds of dependency or interdependency
to which survivor’s benefits seek to respond.
At the same time, if Parliament were to add a definition of domestic relationship to the list of
survivors entitled to CPP, veterans’ or employment pension survivor’s benefits, a number of
difficulties would arise. There would frequently be a number of qualifying domestic relationships
living with the contributor at the time of death. Of course, at the moment there can be multiple
claimants if the deceased leaves both a common law partner and a separated spouse. However, to
add domestic relationships to the mix would give rise to daunting administrative complexities in
dividing the survivor’s benefit between multiple domestic claimants. Moreover, the degree to which
individuals in domestic relationships were dependent upon or facilitated the earnings of a contributor
will vary much more dramatically than is the case with the class of spouses or common law partners
as a whole. A presumption of entitlement is not justifiable, in our view, in the face of the wide
variation in circumstances within the class of domestic relationships as a whole.
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The best way of responding to the legitimate claims of non-conjugal cohabitants in this
context, in our view, is to put in place a registered domestic partnership scheme and then add
registered partners to the definitions of survivors in federal pension legislation. There is a strong
case for permitting registered domestic partners to claim CPP, veterans’ and employment pension
survivors’ benefits on the same terms as married spouses. Like husbands and wives, registered
domestic partners have expressed their commitment to each other publicly, and have voluntarily
subscribed to the full package of rights and obligations accorded to spouses and partners. It is a fair
assumption that registered domestic partners, like husbands and wives, will have lived together in
relationships of dependence or interdependence. The inclusion of registered domestic partners
provides a means of responding to the legitimate claims of non-conjugal cohabitants without
imposing undue costs and complexity on the administration of survivors’ benefits. By registering as
domestic partners, persons in either conjugal or non-conjugal relationships would, in essence, be
able to designate the person they consider the appropriate recipient of their survivors’ benefits. In
this way, a registered partnership scheme avoids the problems of over-inclusion that would result if
all domestic relatives could claim survivors’ benefits at the same time as it responds to the problems
of under-inclusion in current legislation.
What of the situation of a contributor who dies without a spouse, common law partner, or
registered partner? According to the existing scheme of legislation, no survivor’s benefits are
payable in this situation even though the contribution rate to the CPP or employment pensions is not
reduced to take account of single employees’ relational status. If survivor’s benefits are a form of
entitlement earned in employment, arguably the principle of equal pay for work of equal value
requires that an equivalent survivor’s benefit be available to all contributors regardless of their
relational status. The pay equity concern could be addressed by amending federal pension statutes
to give employees without spouses or partners the option of designating the beneficiaries of their
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survivor’s benefits,475 by enriching the death benefit that would be awarded to the estate of single
employees, or by reducing the contribution rate of single employees.
In our view, framing the pay equity argument in this manner misses the mark. Survivors’
benefits, like disability and health benefits provided as part of employment contracts, are a form of
group insurance rather than an equal employment entitlement like wages. The social insurance
aspect of survivors’ benefits is more apparent in the Canada Pension Plan because it is a social
programme that depends upon a great deal of cross-subsidization. Contributors to the CPP do not
receive benefits that correspond to their contributions. For example, those who do not live to
retirement age subsidize those that do. Contributors do have a legitimate claim to being treated fairly
if the events that trigger the needs targeted by the statute occur. Employees’ and employers’
contributions to the Canada Pension Plan insure employees against their own income needs if they
reach retirement age or become disabled. Similarly, employers’ and employees’ contributions to
survivors’ pensions are a form of collective insurance. Benefits are payable on death only if a certain
kind of loss has materialized. The aim is to ensure that employees’ spouses/partners (or their future
spouses/partners) are compensated for the sudden loss of income on which they depended or to
which they indirectly contributed through relational support.476
The social insurance aspects of employment pension benefits may not be as readily
apparent as they are in a national programme like the CPP. Nevertheless, collective risk-spreading
and cross-subsidization, albeit on a smaller scale, are features of survivors’ benefits in employment
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pension plans as well. From a social insurance perspective, the single employee has no more
complaint about his or her estate or chosen beneficiaries being denied survivors’ benefits than the
able-bodied employee has about being denied disability benefits. The denial is premised on the
absence of the relevant need.
It could be argued that the denial to single employees of an entitlement equivalent to
survivors’ benefits runs counter to the value of autonomy. Relational status, unlike age or disability,
may be the result of a conscious choice. Indeed, it is a product of individuals’ exercise of the
fundamental freedom of intimate association. The state should not seek to influence individuals’
exercise of this freedom by attaching financial incentives to any particular relational status. On this
argument, the current treatment of survivors’ benefits in federal pension legislation is objectionable
because it asks single employees to subsidize the relational choices of spouses and partners.
We are not persuaded by the autonomy argument. We agree that the state violates the value
of autonomy if it attaches financial rewards or penalties to a particular relationship status per se,
without regard to its consequences. But the objective of survivors’ benefits is not to reward couples
or to induce people into forming relationships of caring and commitment. Rather, the objectives are
to respond to the distinct needs and legitimate claims that arise in relationships. The dependency
and compensatory objectives do not fit the situation of single employees.
In our view, the situation of single contributors pursuant to the CPP and federal employment
pension laws - including the limitation of survivors’ benefits to spouses, common law partners and
(in our proposal) registered partners - is justified by the value of supporting relationships of caring
and commitment. Supporting such relationships does not mean according coupled individuals
preferential treatment compared to single individuals. Rather, it means recognizing and responding
to the distinct consequences that accompany committed, caring relationships. Single contributors
are treated differently not because their work is considered less valuable or their choice of living
arrangements less worthy of concern and respect. They are treated differently because the
dependence and compensatory objectives of survivors’ benefits are not normally relevant to the
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circumstances of single employees to anything like the same degree that they are for employees
with spouses or partners.
Of course, in some cases there may be a person in a single contributor’s life who is
dependent upon or has supported the contributor’s employment earnings. Indeed, there may be a
number of such persons whose claim to survivors’ benefits could be justified according to the
dependence and compensatory objectives. This valid concern, however, will not be so serious if the
option of registering as domestic partners is available. By putting in place a registered partnership
status, and adding registered partners to the definition of survivors in pension statutes, Parliament
would make the functional equivalent of a designated beneficiary option available.
In summary, we believe that the dependency and compensatory objectives of survivors’
benefits will be best accomplished if the Canada Pension Plan, federal veteran employment pension
plans, and the Pension Benefits Standards Act are amended to extend survivor’s benefits to
registered domestic partners on the same terms as married spouses. The situation would then be as
follows. If at the time of death the deceased was cohabiting with a common law partner, the
common law partner will be entitled to survivors’ benefits. If the deceased also left a separated
spouse or separated registered partner, they will be able to claim a share of the survivor’s benefits in
proportion to the number of years they lived with the deceased.477 If there was no common law
partner at the time of death, then the spouse or registered partner will be the sole survivor entitled to
the benefits.

4.

477

Recognizing the Economic Costs and Value of Caregiving
Relationships

Former common law partners currently cannot claim survivors’ benefits, presumably on the assumption that proving
the existence of a past common law relationship after the contributor’s death poses difficulties, and, in any case, a
division of pension entitlements is now available to common law partners pursuant to the Pension Benefits Division
Act. Former spouses currently cannot claim survivors’ benefits, presumably on the assumption that an equitable
division of property, including pension entitlements, took place upon divorce. If this is right, former registered partners
should be excluded from the definition of survivor only if they have access to a similar right to a division of pension
entitlements upon break down of the partnership.
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We noted in our discussion in Part I above that no federal statute currently provides direct
income support to persons who have provided unwaged domestic labour and caregiving services to
members of their household. The performance of these socially valuable roles often entails
substantial financial sacrifices. The government in the future ought to give serious consideration to
the enactment of a homemaker’s or caregiver’s pension to accomplish this objective. Spousal or
partnership status are crude means of identifying persons deserving of this kind of state support.
The better approach in principle would be to design a scheme that can measure the actual quantity
of unwaged domestic labour and caregiving provided.

5.

Compensation for the loss of, or harm to, emotional and
economically interdependent relationships
(a)

Wrongful Death Action in the Canada Shipping Act

We argued above that the definition of “dependants” entitled to bring a wrongful death action
arising from maritime torts is in need of reform. First of all, the word “dependant” is inapt in this
context and should be replaced. It may have been an accurate description of many claimants in the
nineteenth century, since many widows and children would not have had an independent source of
income. Even then, claimants in fatal accident actions have never had to demonstrate dependence
and the helplessness it suggests. Whether or not they have other means of financial or emotional
sustenance, they are entitled to recover their relational losses. Therefore, we suggest that revised
legislation adopt the terms “claimants” and “relational claims”, or some equivalent neutral
terminology.
The purpose of the relational claim – to compensate for the lost expectation of future
economic or emotional support – suggests that the legislation should define the range of potential
claimants broadly. This is especially so since inclusion in the list of claimants does not entitle one to
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anything other than the right to attempt to prove such a loss through the introduction of evidence in a
court proceeding. The danger of trivial relational claims being filed is reduced by other factors, such
as the costs of litigation and the claimant’s burden of proof. If no loss can be established, then none
will be awarded. Therefore we recommend that the list of claimants in s.645 of the Canada Shipping

Act be expanded to include siblings, common law partners, registered domestic partners, and
persons in a relationship of emotional interdependence with the deceased or injured person that
was of primary importance to each other’s lives. The breadth of the latter portion of this suggested
definition reflects the view that a “living together” requirement would unnecessarily restrict the
objectives of the relational claim. The loss suffered on the death or injury of “best friends” may be as
devastating as the loss of a spouse or partner. The phrase “of primary importance in each other’s
lives” is intended to prevent claims being brought by multiple “best friends”. We are also suggesting
that economic interdependence should not be a necessary attribute of the non-conjugal
relationships embraced by this provision. This is because one objective is to compensate for the
loss of future emotional support, whether or not it is accompanied by a loss of future financial
support.

6.

Preventing violence or abuse in Adult Personal Relationships

Section 215 of the Criminal Code
The offence of failing to provide the necessaries of life set out in s.215 of the Criminal Code
aims to protect the most vulnerable persons in society from neglect that threatens their lives or
health. In our view, there is little doubt that the offence pursues a legitimate state objective.478
However, it is equally clear that the scope of the offence needs to be revised to bring it into line with
modern relational realities and expectations. The law has remained substantially unaltered since its

478

See the comments of LaForme J. in Middleton, supra note 243 at paras 54 and 56 (“it does not stretch the imagination
to know that in most relationships one or more persons within it will be vulnerable and require the protection of
s.215(4)(a)… it is well documented as an area of pressing and substantial concern in Canada which has been
recognized by our courts time and time again.”

187

enactment in 1892.479 As LaForme J. commented in a decision finding that the provision violated the
equality rights in s.15 of the Charter, “this law, as opposed to its purpose, is antiquated and is in
serious need of consideration by Parliament if it is to address present needs and concerns.”480
The Charter violation considered by LaForme J. was the exclusion of common law spouses
from the offence. Parliament will have rectified this omission with the passage of Bill C-23.
Nevertheless, problems in the definition of the offence remain. In our view, s.215 needs to be
redrafted to capture spousal and partnership relationships in a narrower range of circumstances,
and to capture a broader range of dependency relationships.
The duty to provide necessaries will read as follows if the Modernization of Benefits and

Obligations Act comes into force:
215. (1) Every one is under a legal duty (a) as a parent, foster parent, guardian or head of a
family, to provide necessaries of life for a child under the age of sixteen years; (b) to provide
necessaries of life to his spouse or common law partner; and (c) to provide necessaries of
life to a person under his charge if that person (i) is unable, by reason of detention, age,
illness, mental disorder or other cause, to withdraw himself from that charge, and (ii) is
unable to provide himself with necessaries of life.

Section 215(2) provides that it is an offence to fail to provide necessaries of life to a child, spouse or
common law partner who “is in destitute or necessitous circumstances” or whose life or health is
endangered by the breach of duty. It is also an offence to fail to provide necessaries to a wholly
dependent person under one’s charge if the failure endangers the life or health of that person.
In our view, the current provision is poorly tailored to the purpose of protecting wholly
dependent persons from serious forms of relational neglect in two ways. First, it is premised on an
outdated assumption of spousal dependency or helplessness. It is inconsistent with modern
assumptions to require spouses to assume responsibility for each other’s care regardless of the
existence of cohabitation. Section 215 reflects the older legal paradigm in which “husbands were
under a duty to support their wives and provide for their necessaries during and (in the case of
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separation) after a marriage. The logic of support was simple. Marriage gave the husband power
and property and made the wife correspondingly dependent. The dependence gave rise to a support
obligation on the part of the husband toward the wife.”481 Now, it is not marital status itself, but the
nature of the relationship and the expectations that may reasonably flow from it that give rise to an
obligation of spousal support.482 If this is true in family law, it should be all the more so in the context
of legal obligations enforced through criminal prohibitions where deprivations of physical liberty are
at stake.
It follows, in our view, that the duty to provide necessaries should extend to spouses,
common law partners and registered partners who are cohabiting, but should not be imposed on
them if they are no longer living together. Otherwise the law will hearken back to the discredited view
that relational status per se should give rise to legal obligations of support. On the other hand, if
persons are living together after having expressed their commitment to each other through marriage
or registered partnership, or have been living together in a conjugal relationship for at least a year,
then it is indeed a fundamental moral failure to endanger the lives of their spouses or partners by not
taking reasonable steps to provide them with food, clothing, shelter or medical care.
At the same time, s.215 captures too narrow a range of dependency relationships. The duty
is currently limited to persons who have a wholly dependent person “under their charge”. This
wording will capture custodians or institutional caregivers, such as prison officials or nurses, but it is
an inapt expression for capturing the range of relationships than can give rise to extreme forms of
vulnerability.483 The Law Reform Commission of Canada proposed in 1986 that the duty should
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apply to “other family members living in the same household” or “anyone under [a person’s] care”, as
follows:
Everyone has a duty to take reasonable steps, where failure to do so endangers life, to:
(i) provide necessaries to
(A)
his spouse;
(B)
his children under eighteen years of age;
(C)
other family members living in the same household, or
(D)
anyone under his care
484
if such person is unable to provide himself with necessaries of life.

We believe that, with appropriate refinements, this is a sound proposal for a revised s.215.485
Arguably the offence should apply to serious endangerment of health as well as life, as is the case
with the current offence. The closing language, which qualifies all of the relational duties created by
the proposed section, makes clear that the purpose of the offence is to protect wholly dependent
persons from serious neglect by the persons on whom they are dependent. It thus abandons the
assumption of dependency accompanying any particular relational status that was the basis for the
original duty imposed on husbands.
We would suggest that the words “his spouse” in the Commission’s 1986 proposal be
changed to “his or her spouse, common law partner or registered partner living in the same
household.” This brings the relational definitions into line with Bill C-23’s approach and our
suggestion that a registered domestic partnership scheme be enacted for the purposes of federal
statutes. It is necessary to add a “living together” requirement to the duty owed by spouses and
partners to each other, since it is inconsistent with contemporary expectations to impose such a duty
upon the separation of spouses or partners.
Rather than use the phrase “family members living in the same household”, we would
suggest that the duty extend to “domestic relations living in the same household”. In this way, the
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duty will extend not only to relatives by blood, marriage, partnership or adoption. It will also extend to
other cohabitants in an economically and emotionally dependent relationship. And, finally, the
phrase “under his [or her] care” is appropriate because the duty ought to extend to institutional
custodians or caregivers and to persons who find themselves temporarily in circumstances where
another person’s life or health is in their hands.486

7.

Restructuring Financial Arrangements on the Break down of
Relationships of Caring and Commitment
(a)

Family support obligations

Bill C-23 does not affect the law of divorce. As a result, only formerly married couples will be
included within the corollary relief provisions of the Divorce Act. Couples who cohabit outside of
marriage, and non-conjugal couples who might also need assistance in the restructuring of their
financial relationships on relationship break down, are not covered by the federal Divorce Act. These
relationships may also be characterized by economic interdependency, and may also confer
economic advantages and disadvantages to the parties. When these relationships break down, an
argument can be made that an individual who has conferred economic advantages on the other
party should also be entitled to compensation for the disadvantages that he or she has incurred.
While opposite-sex conjugal couples may access provincial support regimes, same-sex couples
only have access in some provinces, and non-conjugal relationships are not generally included
within provincial support regimes.487
However, as discussed in the previous section, the federal government possesses limited
constitutional jurisdiction to legislate in this area. When the federal government has passed
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legislation that deals with the rights and responsibilities of common law partners, it has done so as
an incidental aspect of its jurisdiction in relation to some other federal constitutional matter, such as
immigration, pensions, and taxation. The federal government has no independent power to legislate
in relation to spousal and child support obligations, custody of and access to children, and the
division of property. Rather, federal legislation in relation to these matters is valid only as an
incidental aspect of federal jurisdiction in relation to the formation and termination of marital
relationships.488 As we suggested above, it might be possible to argue that the federal jurisdiction in
relation to marriage and divorce needs to evolve to reflect the demographic and normative
transformations in the ways that individuals live in conjugal relationships. If the federal government’s
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce was interpreted as including jurisdiction in relation to conjugal
couples, then this jurisdiction could include corollary relief issues – spousal and child support, child
custody and access. Notwithstanding the “living tree” principle of constitutional interpretation, it is
not likely that the courts would interpret the words “marriage” and “divorce” so broadly as to be
capable of supporting laws that deal with matters such as support obligations. Further, the federal
government could have no jurisdiction to deal with the support obligations of non-conjugal
relationships. These are matters that clearly fall outside federal jurisdiction in relation to marriage
and divorce and within exclusive provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights in the
province.
As discussed in the previous section, the federal government does have jurisdiction to
change the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples, who could then be included in the
corollary provisions of the Divorce Act, in relation to spousal support, child support, and child
custody and access.

(b)

488

Enforcement of Family Support Obligations

Section 91(26) of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives Parliament jurisdiction to pass laws in relation to “marriage and
divorce”.
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The federal statutes with provisions for the enforcement of family support obligations are
drafted broadly to include persons with support obligations. The Garnishment, Attachment and

Pension Diversion Act489 provides for garnishment and attachment of federal salaries, as well as the
diversion of pension benefits from federal sources to satisfy financial support orders, including any
support order made under the Divorce Act, or any provincial law relating to family support
obligations. The superannuation statutes similarly allow for pensions, annuities or amounts
otherwise payable under the statutes to be diverted to satisfy financial support orders in accordance
with the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act.490 The Family Orders and

Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act491 provides for the release of information that may assist in
locating persons in default of their support orders, as well as for the garnishment and attachment of
federal moneys to satisfy these orders, and the denial of federal licenses. The statutes are as broad
as the support obligations themselves – they include family support obligations under either federal
or provincial law.492 As such, the breadth of these enforcement provisions are directly related to the
breadth of these support obligations. To the extent that provincial law includes common law
opposite-sex couples, same-sex couples and/or other dependant relationships within their
provisions for support, then these family support obligations will be included with the enforcement
provisions of these federal statutes. Any question of extending the coverage to other adult
relationships not currently included, such as ‘a domestic relationship’ or ‘a close personal
relationship between persons who are not relatives’ is more appropriately a question for the law of
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support obligations (provincial and federal) as discussed in the section above. If the law of support
obligations was extended beyond its current scope (married spouses, common law opposite-sex
partners, and in some provinces, same-sex partners, and adult children in relation to their parents)
to include other familial or non-familial relationships, the federal enforcement provisions could and
should apply. 493

(c)

Division of Pensions on Relationship Break Down

The Canada Pension Plan Act, Pension Benefits Division Act and the Pension Benefits

Standards Act provide for a division of pension earnings between spouses and common law
partners when the relationship breaks down. Bill C-23, by including common law partners within
these provisions, recognizes that these relationships constitute economic partnerships, thereby
entitling the parties to share in the wealth generated during the relationship on relationship break
.down.
However, non-conjugal relationships are not covered by these statutes for the purposes of
division of pension entitlements. There is no recognition that non-conjugal relationships may be
characterized by economic interdependency, and no provision for the sharing in the wealth
generated during these relationships if and when these relationships break down. The question to
be addressed in evaluating this exclusion is whether these relationships ought to be recognized as
economic partnerships, or whether there is a legitimate reason for their exclusion.
While little consideration has been given to this exclusion in public policy debates, its
defence would lie in the argument that non-conjugal relationships are qualitatively different from
conjugal relationships. More specifically, the argument would focus on the differences in
commitment, and the reasonable expectations of the parties. Non-conjugal relationships might be
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said to not give rise to the same expectation of long-term commitment and mutual support. On the
break down of these relationships, then, there would be no expectation of continued financial
support, nor of sharing in the wealth generated during the relationship. The argument could also
rely on the exclusion of non-conjugal relationships from virtually all provincial family property
regimes.
In contrast, the argument in favour of inclusion would argue that non-conjugal relationships
may well involve the pooling of economic resources akin to the economic partnership model of
marriage, and may well involve the assumption of mutual support obligations. While not all nonconjugal relationships would be characterized by economic interdependency, the blanket exclusion
of all these couples with no ability to opt in to the private rights and responsibilities could be argued
to be too broad. At least some of the non-conjugal relationships do structure their relationships as a
economic partnership, and would be in a similar position as conjugal couples on the break down of
their relationships. The inability of the individuals within these relationships of economic
interdependency to share in any of the wealth generated by the relationship arguably lacks a rational
connection to the objectives of state legislation.494
One approach to inclusion of non-conjugal relationships for the purposes of pension division
would be by way of a registered domestic partnership regime. Individuals in non-conjugal
relationships could register their relationships, and thereby be entitled to the division of pension
earnings within these federal statutes. Inclusion would then only involve those individuals who have
chosen to designate their relationships as domestic relationships. It would be done on the basis of
self-designation, and would thereby meet most of the objections to the inclusion. Individuals with a
long-term commitment and with an expectation of sharing in the wealth generated by the partnership
would be included.
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The more difficult question is whether individuals in non-conjugal relationships who have not
registered their relationships as a domestic partnership should ever be included for the purposes of
pension division. If these individuals are not included through an ascribed relational status, there
would be a serious possibility of under-inclusiveness – some individuals may have a long term
commitment and an expectation to share in the wealth of the relationship, but do not register their
relationship, and would thereby be excluded. However, an ascribed relational status creates its own
risks, including a risk of over-inclusiveness. Ascribing relational status to non-conjugal cohabitants
who have not designated their relationships as domestic partnerships would risk including a range of
individuals who never intended to share in the wealth of the relationship.495 It would thereby risk
undermining the value of relational autonomy. Further, ascribing such relational status to nonconjugal couples for the purposes of pension division would go well beyond the kind of division of
property on relationship break down contemplated within provincial family law schemes, where the
law remains reluctant to even ascribe spousal status.496
It might be possible to ascribe relational status in a manner that establishes an appropriate
threshold for claims to division of pensions on relationship break down. In New South Wales for
examples, individuals in a domestic relationship may make an application for division of property on
relationship break down. But, the entitlement is not automatic – rather, the statute gives the courts
the discretion to make such orders as seem to the court just and equitable, having regard to the
contributions of the parties (both financial and non-financial). 497 However, in our view, the risks of
adding a definition of domestic partner to these provisions allowing for a division of benefits on
relationship break down outweighs the benefits. At this stage, the best option for responding to the
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legitimate claims of non-conjugal cohabitants is to put in place a registered domestic partnership
scheme, and then add registered partners to the provisions of the Canada Pension Plan Act, the

Pensions Benefits Division Act and the Pension Benefits Standards Act.

8.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the scope of federal legislation governing adult personal relationships has
steadily expanded over the past thirty years. In undertaking this expansion, Parliament has been
driven largely by its desire to bring legislation into line with the requirements of formal legal equality.
Law reform has come in three stages.
The first stage, characteristic of the early to mid-1970s, was a result of a drive to achieve
formal sex equality. Gender-specific statutory provisions were expunged from the statute books.
Rights and responsibilities that formerly could be claimed only by women or only by men were now
possessed by men and women alike. Of course, behind the surface appearance of gender equality,
a deeply gendered reality remained. One of the difficulties of accurately describing the contemporary
roles of federal statutes is that their gender-neutral surface alters and obscures their original
gendered objectives. The particular importance, for example, of pension survivors’ benefits or the
old age spousal allowances to elderly women is not a matter of historical interest only.
The second and third stages have resulted from Parliament's desire to eliminate
discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation respectively. The normative and
legal commitment to formal equality required that functionally equivalent relationships be treated
equally under the law. The second stage brought persons of the opposite sex within the legal
category of spouse if they lived together outside of marriage in relationships that were functionally
equivalent to marriage. This second stage elimination of marital status discrimination proceeded
haltingly from the 1950s through the 1990s. Common law opposite-sex couples were added to
federal pension and tax laws. Systematic progress did not occur until this year, with the expected
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passage of Bill C-23. Soon unmarried opposite-sex couples will have the same rights as married
couples in the vast majority of federal statutes.
In comparison, the third stage elimination of sexual orientation discrimination has advanced
remarkably quickly. The process that began in 1999 in employment pension statutes will soon be
largely complete with the passage of Bill C-23. The Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act
will expand the application of federal relational statutes to include same-sex couples, along with
unmarried opposite-sex couples, under the new label of common law partners. The second and third
stages of reform will be complete if the exclusion of unmarried conjugal relationships from a handful
of important statutes is addressed by Parliament, and if the same-sex marriage bar is removed. We
argued that the remaining statutory anomalies - including the Immigration Act, the Canada Evidence

Act and the Canada Shipping Act - need to be eliminated. There is no longer any compelling
justification for the exclusion of conjugal couples from the full range of federal statutes imposing
relational benefits and obligations. The inclusion of conjugal couples can be advanced in two ways.
First, those conjugal couples who are currently excluded from marriage - that is, same-sex couples ought to be given an opportunity to opt in to conjugal status. A government committed to the values
of equality and autonomy in intimate relationships ought to amend the definition of marriage to
include same-sex couples. However, given the continuing political resistance to this option, at a
minimum, the federal government ought to enact a registered domestic partnership scheme that
allows same-sex couples (among others) to opt into a new civil status entitling them to the full range
of federal rights and responsibilities extended to spouses.
These three stages of law reform designed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex,
marital status and sexual orientation have been the focus of Parliamentary attention to relational
statutes for several decades. The pattern has been to add a new layer of individuals or relationships
to the existing legislative schemes. In our view, this process of law reform by accretion has not
resulted in a serious interrogation of two questions that ought to give rise to fourth and fifth stages of
law reform in this area. The first is whether the underlying objectives of relational statutes remain
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legitimate. The second is whether relationships that lack a sexual component - and therefore may
not qualify as conjugal - ought to qualify for inclusion in a broader range of federal statutes.
Our review of federal legislation led us to conclude that there are in essence two legitimate
relational objectives being pursued by the state: the regulation of the formation and dissolution of
relationships, and the regulation of the consequences of relationships characterized by emotional
intimacy and economic interdependence. We discovered that the remarkable diversity of federal
statutes employing adult relational terms can be allocated to one or the other of these objectives. In
our view, these are both important state objectives. We have not called their legitimacy into
question. In most federal contexts, therefore, the issue is not whether relational objectives should be
abandoned. Rather, it is the scope of these laws - how they should define the relevant relationships
to which they should apply - that is at issue. Our analysis did identify a number of federal statutes
that employ relational terms in a manner that is no longer compelling or necessary to the pursuit of
the two valid relational objectives. The rules regulating spousal competence and compellability in
criminal trials, the monthly allowance in the Old Age Security Act, and the definitions of insurable
employment in the Employment Insurance Act are examples of federal laws that do not promote
legitimate relational objectives. We have suggested that these statutes should be amended to
remove relational terms altogether. Our analysis also indicates that a number of relational statutes
need to be updated to abandon outdated assumptions. Some statutes based on assumptions of
married women’s economic dependency, for example, have never been seriously re-examined.
They have simply been expanded to include individuals without discrimination on the basis of
gender, marital status or sexual orientation. The repeal and refinement of outdated relational
statutes is a fourth stage of law reform that remains to be accomplished (and needs to be
accomplished on an ongoing basis).
Our report also seeks to advance the conversation about the situation of non-conjugal
cohabitants. This group lacks a coherent identity. Their interests are not advanced by advocacy
organizations, nor has anti-discrimination law placed their issues on the legislative agenda. It is not
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clear whether living in a non-conjugal relationship is a ground of discrimination prohibited by human
rights statutes or the guarantee of legal equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These
differences in the political and legal resources available to non-conjugal cohabitants may help
explain their marginalized position in federal statutes. The question of principle that remains,
however, is whether these relationships have functional attributes worthy of greater recognition in
federal statutes. Non-conjugal relationships are currently included in a limited number of federal
statutes, in a manner that appears arbitrary and inconsistent. Moreover, with several notable
exceptions, the inclusion of non-conjugal relationships is limited to individuals living in a household
with others connected by recognized familial relationships, that is, by connections of blood,
marriage, adoption or, after Bill C-23, common law partnership. Bill C-23 does not deal with nonconjugal relationships generally, and thus, does nothing to remedy the perfunctory nature of the
treatment of non-conjugal relationships in current federal legislation.
In our view, a detailed examination of the objectives underlying many federal statutes yields
the conclusion that there are compelling reasons to include many persons living in non-conjugal
relationships of dependence or interdependence in federal laws. We are of the view that the best
option for inclusion is through the enactment of a registered domestic partnership scheme, which
would allow individuals in non-conjugal relationships to opt into the full package of relational rights
and responsibilities in federal legislation. A domestic partnership regime would advance all of the
fundamental values animating the regulation of adult relationships of caring and commitment:
equality, autonomy, security and privacy. Individuals could choose the status of their relationships,
and have this choice respected in law without undue intrusion into the intimate details of their lives.
The more difficult, and contentious issue is whether relational status should be ascribed to
individuals in non-conjugal relationships who do not opt into a domestic partnership scheme.
Ascribing relational status to individuals who have not opted in runs the risk of undermining the
values of autonomy and reasonable expectations, by imposing rights and responsibilities never
contemplated by the parties. However, as we have tried to highlight, this is not an entirely novel
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issue – federal legislation does currently ascribe relational status, and impose some rights and
responsibilities to individuals in non-conjugal relationships through such concepts as dependant,
associate and related persons. But, this is not an issue that can in any way be answered in the
abstract. Rather, as we have insisted, the inclusion of these relationships can only be evaluated on
a statute by statute, provision by provision basis. There is, in some circumstance, a compelling
case to be made for inclusion.
For example, we argued that there is a strong argument for broadening the inclusion of nonregistered, non-conjugal relationships in immigration law. The category of 'family class' already
includes a broad range of non-conjugal relationships, but does not allow for sponsorship of
individuals who are not related to each other. Given the seriousness of the sponsorship obligations
– including the potential for long term financial support – individuals ought to be given an opportunity
to decide for themselves who is sufficiently important to them (within the limits of a test for emotional
interdependency), and to voluntarily undertake responsibility for that person. In this sense, the
recognition of a broader range of relationships would be entirely consistent with the value of
relational autonomy.
Similarly, we are of the view that domestic relationships of emotional intimacy and economic
interdependency should be included within the privilege that attaches to private communications in
the Canada Evidence Act.

As for statutes concerned with the potential existence of shared

economic interest in interdependent relationships, we concluded that a compelling case can be
made for including domestic relationships, provided that presumptions against fair dealing between
the parties are made rebuttable.

In our consideration of statutes tailoring financial benefits and

penalties to recognize the consequences of relationships of economic dependence or
interdependence, we argued that there is a strong case to be made for including a broader range of
domestic relationships in the rules for determining eligibility for the guaranteed income supplement
of the Old Age Security Act. We argued that the current system needs to be revised so that the gap
between single and cohabitant rates is reduced and the presumptions regarding pooled income
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made rebuttable. These refinements are necessary to ensure that the scheme does not have the
perverse consequence of discouraging the formation of relationships of caring and commitment.
With these revisions in place, we argued that the statute can more effectively target need by
including a broad range of domestic relationships in its eligibility rules.
In the context of compensation for the loss of future economic or emotional support, there is
again a strong case to be made for defining the range of potential claimants broadly. For example,
we argued that including unregistered, non-conjugal relationships within s. 646 of the Canada

Shipping Act does no more than entitle an individual with the right to try to prove such a loss through
the introduction of evidence in a court proceeding. If no loss can be established, then none will be
awarded. Finally, in the context of preventing violence or abuse in adult personal relationships, we
were similarly of the view that it was entirely appropriate to include unregistered, non-conjugal
relationships within the ambit of section 215 of the Criminal Code dealing with the necessities of life.
However, there are other legislative contexts in which we believe that it would be less
appropriate to ascribe relationship status to individuals in non-registered, non-conjugal relationships.
Survivors’ benefits and division of pension earnings on relationship break down in pension
legislation are two examples of legislative contexts in which we believe that it would not be
appropriate to ascribe relationship status through a definition of domestic relationship. In these
contexts, the administrative complexities, the problems of overbreadth, and the risks to relational
autonomy outweigh the advantages of inclusion. It is quite possible that this conclusion could
change over time, as more and more non-conjugal relationships come to be included in the web of
federal legislation, creating a different and higher set of expectations amongst individuals within
these relationships. However, at this stage, the best option would be to create a means by which
individuals in these relationships could opt to have their relationships recognized (domestic
partnership registration), allowing these individuals to choose to be included within these statutory
provisions.
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In returning then, to the scenario with which we began – of the two individuals who have lived
together for 15 years in a close emotional and economic relationship of caring and commitment –
the question of their inclusion in the web of federal legislation can only be answered conditionally
and contextually. If they have chosen to express their commitment to care for each other through
marriage or registered partnership, then, yes, they should be included in all federal relational
statutes. If they have lived together in a conjugal relationship for at least a year, after Bill C-23 they
will be included in the vast majority of federal statutes as common law partners. But what if they
have not chosen to formalize their non-conjugal relationship through registered partnership or
marriage? Should their relationship nevertheless be included in rules regulating conflict of interests?
Yes, provided that the rules allow assumptions of shared economic interests to be rebutted. Should
they have a legal obligation to provide for one another? It depends. For the purposes of criminal
sanctions of failing to provide the necessaries of life? Yes, if they still live together and one is wholly
dependent on the other. On relationship break down? Yes, if they are married. If they are common
law partners, registered partners, or living in a domestic relationship, the answer is likely well beyond
the scope of federal jurisdiction. Should the state provide financial relief if their household income is
suddenly diminished as a result of disability, retirement or death? In many cases the answer is no
since the group of unregistered non-conjugal cohabitants is too diverse to justify broad
presumptions of dependence or interdependence. The answer might be yes if the nature of the
statutory scheme enables the isolation of situations - through an adjudicative or administrative
process - where a real relational loss has occurred.
What is clear is that the answers to these questions can no longer be answered simply by
whether or not the individuals were married. Marriage is no longer an appropriate proxy for marking
those relationships deserving of legal recognition. Nor can the question be answered simply by
reference to whether or not they are living in a marriage-like or conjugal relationship. The question of
the appropriate scope for the legal regulation of adult personal relationships now requires a far more
complex series of inquiries into the objectives and assumptions of the statutory provisions.
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Moreover, the distinction between conjugal and non-conjugal relationships is becoming less and
less clear, and can no longer serve as the basis for determining entitlements and obligations across
the board. Rather, as we have argued throughout this paper, federal statutory provisions need to be
examined on a statute by statute, objective by objective basis. And there is a compelling case to be
made in many contexts to expand the scope of federal regulation to include non-conjugal couples.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the process of rethinking federal legislation, and
expanding the scope of federal regulation is precisely that – a process. And as such, the process is
likely to be evolutionary. The inclusion of non-conjugal relationships in some legislative contexts
and not others will no doubt have to be re-evaluated in the future. Much like the progressive
inclusion of conjugal couples within federal legislation, it may well be that in the future, the values of
equality, autonomy, privacy and security will require a more complete inclusion. Or perhaps not.
The legal regulation of non-conjugal relationships remains relatively uncharted territory, and there is
little reason to believe that the conclusions reached today will withstand, without further amendment,
the test of time.
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Appendix A:
Origins and Evolution of Definitions of Common
Law Spouses in Federal Legislation
Marital Model: Spouse and related terms referred to wives and, sometimes, husbands. Common
law couples were not recognized. Before the 1950s, this was the dominant model (departed from
only in the case of common law spouses of men in the armed forces in the Pension Act of 1919). Its
dominance was eroded beginning in the 1950s in pension statutes. The definition of spouse as
husbands and wives has been revived by Bill C-23 just as the exclusivity of marriage as a policy
device has been rejected.

Model #1 (up to 1970s): Decision-makers had discretion to deem a woman to be a surviving widow
if she established that she had "been maintained" and "publicly represented by the contributor as the
spouse of the contributor" for seven years (if either the deceased or the claimant were married to
someone else) or for an unspecified "number of years" (if neither was married).
Comment: This gender-specific definition of common law spouses responds to women’s actual (not
presumed) dependence. It creates a discretionary entitlement in contrast to the rights of wives. The
onus is on the claimant to establish the relevant facts, which include a lengthy period of
cohabitation. The definition reflects deep ambivalence about recognizing women in common law
relationships at all.

Model #2 (1970s): Like model #1, the entitlement of common law cohabitants is discretionary. The
dependency (“been maintained”) requirement is dropped, and the number of years of required
cohabitation is reduced to three if the contributor was married and one if not.
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Comment: The entitlement is rendered gender neutral. The unstructured discretion of decisionmakers and the onus on the claimant remains. This definition indicates a grudging move towards
greater recognition of women (and men) living in opposite-sex relationships outside of marriage.

Model #3 (1970s-1990s): The duration of required cohabitation is reduced to one year in all cases.
Public representation as husband and wife is required and the entitlement is discretionary.
Comment: Shorter period of cohabitation but discretionary nature of entitlement keeps common law
spouses in a second-class legal position compared to married spouses.

Model #4 (1980s-1990s): A spouse is defined as a person of the opposite sex who is cohabiting
with the contributor in a conjugal relationship at the time of the contributor’s death, having so
cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period of at least one year (in some statutes, the
requirement of public representation as husband and wife is retained in place of the conjugal
requirement).
Comment: The discretionary nature of the entitlement in the previous models is repealed.
Entitlement now follows from recognition just as it does for married spouses. Represents a
significant step forward in eliminating marital status discrimination.

Model #5 (1999-2000): This model was first adopted in the definition of survivor added to a number
of pension statutes by the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34. It was
extended to most federal statutes dealing with the rights of spouses by the Modernization of Benefits

and Obligations Act, 2000. As in the marital model, spouse is a term restricted to husbands and
wives. Common law partners are included alongside spouses in federal statutes. "Common law
partner" is defined as "a person who is cohabiting with the contributor in a conjugal relationship" at
the time of the contributor’s death, "having so cohabited with the contributor for a continuous period
of at least one year."
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Comment: Bill C-23 removes opposite sex common law couples from the definition of spouse in
pension statutes and the Income Tax Act. It creates a new status of common law partner that has
the effect of adding same-sex couples to federal statutes and extending the inclusion of oppositesex common law couples beyond pension and tax laws. Model #5 represents a significant step
forward in eliminating discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation in the
distribution of burdens and benefits. However, its terminology is regressive.

YEAR THAT COMMON LAW SPOUSES INCLUDED
IN CURRENT STATUTES PRIOR TO BILL C-23

Statute

Model #1

Model #2

Model #3

Model #4

Model #5

Canada Pension Plan498

1966

1974

1986

2000

Canadian Forces Superannuation Act499

1959

1975

1992

1999

Defence Services Pension Continuation Act500

1955

1975

1993

1999

Income Tax Act501

1993

2000

Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances Act502 – M.P.s

1995

1999
2000

- P.M.

Old Age Security Act 503 – spousal allowance
– guaranteed income supplement

1975504

1985

2000

1998

2000

498

Canada Pension Plan, S.C. 1964-65, c.51, s.56; An Act to amend the Canada Pension Plan, 1974-75-76, c.4, s.30; R.S.C. 1985, c.30 (2nd
Supp.), s.1; Bill C-23, s.42.

499

Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, S.C. 1959, c.21, s.12(4); S.C. 1974-75-76, c.81, s.39(3); S.C. 1992, c. 46, s. 43; Public Sector Pension
Investment Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34.

500

Defence Services Pension Continuation Act, S.C. 1955, c.28, s.15; S.C. 1974-75-76, c.81, s.51; S.C. 1992, c.46, s.86; Public Sector Pension
Investment Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.207.

501

S.C. 1994, c.7, Sch. VIII (1993, c.24), subsec. 140(3); Bill C-23, s.141.

502

Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances Act, S.C. 1992, c. 46, s. 81; S.C. 1995, c.30, s.4 and s.13; Public Sector Pension Investment Board
Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.224; Bill C-23, s.179.

219

Pension Act505

1919506

1975

2000

Pension Benefits Division Act507

1992

2000

Pension Benefits Standards Act508

1986

2000

Public Service Superannuation Act509

1953

1975

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Continuation Act510

1992

1999

1992

1999

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act511

1959

1975

1992

1999

War Veterans Allowance Act512

1961

1974

1990

2000513

503

504
505

506

Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.O-9; S.C. 1974-75-76, c.58, s.1(2); R.S.C. 1985, c.34 (1st supp.), s.1(1); S.C. 1998, c.21, ss.108-11; Bill C23, s.192.
Unlike other uses of model #2, the 1975 Old Age Security Act definition gave rise to an automatic entitlement.

Pension Act, S.C.1919, c.43, s.33(3); S.C. 1970-71-72, c.22 (2nd supp.), s.1(2); S.C. 1974-75-76, c.66, s.14; S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c.19, s.14(4);
S.C. 1990, c.43, s.21; S.C. 1995, c.18, s.64; Bill C-23, s.211.
The 1919 Pension Act, and 1980 and 2000 amendments to the Act, do not fit the models neatly, since they all require cohabitation for an
unspecified $reasonable time” and the entitlement remains discretionary throughout.

507

Pension Benefits Division Act, S.C. 1992, c. 46; Bill C-23, s.243.

508

Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2nd Supp.), s.2(1); Bill C-23, s.254(1).

509

Public Service Superannuation Act, S.C. 1952-53, c.47, s.12(4); 1974-75-76, c.81, s.9; S.C. 1992, c.46, s.13; Public Sector Pension Investment
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.53.

510

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension Continuation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-10; S.C. 1992, c.46, s.91; Public Sector Pension Investment Board
Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.216.
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Royal Canadian Mounted Police Superannuation Act, S.C. 1959, c.34, s.13(4); 1974-75-76, c.81, s.60; S.C. 1992, c. 46, s. 72; Public Sector
Pension Investment Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.169(2).
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War Veterans Allowance Act, S.C. 1961, c.39, s.2(3); S.C. 1974, c.8, s.3(7); S.C. 1975, c.66, s.24; S.C. 1990, c.43, s.32(6); Bill C-23, s.317(10).
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The reform of the War Veterans Allowance Act has consistently lagged behind the other federal pension statutes. The entitlement of common law
spouses has remained discretionary, although this will no longer be the case if Bill C-23 is enacted (dropped by the other statutes when they
adopted model #4). Remarriage by a common law partner still terminates entitlement (even after Bill C-23), although this is no longer the case in
the other pension statutes.

Appendix B
Summary of Amendments to Federal Statutes in Bill C-23,
the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act
1.

Statutory provisions that previously applied to married spouses only, that after Bill C-23 will
apply to married spouses and common law partners

Statute

Section

Bill C-23 section

Bank Act

s.283(1)(e) associate of the offeror includes spouse

s.4

Bank Act

s.486(1) related party includes spouse

s.7

Bank Act

s.496(5) and (6) when loans to spouses of senior officers permitted

s.5

Bank Act

s.675(3) fine should reflect proceeds of offence received by spouse or
other dependant

s.6

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.4(2) “related persons” includes marriage

s.9

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.113(3) spouse of bankrupt cannot vote for trustee or inspectors

s.13

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.121(4) spousal support a provable claim, not released by discharge

s.14

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.137(2) spouse or former spouse cannot claim wages before other
creditors

s.15

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.138 family claims (including married spouses) for wages cannot be
preferred

s.16

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.178(1) discharge in bankruptcy does not release the bankrupt from
liability for spousal or child support

s.18

Business Development Bank of
Canada Act

s.31 “interested person” includes spouse

s.26
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Canada Business Corporations Act

s.2(1) defines “associate” as including spouse

s.27

Canadian Cooperatives Act

s.2(1) defines “associate” as including spouse

s.28

Canada Corporations Act

s.100(1) defines “associate” as including spouse

s.29

Canada Elections Act

s.15(1) anti-nepotism clause prohibits hiring of spouse

s.31

Carriage by Air Act

sch. 2, s.1 relational tort claim; includes liability to husband or wife

s.73

Citizenship Act

s.5(1.1)

s.74, s.75

Cooperative Credit Associations Act

s.410(1)(c) related party includes spouse

s.86

Cooperative Credit Associations Act

s.466(3) fine should reflect proceeds of offence received by spouse or
other dependant

s.85

Corporations Returns Act

s.2(1) related group includes marriage

s.87

Criminal Code

s.215 duty to provide necessaries to spouse

s.93

Criminal Code

s.423(1) intimidation through threats to spouse an offence

s.95

Criminal Code

s.718.2 spousal abuse a factor in sentencing

s.95

Criminal Code

s.738(1) restitution order may include moving expenses of A “spouse”
and member of household if harmed or threatened

s.95

Criminal Code

s.810 may lay an information when fear of harm to spouse

s.95

Customs Act

s.45(3)(a) “related persons” includes marriage

s.96

Diplomatic Service (Special)
Superannuation Act

s.5(9) death benefit to spouse

s.100

Excise Tax Act

s.2(2.2) references definition in Income Tax Act

s.140, Sch.2, s.10

Excise Tax Act

s.325 transactions between spouses not arm's length

s.112, Sch.1, s.1

Governor General’s Act

s.7, s.8 death benefit to spouse

s.127, s.128

Insurance Companies Act

s.307(1)(d) associate of the offeror includes spouse

s.154

Insurance Companies Act

s.518(1) related party includes spouse

s.158

Insurance Companies Act

s.529 when loans to spouses of senior officers permitted

s.155
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Insurance Companies Act

s.706(3) fine should reflect proceeds of offence received by spouse or
other dependant

s.157

Judges Act

s.40 moving expenses for surviving spouse

s.160

Judges Act

s.44, ss.46-9 survivor benefits to spouse

ss.162-7

Lieutenant Governors
Superannuation Act

s.2 definition of survivor added

s.170

Lieutenant Governors
Superannuation Act

ss.7-9 survivor benefits to spouse

ss.171-5

Members of Parliament Retiring
Allowances Act

s.49 survival benefits to spouse of former Prime Minister

s.180

Special Import Measures Act

s.2(3) related persons includes married persons

s.291

Trust and Loan Companies Act

s.288(1) associate of the offeror includes spouse

s.299

Trust and Loan Companies Act

s.474(1) related party includes spouse

s.302

Trust and Loan Companies Act

s.484 when loans to spouses of senior officers permitted

s.300

Trust and Loan Companies Act

s.534(3) fine should reflect proceeds of offence received by spouse or
other dependant

s.301

224

2.

Statutory provisions that previously applied to married spouses and common law
heterosexual couples, that after Bill C-23 will apply to married spouses and common law
partners

Statute

Section

Bill C-23 section

Agricultural Marketing Program Act

s.3(2) presumption against arm’s length transactions if ’cohabiting’ or
married

s.2 adds common
law partners

Canada Pension Plan

amended to include common law partners throughout

s.42-65

Employment Insurance Act

s.5 employment not insurable if not at arm’s length

sch.2, s.10

Income Tax Act

amended to restrict spouse to married persons, and to include common
law partners throughout

ss.130-146,
Schedule 2

Old Age Security Act

s.12 calculation of entitlement to guaranteed income supplement

s.207

Old Age Security Act

Entitlement to spousal allowance

ss.195-202

Pension Act

Survivor benefit’s to spouse

ss.212-240

Pension Benefits Division Act

Amended to include common law partners throughout

ss.243-253

Pension Benefits Standards Act

s.2(1) spouse redefined to remove common law couples; definition of
common law partner added, and implemented throughout the Act

ss.254-264

War Veterans Allowance Act

s.2(1) spouse redefined to remove common law couples; definition of
common law partner added, and implemented throughout the Act

ss.317-337
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3.

Statutory provisions that apply to married spouses and common law partners that will not
be amended by Bill C-23

Statute

Section

1. Canadian Forces Superannuation Act

see definition of survivor in s.29(1) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.136

2. Defence Services Pension Continuation Act

see definition of survivor in s.32(1) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.214

3. Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances
Act

see definition of survivor in s.2(1) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.224

4. Public Service Superannuation Act

see definition of survivor in s.25(4) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.75

5. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Pension
Continuation Act

see definition of survivor in s.25.1 enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.222

6. Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Superannuation Act

see definition of survivor in s.18(1) enacted by Public Sector Pension Investment
Board Act, S.C. 1999, c.34, s.185

226

4.

Statutory provisions that apply only to married spouses that will not be amended
by Bill C-23

Statute

Section

Canada Evidence Act

s.4 rules regarding competence and compellability of spouses, and marital communications
privilege

Canada Shipping Act

s.645 dependants entitled to bring wrongful death action for maritime tort includes A ‘wife,
husband'

Canada Shipping Act

schedule 6, c.1, art. 3 claims by 'dependants' of employees governed by contract

Criminal Code

s.159(2) married persons under the age of 18 are exempt from the anal intercourse offence

Criminal Code

s.307(2) defamatory libel can extend to statements made in debates of House of Commons
regarding marriage or divorce

Employment Insurance Act

s.133 subject to privilege in s.4(3) of Canada Evidence Act, spouse is competent and
compellable regarding offence of false statement

Immigration Act

s.2(1) dependant includes spouse; member of family class includes spouse and fiancé(e)
s.6(1) immigrant who meets all selection standards and dependants entitled to landing
s.6(2) sponsorship of family class

Special Retirement Arrangement
Act

s.22

Young Offenders Act

s.9(4) notice of arrest and detention of young offender may go to married spouse instead of
parent
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5.

Statutory provisions that use other household, family or relational definitions that will be
amended by Bill C-23

Statute

Section

Bill C-23 section

Agricultural Marketing Programs Act

s.3(2) if cohabiting or related by blood, adoption, marriage, presumed
to be not at arm’s length unless proven to the contrary

ss.2-3:
presumption
extended to CLPs

Bank Act

s.283(1)(f) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’

s.4 adds CLPs

Business Development Bank of Canada
Act

s.33 applicant must disclose ’interested person’; Board approval of
assistance necessary

s.26 adds CLPs

Canada Business Corporations Act

s.2(1)(f) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’

s.27 adds CLPs

Canada Cooperatives Act

s.2(1) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’

s.28 adds CLPs

Canada Corporations Act

s.100(1) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’

s.29 adds CLPs

Insurance Companies Act

s.307(1)(f) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’

s.154 adds CLPs

Trust and Loan Companies Act

s.288(1)(f) associate includes ’relative’ with ’same residence’

s.299 adds CLPs

Visiting Forces Act

s.2 definition of dependant replaced; now defined as ’a person who
forms part of a member’s household and depends on the member for
support’

s.316
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6.

Statutory provisions that use other household, family or relational definitions that will not be
amended by Bill C-23

Statute

Section

Canada Labour Code

s.210(1) bereavement leave entitlement on death of employee’s ’immediate family’ member

Corrections and Conditional Release
Act

s.71(1) in order to promote relationships, reasonable contact, including visits with ’family,
friends and other persons’, should be encouraged

Criminal Code

s.91(5), s.94(5), s.113(1) exemption to firearms offences if used ’to sustain the person’s family’

Criminal Code

s.121(1) bribery includes offer to ’any member of [an official’s] family’

Criminal Code

s.186(2) can wiretap solicitor’s residence if ’member of the household’ is suspected of criminal
activity

Criminal Code

s.264(2) criminal harassment includes threatening ’any member of their family’

Criminal Code

s.423(1) intimidation aimed at ’relatives’ is an offence

Criminal Code

s.632 judge can excuse juror who has ’relationship’ with accused (not defined)

Criminal Code

s.738(1) restitution order may be made to cover moving expenses if ’any member of the
household’ harmed or threatened

Excise Act

s.176(1) exemption for brewing beer for family consumption

Excise Act

s.227 exemption for tobacco ’for use of family’ on farm

Firearms Act

s.112(2) exemption to offence if used to sustain the person’s family

Investment Canada Act

s.3 ’voting group’ includes 2 or more persons in a ’personal relationship’ who ’would ordinarily
be expected to act together’

National Defence Act

s.117 offence to receive gifts etc. ’by or through any member of his family’

Special Import Measures Act

s.2 question of fact whether persons not related to each other were at ’arm’s length’; irrebutable
presumption that related persons are not

Territorial Lands Act

s.20(4) eviction order can require removal of ’all members of that person’s family’
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Witness Protection Program Act

s.2 ’witness’ means a person who may require protection ’because of their relationship or
association’ with a witness

Young Offenders Act

s.16.2, s.24.1, s.26.2 sentencing should take into account accessibility to ’family’

7. Statutory provisions that previously employed relational terms that will be repealed by (or use of relational
terms removed by) Bill C-23
Statute

Section

Bill C-23 section

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.91(3) settlements made within one year of bankruptcy void unless made
before and in consideration of marriage

s.11 repealed

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.92 covenants or contracts made in consideration of marriage

s.12 repealed

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.93 payments of money that are void against the trustee

s.12 repealed

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

s.177 transactions made in consideration of marriage

s.17 repealed

Bridges Act

s.14 liability to any person including the wife or husband

s.25 relational terms
deleted

Criminal Code

s.23(2) married persons cannot be accessories after the fact for providing
comfort, assisting escape

s.92 repealed

Criminal Code

s.329(1) theft does not apply to property of cohabiting husband and wife

s.94 repealed

